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The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how my research promotes knowledge 
exchange about my overarching research theme: the rights, status and capacity of 
distinct categories of individuals in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law.  
These categories include disempowered individuals (namely young people and 
transsexuals) and persons of reduced or questionable legal capacity (to date, 
children and disabled people).   
 
The thesis is in two parts.  Part 1 (Volume I) is a reflective commentary and Part 2 
(Volume II) comprises the published work submitted. In the reflective commentary, 
my published work is critically appraised and placed within a wider legal and 
thematic framework.  My overarching research theme is summarised and evaluated 
with reference to the legal premises, methodology and the research outcomes of my 
published work.    
   
In particular, I present a critical reflection of eight of my publications, each of 
which is concerned with the impact of the law, and issues surrounding legal reform, 
upon the young and certain disempowered adults. I demonstrate that this body of 
work forms a contribution to interdisciplinary sharing of novel and meaningful 
research outputs both (i) within the academic arena and (ii) throughout the wider 
professional community. 
 
I argue that my published work is original, because it is concerned with important, 
but largely neglected, areas of Scottish (and often wider UK) law.  Furthermore, I 
argue that my publications are independent and significant in that they provide a 
distinct and critical evaluation of existing law and seek to promote the growth of 
individual status and capacity.  This, in turn, often generates greater provision for 
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     Thesis Introduction 
 
(I) An Era of Change in the Individual’s Rights, Status and Capacity in Scots 
Law 
 
In the course of the last three decades there has been tremendous momentum for legal 
change in Scotland.  In particular, the general approach of Scots (and wider-UK1) law 
towards a range of previously disadvantaged groups of individual has been radically 
reformed.    
 
Nowhere is this reform more evident than in the personal lives and interactions of 
individuals.  The creation, or growth, of personal rights, status and capacity for 
particular groups in society has been a significant Scottish reform theme: in a 30-year 
period, legislation has, for example, afforded children with capacity a “right” to have 
their views taken and considered in various circumstances, provided recognition and 
remedies for cohabitants, improved the status of unmarried fathers, created broad 
parity between civil partners and spouses, reformed adoption law and increased 
available civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic abuse.2  This extensive, 
if at times precipitous, process of reform is set to continue.  In 2014, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (also referred to in this thesis as “the 
UNCRC”, or “the Convention”) is likely to assume greater significance in Scots 
Law.3  The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill (2014), recently passed, 
also makes provision for same-sex marriage.4 
  
However, while some areas of our law (such as Child and Family Law) have been 
substantially re-written and harmonised5 in recent years, in other fields (such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arguably, in Scots Child and Family Law, much of this reform began in the areas of my research with 
the Scottish Law Commission reports on (i) Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils 
2 Key pieces of legislation relating to the reform areas mentioned include: Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Act 1991; Children (Scotland) Act 1995; Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006; Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 (UK-wide legislation); Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007; Domestic Abuse 
(Scotland) Act 2011. For an overview of the work of the Scottish Parliament in this area, see Sutherland, 
E.E. (2011), ‘Child and Family Law: Progress and Pusillanimity’, chapter in Elaine E. Sutherland et al, 
Law Making and the Scottish Parliament: The Early Years, Edinburgh University Press, at pp 58-83. 
3 The Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill was passed on 19 Feb 2014, bill and supporting 
information available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/62233.aspx 
4 Marriage and Civil Partnership Bill (published 12 December 2012 and passed on 4 February 2014) and 
supporting documentation available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/12/9433.   
5 The aim of, for example, the Scottish Law Commission in its Report on Family Law (see note 1 above), 
when the Commission called for a unified and “comprehensive code” on Scots Private Family Law has 
been achieved (certainly, since the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 came into force). 
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Delict and Education Law) legal provision remains outdated, inconsistent or 
uncertain.   
 
My overarching research theme concerns the emergence, recognition and 
development in law of rights, status and capacity for certain groups, or categories of 
individual, in contemporary society. These groups, whether comprising young 
people, disabled people or disempowered adults, are united by a common theme: the 
creation, or cultivation, of contemporary rights, legal status and capacity. These three 
concepts, which are interconnected in theory and practice, and in law and society, are 
discussed below.   
 
(II) Conceptual Framework of Critical Analysis: Rights, Status and Capacity 
 
In subsections (a), (b) and (c) below, the three, interconnected, concepts of “rights”, 
“status” and “capacity” are explored and developed. My work is contextualised 




Defining rights  
 
“Lawyers lean heavily on the connected concepts of legal right and legal 
obligation… [which] we take… as a sound basis for making claims and 
demands… But our understanding of these concepts is remarkably 
fragile”.6  
 
When lawyers speak of rights, we generally mean legal rights, although, as both 
Hohfeld and Dworkin observe, we “fall into trouble when” when attempting to 
unravel what we mean by “rights”, or “legal rights”, any further than this. 7 
Consequently, while laws provide mechanisms across a broad range of fields 
(including Child and Family law) through which personal legal rights are recognised 
and enforced, there is little discussion amongst practitioners about the origin and 
meaning of these rights. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Dworkin R, (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, p 14; Hohfeld, WH, ‘Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 4378 (available: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5383&context= 
fss_papers), at p 724. 
7 Ibid.  
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Notwithstanding this, there is a significant literature concerning rights, spanning 
generations, continents – and disciplines. The notion that individual rights exist can be 
dated in the UK from as early as the Magna Carta (1215) and, later, the Bill of Rights 
(1689).8  Rights have borne a variety of definitions over time. Such definitions range 
from the sensational (“nonsense upon stilts”; “an inconvenience”) to the prosaic 
(“claims or entitlements”).9  Scholars disagree on a number of issues, including, for 
example: (i) can rights can ever be fully defined and, if so, with reference to which 
constant(s)?; (ii) do rights only exist in terms of an unconditional, corresponding (and 
enforceable) duty?; (iii) are wider philosophical issues concerning “permission, power 
and immunity” core to understanding rights?; (iv) what is the nature of the difference 
between a moral and a legal right? 10  The reader emerges from a broad review of the 
literature with an overwhelming sense of having journeyed over margins of time, place, 
perspective and semantics.  
 
Pre-20th century literature that we would today recognise as concerning rights 
belonged principally to philosophers and renowned theorists.11 They wrote as lovers 
of personal freedoms, believing that their essays about the “struggle between Liberty 
and Authority” might one day contribute to change.12 Throughout the 20th century, 
rights-driven discussion and debate rapidly gathered momentum. It did so through a 
range of contemporary movements (e.g. the civil rights’ movement, feminism, 
children’s rights13) fuelled by activists, writers and scholars. Accordingly, in place of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See (i) ‘The Great Charter’ at: http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/document/index.html#, and (i) 
the Bill of Rights at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2/introduction. See also 
Kant I, (1793 / 2013), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Print on Demand: ReadaClassic.com.  
9 Quotes taken, respectively, from (i) Bentham (see note 11 below), (ii) Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it 
remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, at p 
8 and (iii) Cameron E, (2012),‘What you can do with rights’, European Human Rights Law Review, 2, 
147-159, at 147. 
10 See, e.g., Spector H, (2009),‘Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights’, chapter in Baurmann 
M and Lahno B, Perspectives in Moral Science, 355 – 371; MacCormick N, (1976 / reprinted 1982), 
‘Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Rights’, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in 
Legal and Political Philosophy, Clarendon Press, 154-166; Campbell, K, "Legal Rights", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.): 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/legal-rights/; Dworkin (1977), Taking Rights 
Seriously, London: Duckworth.  
11 See Bentham J, (1843), ‘Anarchial Fallacies’ in J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
2:489–534, London: Murray, as cited in Bentham, J (1782 / 1970), Of Laws in General (along with many 
of his other discussions of rights) in Hart HLA (ed.), London: Athlone Press.  
12 Quotes taken from chapter 1 (p 2) On Liberty, (1859 / 1998, Longman), the work of Bentham’s 
student, John Stuart Mill. Both Mill and Bentham focused their writings upon adults.  
13 See, e.g., Federle KH (1994), ‘Rights flow downhill’, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 2 
343-368; Eekelaar J, (1986), ‘The Emergence of Children's Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
6(2), 161–182; Cassidy C, (2007), Thinking Children, Continuum International; Grigolo M, (2003), 
‘Sexualities and the ECHR: introducing the universal sexual legal subject’, European Journal of 
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the more historic rights-discourse of ideas and ideals, the modern rights-discourse 
was concerned with emerging realities – and at times radical reform. Rights were 
transformed into something demanding immediate attention, whether in support of,14 
or opposition to,15 one group or another. Likewise, questions about the political, 
social and legal recognition of rights became more focused.16  
 
Since the middle of the 20th century, rights also became a matter of growing 
international importance, commonality in State approach and (significantly) 
governmental accountability. Many States ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”), a treaty concerned with all 
mankind, regardless of “sex, race… religion… national[ity]… or other status”.17  Our 
human rights are recognised as forming part of our “inherent dignity”; they are “equal 
and inalienable rights [for] all members of the human family”.18 State parties to the 
ECHR are expected to safeguard and uphold the ECHR rights in their jurisdiction, 
thus ensuring that “human rights” are also recognised as being “legal rights”. 
 
Accordingly, in the UK, the language of rights has featured increasingly in legislative 
provisions relating to specific statutory rights and corresponding legal duties.  The 
Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force over a decade ago,19 incorporated the 
rights outlined in the ECHR into UK law. This enabled citizens to directly access 
their rights in domestic courts. The 1998 Act cemented the broad, contemporary view 
that rights should be a readily accessible – and legally enforceable – reality.  Some 
scholars have, however, taken the view that growing “adult” human rights observance 
does not necessarily facilitate children’s rights observance.20   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Law, 14(5), 1023-1044; O’Flaherty and Fisher J, (2008), ‘Sexual orientation, gender 
identity and international Human Rights law: contextualizing the Yogyakarta principles’, Human Rights 
Law Review, 8(2), 207-248.  
14 For a helpful overview of what we can learn in wider society “each time we let in an excluded group” 
in terms of the expansion of our “[ways] of knowing and… our current way of seeing”, see Menkel-
Meadow C, (1987), Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the 
Law, 42 Miami Law Review 29 -53 at p 52. 
15 See, e.g., Tushnet M, (1984), ‘An Essay on Rights’ 62 Texas Law Review 1384, and, O’Neill O, 
(1998), ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’, Ethics, 98, 445-46; Guggenheim M, (2005), What’s 
wrong with children’s rights? Harvard University Press. 
16 For contemporary rights-based discussions concerning children, see Chapter 1, Section 1.3. below. 
17 Words taken from Article 14 of the ECHR. There are currently 47 Member States (and 6 observer 
States, including the United States and Canada): http://hub.coe.int/. 
18 Quote taken from the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  
19 Also referred to as ‘the 1998 Act’, which came into force on 2 October 2000. 
20 See, e.g. Fortin J, (2006), ‘Accommodating Children’s Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era’, The 
Modern Law Review, (69(3)) 299-326. 
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The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (the “UNCRC” or “the Convention”) 
represented a further, and significant, landmark where the rights of the young are 
concerned. The Convention is widely ratified, and it “codifies a recognisable cannon 
of thought about the rights of children.”21  This is particularly significant, for:  
 
“the rights given to children in the UNCRC are the rights that we – at 
least the ‘we’ of Western liberal democratic post-Enlightenment  societies 
– now think it is important to give children” 22 
 
Thus, the significance of the UNCRC lies in its representation of the child himself or 
herself as a valid subject (or bearer) of rights, including “having agency and… having 
a voice that must be listened to.”23  As Sutherland observes:  
 
“It is one thing to be acknowledged by the legal system as an object of 
protection.  It is quite another to be recognised as a person with rights.”24 
 
The UNCRC aims to do just this: to distinguish, or characterise, the child as a 
individual to whom specific, personal rights belong.  In possessing these Convention 
rights, and in having these rights acknowledged in the legal systems of States Parties, 
children acquire a recognised legal status.25 Thus, in contemporary UK law, both 
adults and children possess a range of legal rights and are owed corresponding legal 
obligations. 
  
Yet, for all this, “rights” themselves remain abstract as a concept, and their meaning, 
impact and proper context is an enduring source of debate. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that one of the dominant themes found in the literature is a lack of consensus 
about the basics: what rights are and exactly “what you can do with rights”.26  In more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), London Routledge, at p 58. All States, 
save the USA and Somalia have ratified the UNCRC.  See also, Fortin J, (2003), Children’s Rights and 
the Developing Law, (2nd ed.), LexisNexis/Butterworths, chapter 2. 
22 Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood, ibid, at p 58. 
23 Ibid, at chapter 9, p 125. Article 12 of the Convention is discussed more fully in chapter 1 below. 
24 Sutherland, E.E, Child and Family Law, 2nd ed., Thomson / W Green, p 145. 
25 Certainly, the contemporary view concerning children is that they may hold the status of “independent 
social actors within the social moral, political and economic constraints of society”, James and James 
(2012), at p 5. See also Archard (2004), supra. For a historic overview of the child’s considered (and 
greatly reduced) status, see Locke J, Thoughts, at 81, available in the following volume: Axtell JL 
(editor), (1960), The Educational Writings of John Locke, Cambridge University Press. Legal status is 
discussed more fully in the main text below. 
26 Cameron E, (2012),‘What you can do with rights’, European Human Rights Law Review, 2, 147-159; 
Sreenivasan G, (2005), ‘A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 25, 257–
274.  
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recent decades, a positive scholarly view of this “conceptual fuzziness” 27  has 
emerged. Legal theorists have suggested that the “woolliness” surrounding rights is 
something that reflects, rather accurately, the “incommensurabilities with which life 
abounds”.28  In other words, perhaps we should embrace the impossibility that rights 
can precisely be defined or measured with reference to any agreed benchmark.  They 
simply reflect truths at the core of who we are and what we are driven to champion. 
Rights therefore endure as flexible and necessary things, capable of empowering 
“rights-bearers”29 in any era or civilization to be:  
 
“Agents… decision-makers… people who can negotiate with others, who 
are capable of altering relationships or decisions, who can shift social 
assumptions and constraints.”30 
 
Contemporary writers broadly agree that the concept of “a right” is “common to law 
and morality”. 31 However, some believe that society should be wary of entrusting the 
ongoing recognition, evolution (and, at times, restriction) of rights to lawyers and 
judges. Accordingly, what might be termed the increasing legalisation of rights 
discourse remains controversial – even for the judiciary themselves who, according to 
Sumption, do not wish to be perceived as social policy creators or political decision-
makers. 32  Most agree that rights should be enshrined in treaties, charters and 
legislation, since at least the legislature is “accountable to the electorate for their 
decisions”. 33  Yet, even where treaties and legislation are concerned, questions 
persist34 about the enforceability of rights. Such instruments do not always provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cameron E, ‘What you can do with rights’, ibid, at 149. 
28 Quotes taken from Raz J, (1988), The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, at p.409.  See 
also, Pieterse M, (2007), ‘Eating Socioeconomic   Rights: The Usefulness of   Rights Talk in Alleviating 
Social Hardship Revisited’, Human Rights Quarterly 29: 796-822; Griffin J, (2008), On Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press. 
29 Being the “bearer” of rights (or, indeed, any corresponding duties) is common terminology in rights-
based discussions.  See, e.g., Wenar, Leif, ‘Rights’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/. Exactly who 
(or what) becomes a recognised bearer of rights and in which circumstances is one of the enduring 
debates in law and philosophy – and policy. Discussions about whether instinctive rather than rather than 
rational beings (such as animals and babies) can be rights-bearers is outwith the scope of this thesis. 
30 Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 15, at p 8. 
31 This is a dominant theme in the work of Raz and Wellman. See: Raz J,(1984), ‘Legal Rights’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 4: 1–21; Wellman C, (1995), Real Rights, New York, Oxford University Press. 
32 Sumption (Jonathan) QC (now UK Supreme court judge), ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making, 
The Uncertain Boundary’, F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov 9, 2011), Guardian.co.uk, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/interactive/2011/nov/09/jonathan-sumption-speech-politicisation-judges.  
33 Sumption, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making, The Uncertain Boundary’,ibid, p 3.  
34  See, e.g., Harel A and Kahana T, (2010), ‘The easy core case for judicial review’, Journal of Legal 
Analysis, (2)1, 227-256, c.f. Finnis J, (2013), ‘A Response to Harel, Hope and Schwartz’, Jerusalem 
Review of Legal Studies, (Aug) 1-20 (at p 7). 
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for effective rights’ realisation in reality. In particular, where any instrument is too 
“highly general, indeterminate, lofty, aspirational and abstract… nebulous, turbid and 
cloudy”, then this is likely to prevent it from providing “the objectively determinable 
criteria” required to guarantee entitlement to specific rights.35  
 
My publications: the rights of distinct categories of individual in Scots Law 
 
It is the entitlement to (or recognition of) specific rights in law that is the focus of my 
published work. In particular, my research is concerned with the development of 
certain rights through statute and judicial decision-making in Scotland. Consequently, 
I have not sought to conceptualise, or reconceptualise, the nature of rights themselves. 
My contribution is practical rather than “abstract”, or theoretical. I focus on two 
distinct categories of individuals in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law: the 
young, and certain disempowered adults. I have written about: (i) the extent to which 
our legal system has recognised (and may yet recognise) particular rights relating to 
personal capacity and legal status (see below); (ii) how the practical detail of those 
rights has been framed in legislation and interpreted by the judiciary when individual 
remedies are sought; (iii) the conclusions that might be drawn in law and in legal 
practice about particular issues concerning individual rights, status and capacity.   
 
Accordingly, as will be seen in the following Chapters, (i) the right of the child to 
express a view, and his or her capacity to participate in Family Law proceedings, (ii) 
the child’s rights in education and (iii) the child’s rights, status and capacity within 
the wider community are themes in my publications. Similarly, where disempowered 
adults are concerned, developments concerning sexuality and gender have been a 
focus of my research and published work, and so (iv) the rights, status and capacity of 
transsexuals before and after the Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force are 
discussed. How these relatively new voices are accommodated in Scots law and legal 
practice is a significant theme in my work. 
 
Much of my source material is primary: statute and court judgments. Also, while in 
my research I identify principally with the work of other Family, Child and Private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Quote taken from the judgment /comments of Heydon JJ, at para 429, in the (in)famous Australian 
High Court case, Momcilovic  v The Queen [2011] HCA 34 (8 Sept 2011). Similar observations have 
been made about rights-based legislation in the UK (e.g. see the terms of s1 of the Standards in Scotland 
Schools (Scotland) Act 2000, canvassed in Publication 4 at pp 212-213). 
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Scots Lawyers,36 I also draw on relevant legal literature produced by academic 
lawyers, judges and practitioners in other jurisdictions.37 Law and policy materials 
and social research are considered, with Scottish and UK Government publications in 
particular being referred to.38 Some broader socio-legal literature is also drawn 
from,39 and this is discussed more fully with reference to children’s rights and their 
involvement in Family Law proceedings in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 below. A general 
discussion and analysis of research methods can be found here in the Thesis 






Discussions concerning rights are inevitably tied to discussions about status, since the 
status, or “official classification given to a person... [determines] their rights and 
responsibilities.”40 Many theorists believe that individual status and rights can only be 
afforded due recognition in a liberal democracy in which equal citizenship is a 
cornerstone. Equal citizenship means that individuals belong to a society in which: 
 
“[t]hey see themselves as having certain basic rights and liberties, 
freedoms they can not only claim for themselves but freedoms they must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See, e.g., Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: The Protection Participation Debate, 
Stationary Office Books; Cleland A, Sutherland E (2009), Children’s Rights in Scotland (3rd ed.), W 
Green; Barr A and Edwards L, (1992), ‘Age of legal capacity: further pitfalls: Part 2: Litigation and 
damages’, Scots Law Times, 11, 91-95; Norrie K McK, (2013), The Law Relating to Parent and Child in 
Scotland (a new 3rd edition has now been published), W Green (in particular, chapters 1, 5, 8, 9). 
37 Freeman and Eekelaar, for example, in respect of children’s rights. See, e.g. Freeman M, (1983), 
Rights and Wrongs of Children, Pinter (London); Freeman, M (2007), ‘Article 3. The Best Interests of 
the Child’, in Alen A, Vande Lanotte J, Verhellen F, Ang E, Verheyde M (eds), A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Eekelaar J, (1986), 
‘The Emergence of Children's Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 6(2), 161–182.  For authors 
writing about the rights of disadvantaged adult groups see, e.g: Grigolo M, (2003), ‘Sexualities and the 
ECHR: introducing the universal sexual legal subject’, European Journal of International Law, 14(5), 
1023-1044. 
38 Recent studies, include, e.g. Scottish Government Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: A Scoping Study 
of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use of Bar Reports, Whitecross RW (2011), available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/07142042/0; Children’s Rights Alliance for England, 
The State of Children’s Rights in England 2013, Review of Government progress during 2013 in 
implementing the UNCRC in England, available: http://www.crae.org.uk/.  
39 E.g., (cited in Publication 6): Perrochet, L. & Colella, U. (1993), ‘What a difference a day makes: age 
presumptions, child psychology, and the standard of care required of children’, 24 Pacific Law Journal 
1323. See also: Brighouse H, (2003), ‘How should children be heard?’, Arizona Law Review, Fall 45(3), 
691-711; Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), London Routledge. See also 
James A and James A, (2012), Key Concepts in Childhood Studies, 2nd ed, Sage Publications. 
40 The Oxford dictionary, see: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/status. 
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also respect in others. Doing this belongs to their conceptions of 
themselves as sharing the status of equal citizenship.”41  
 
Thus, within the possession of status, there are elements of social, political and legal 
recognition, respect – and belonging.  These elements have been discussed in respect 
of issues surrounding the rights, status and capacity of a range of disadvantaged 
groups, including children, disabled people and LGBT groups.42 There is an inherent 
relativity, or mutuality, to the concept of status, for it is understood with reference to 
how we perceive others and how others perceive us.   
 
This mutuality, or mutual respect, for a range of personal statuses, is a theme in legal 
literature about status and rights.43 Just as legal rights confer status upon the bearer of 
those rights, the possession of recognised status itself confers a compendium of rights 
upon the individual.  Such rights may be conferred by development of the common 
law, by legislation, treaty or by judge-made law. H.L.A. Hart suggests that the 
acquisition of “legal status… owe[s] [that] status… to a deliberate law-creating act.”44  
 
Legal status, in particular, is a platform for accessing the right to make personal 
choices about relationships and personal life – and having these choices validated 
through the appropriate legal processes.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Rawls J, (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, at p 
146.  See also Politics: 1252a16, as discussed by Barnes J in his chapter, ‘Aristotle and Political Liberty’ 
in Kraut R and Skultety S (eds), (2005), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, Rowman & Littlefield, at p 
192; Koppelman, A, (1996), Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality, New Haven: Yale University 
Press at p 85. For a general overview of this argument, see: Rawls J, (2001), Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press. 
42 See, e.g., (i) Children: Arneil B, (2002), Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in 
Liberal Theory, chapter in MacLeod C M and Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of 
Children, OUP; Cassidy C, (2012), Children’s Status, Children’s Rights and ‘dealing with’ Children’, 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 20, 57- 71; (ii) Disabled people: Becker L, (2005), 
‘Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability’, Ethics, 116, 9–39; (iii) LGBT (transgender) status and rights: 
O’Flaherty and Fisher J, (2008), ‘Sexual orientation, gender identity and international Human Rights 
law: contextualizing the Yogyakarta principles’, Human Rights Law Review, 8(2), 207-248; Sharpe A, 
(2012), ‘Transgender marriage and the legal obligation to disclose gender history’, Modern Law Review, 
7591), 33-53. 
43 The Oxford dictionary online further defines “status” as an individual’s “relative... position; standing”: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/status; Norrie K McK, (2000), ‘We are family 
(sometimes): Legal recognition of same-sex relationships after Fitzpatrick.’ Edinburgh Law Review, 4 
(3), 256-282; Grigolo M, (2003), ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: introducing the universal sexual legal 
subject’, European Journal of International Law, 14(5), 1023-1044.  
44 Hart HLA, 2nd ed., (1997), The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law, at p 44. 
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Where the young are concerned, it should also be observed that “age is regarded as a 
key definitional marker of the status of [the] ‘child’”. 45  This is the case 
notwithstanding widely expressed concerns about the restrictive nature that age 
benchmarks can have on children in terms of personal development, participation in 
various activities and perceived competence.46 In contemporary society, the child’s 
age is characteristically perceived a valid measure of maturity, irrespective of a 
prevailing view in Childhood Studies that: 
 
“challenges static accounts of the ‘life cycle’ as a fixed and repetitive 
sequence of ages and stages within human life and experience.”47 
 
This more flexible construct of ageing as a diverse biological and social process has 
certainly not made great inroads into the law.  The legal imperative for certainty and 
regulation is deeply ingrained in statute, policy and practice.48  Thus, for most 
lawyers, questions surrounding the child’s status and capacity are inevitably (and 
instinctively) bound up with discussions about the  “age and maturity.” 49  
My publications: status 
 
Insofar as my publications are concerned, personal status (as with rights and capacity) 
is an ongoing theme, but it is also a particular focus of my work concerning two 
categories of disadvantaged individual: (i) children in Education Law, and (ii) adult 
transsexuals in Private and Family Law.50 In respect of both groups, it can be seen 
that without possessing legal status, certain significant rights and remedies are 
inaccessible. 51  In the case of school children, only parents are recognised as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 James A and James A, (2012), Key Concepts in Childhood Studies, 2nd ed, Sage Publications, pp 1-3, 
although it should be noted that the authors observe that the tendency in modern society to 
“institutionalise” age is “now regarded as problematic” and unduly restrictive for children. 
46 See, e.g., Freeman M, (1983), Rights and Wrongs of Children, Pinter (London), chapters 1 and 7; 
Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), London Routledge, chapter 3 and 9; Punch 
P, Research with Children: The Same or Different from Research with Adults? Childhood, 2002, 9(3) 
321-341. 
47 Hockey J and James A, (2003), Social Identities Across the Life-Course, Basingstoke/Palgrave, at p 5. 
48 This is observed by Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: The Protection 
Participation Debate, Stationary Office Books at p 85, and chapter 9 of Freeman, Rights and Wrongs of 
Children, ibid, gives an excellent overview of ‘Children under the Law’.  
49 Quote taken from Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 6(1)(b). The constructs of age and maturity are 
discussed by James and James, ibid and also by Hockey and James (2003) in chapter 2 (“The Structuring 
of Age”) of Social Identities Across the Life-Course, ibid.   
50 See, in particular, publications 4 and 7. 
51 The child’s developing status in Education Law is addressed in Publication 4 (and discussed in 
Chapter 2), p 209, under the heading “The evolving focus of educational rights”. In respect of 
transsexuality, the developments towards the acquisition of status across a range of fields have been 
charted in a ‘Transsexuality Timeline’, addressing medical, social and legal developments, in the 
Appendix to this thesis.  Developing status is also a significant theme in Publication 7. 
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possessing the legal status to access certain personal rights and remedies on the 
child’s behalf,52 whereas in the case of transsexuals, no legal status53 existed prior to 
the coming into force of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“2004 Act”). 
 
Scots law concerning both children in education and adults with gender dysphoria, is 
underdeveloped and (certainly at the time of researching publication 7) emerging. My 
chief research sources were primary law (statute and case law from Scotland and 
elsewhere 54 ), government publications and statistics 55  and (in the case of 
transsexuality) medical, ethical and social publications spanning decades.56 
 
First, in my published work concerning children within education, the (gradually) 
changing face of Scots Education law is considered with reference to the relevant 
articles 57  of the UNCRC. I consider the extent to which contemporary Scots 
Education Law recognises the changing status of children. The traditional approach of 
Education law towards school children is grounded in an ethos in which children 
(perceived as human “becomings”58) depend on parents to make decisions for them.  
 
Much of Scottish education statute pre-dates both international developments (i.e. the 
UNCRC) and domestic reform concerning children’s participation in decision-making 
(i.e. Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991; Children (Scotland) Act 1995). The 
foundations of Education Law59 have not yet been entirely rebuilt. The ongoing 
process of reform is “somewhat fragmented”:60 it can be observed that Scottish statute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This is true, even in respect of children who may be competent to instruct their own solicitor. See 
Publication 4. 
53 As observed in Publication 7, this left the transsexual in a “legal no [wo]man’s land”. 
54 E.g: (i) Education Law: Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000; Sim v Argyll and Bute Council 
[2006] CSOH 144; (ii) Transsexuality: Forbes-Sempill, 29 Dec 1967, Court of Session Outer House, 
court process available National Archives of Scotland, CS258/1991/P892; Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 
EHRR 18; Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
55 E.g: Scottish Executive Statistics for 2006-7: www.scotland.gov.uk/schoolstats; Scottish Executive 
Education Department Circulars 5/2003, 8/2003 and 1/2005; Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
documentation and Scottish Government Publication: Transforming Public Services: Complaints, 
Redress and Tribunals (2004). 
56 E.g: Benjamin H, (1954), ‘Transsexualism and transvestism as psychosomatic and somatopsychic 
syndrome’, 8 American Journal of Psychotherapy 219-230; Smith D K, ‘Transsexualism, sex 
reassignment surgery and the law’, (1971) 56 Cornell L Rev 963-1009; Blasius M and Phelan S, We are 
everywhere: a historical sourcebook in gay and lesbian politics, Routledge (1997); J.N. Zhou J N et al, 
(1995),‘A sex difference in the human brain and its relation to transsexuality’, Nature, 378, 68-70. 
57 Notably, articles 12, 23, 28 and 29. 
58 See, e.g., Arneil B, (2002), Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal 
Theory, chapter in MacLeod C M and Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children, 
OUP; Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 5-23. 
59 See Publication 4, and Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
60 Publication 4, at p 231. 
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does not yet fully reflect significant changes made to the child’s legal status over the 
last two decades.   
 
Secondly, my publication concerning the status of disempowered adults (to date, 
transsexuals) was produced when the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was recently in 
force. The 2004 Act was perceived as a mechanism for recognition of the 
transsexual’s status in UK Law across various interconnected fields, ranging from 
family life, to sports and employment.61 It had been noted that:  
 
“over time, ‘sexual orientation’ has assumed the meaning of a status and 
has been treated as a prohibited ground of discrimination.”62  
 
Yet, the same could not be said of gender identity prior to the coming into force of the 
2004 Act. Arguably, transsexuals have still not fully achieved a status that ensures 
access to the full gamut of rights in Scots (or UK) Family Law.63 Developments in the 
legal status of transsexuals continues to be a personal research interest.  
 
The third, and final, concept developed here concerning my published work is 
“capacity”. Whereas status is concerned with personal ownership of certain rights and 
responsibilities in social, political and legal life, capacity is concerned with personal 




“Capacity is a construct which enables law to recognise and validate the 
decisions that a person makes... denial of legal capacity can mean that a 
person is stripped of the legal authority to [decide]… Legal capacity 
therefore underpins the enjoyment of a range of fundamental rights.”64 
 
Criteria exist in many western jurisdictions whereby personal capacity to make 
certain decisions can be judged. These criteria are not always agreed between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Most provisions of the 2004 Act came into force on 4 April 2005. See, e.g., 2004 Act, ss 9, 12, 15 20. 
The continuing impact of the 2004 Act is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
62 Grigolo M, (2003), ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: introducing the universal sexual legal subject’, 
European Journal of International Law, 14(5), 1023-1044, at 1044. 
63 See: Sharpe A, (2012), ‘Transgender marriage and the legal obligation to disclose gender history’, 
Modern Law Review, 7591), 33-53, and representations made by the Scottish Transgender Alliance in 
respect of the (current) Marriage and Civil Partnership Bill, consultation documentation available at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/64983.aspx.  
64 Lewis O, (2011), ‘Advancing legal capacity jurisprudence’, European Human Rights Law Review, 6, 
700-714, at p 700.  
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regulating bodies, and much of the guidance about capacity is focused on particular 
areas of practical and theoretical difficulty, such as mental health, disability and 
medical treatment (e.g., Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000). Where children 
are concerned, capacity to consent to medical treatment has been the focus of much 
literature and guidance to date.65 In other fields, however, mutualising clinical and 
legal understandings of capacity criteria is emerging as an issue deserving further 
consideration.66 Accordingly, both the conceptualisation of capacity and practical 
issues surrounding the determination of capacity are highly interdisciplinary subjects.  
 
A considerable body of literature exists concerning capacity (and the connected issues 
of autonomy,67 personhood68 and competence69). In consequence, the meaning of 
capacity and how it should be assessed is debated across a range of fields, in 
particular law, medicine and philosophy.70  
 
Determinations of capacity 
 
Insofar as individual capacity determinations are concerned, various components to 
capacity have been proposed. The components are diverse, and they are the product of 
considerable ethical, clinical and professional contributions – but they are neither 
fixed nor are they universally agreed. The first component that might be proposed is 
decision-making competence. It is however, unfortunate that the terms “competence” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See, e.g., Donnelly M, (1995), ‘Capacity of minors to consent to medical and contraceptive 
treatment’, Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland, 1(1), 18-21; Buchanan A, (2004), ‘Mental Capacity, Legal 
Competence and Consent’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 920, 415–420; Gilmore S and 
Herring J (2011), ‘”No” is the hardest word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, 23(1), 3-25. 
66 See: Tan JOA and McMillan JR, (2004), ‘The discrepancy between the legal definition of capacity and 
the British Medical Association’s guidelines’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 30, 427-429; Elliot C, (2011), 
‘Criminal responsibility and children: a new defence required to acknowledge the absence of capacity 
and choice’, Journal of Criminal Law, 75(4), 289-308. 
67 See, e.g., Dworkin G, (1988), The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press.  
See also Callan E (2002), Autonomy, Child Rearing and Good Lives, chapter in MacLeod C M and 
Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children, OUP; Driscoll J, (2012), ‘Children's rights 
and participation in social research: balancing young people's autonomy rights and their protection’, 
Child and Family Law Quarterly, 24(4), 452-474. 
68 In Finnie v Finnie, 1984 SLT 439, for example, Lord Cameron indicated that pupils, in lacking 
capacity, were those “without legal personality”.   
69 See, e.g., Pincoffs EL, (1991), ‘Judgments of Incompetence and Their Moral Presuppositions’, 
Philosophy and Medicine, 39, 79-89; Buchanan AE and Brock DW, (1989), Deciding for Others: The 
Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
70 For a broad overview of cross-discipline questions that might be asked about decision-making 
capacity, see Pincoffs EL, (1991), ‘Judgments of Incompetence and Their Moral Presuppositions’, 
Philosophy and Medicine, 39, 79-89. For a legal theorist view, see Dworkin G, (1988), The Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press. Discussion about the conceptual differences and 
overlays between “autonomy”, “competence” and “capacity” is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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and “capacity” have become virtually indistinguishable in some areas of the law, 
particularly in respect of the young.  Hence, the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 
1991 deals with (among other things) the capacity of the child to instruct a lawyer and 
consent to medical treatment, whereas medical issues have been addressed in England 
largely by courts on the basis of ascertaining “Gillick-competence”. This has led to 
discussions about whether Gillick-competence can be extended to other fields.71  
 
A second component of capacity is believed to be rationality. The theory of 
rationality admits, however, that those with capacity may still “make unpopular” or 
(what appear objectively to be) “highly irrational” decisions. A considerable body of 
medical (and medico-legal) literature exists about competence and “rationality”.72 
Informed awareness about the circumstances in which the decision is being made is 
considered by many to be a third component in the possession of capacity. This might 
be described as possessing an “authentic” and reasonably accurate appreciation of 
reality. Roberts (a psychiatrist) observes that subjective factors (including life history, 
possible emotional distress and experiences of “power relationships”)” should also be 
considered in respect of safeguarding the broad awareness, and voluntariness, of the 
subject.73 
 
A fourth proposed component of capacity is freedom from coercion – although it 
should be noted that this is something that lawyers tend to presume “if no evidence 
exists that someone has unduly influenced or coerced the person deciding”.74 A final 
component of capacity often suggested (in the case of children) is attainment of 
requisite age and / or maturity. In Scots Law, age, in particular the age of 12, is often 
either a conclusive or a presumptive feature insofar as decision-making (and 
participating) capacity is concerned.  This is notwithstanding that:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See, e.g., Buchanan A, (2004), ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent’, Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 920, 415–420; Driscoll J, (2012), ‘Children's rights and participation in social 
research: balancing young people's autonomy rights and their protection’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, 24(4), 452-474. 
72 See, e.g., Buchanan A, (2004) ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent’, ibid, and (in 
respect of children) Potter J, (2006), ‘Rewriting the competency rules for children: full recognition of the 
young person as rights bearer’, Journal of Law and Medicine, 14(1), 64-85. 
73 Roberts LW, (2000), ‘Informed Consent and the Capacity for Voluntarism’, American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 159(5), 705–712 (quotes from 705;707).  
74 Appelbaum PS, Lidz CW and Klitzman R, (2009), ‘Voluntariness of Consent to Research A 
Conceptual Model’, Hastings Center Report, 39(1): 30–39, at 32, available at: 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/HCR/Detail.aspx?id=3126.  
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“Article 12 [of the UNCRC] imposes no age limit on the right of the child 
to express her or his views, and discourages States parties from 
introducing age limits either in law or in practice which would restrict the 
child’s right to be heard.” 75   
 
It has been observed that the law is “increasingly being called upon to respond” to a 
variety of developments of a clinical and ethical nature.76  Certainly, for lawyers and 
other professionals acting under instruction, the lack of consensus about what 
capacity is and the lack of precise direction about how it should be measured is 
challenging. This is particularly true when, for example, a statutory test determining 
capacity in law does not accord with empirical research about what is believed to 
constitute actual, or clinically measurable, capacity.77 Thus, for example, statute 
might deem legally capable the psychopath lacking mens rea. 78  Contemporary 
theorists have explored some interfaces between legal tests and clinical 
determinations.79  
 
However, in other areas, such as family life, and Family Law, a veil is often drawn 
over legal determinations of capacity – and such determinations frequently concern 
children.  Social research has provided valuable insights into how issues relating to 
capacity within the Family Law process are dealt with by lawyers and other 
professionals. Studies indicate, for example, that “capacity” can become a routinely 
used tool through which the views of children below the age of puberty (often 
perceived as “incapable” of expressing a view) have simply not been heard.80 Here it 
must be acknowledged that the fact that “children’s physical and mental capacities 
[often] increase with age and experience” is reflected “somewhat crudely”81 in Scots 
law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 UN Committee General Comment 12, (2009), at para 20, discussed in Chapter 1 below. See, e.g., Age 
of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991; Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  
76 Charland, L, ‘Decision-Making Capacity’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/decision-capacity/. 
77 Discussed in Elliot C, (2011), ‘Criminal responsibility and children: a new defence required to 
acknowledge the absence of capacity and choice’, Journal of Criminal Law, 75(4), 289-308. 
78 See, e.g. Quek J, (2012), ‘Our brain "Kant" tell us? A Kantian perspective of how neuroscience 
challenges our notions of moral responsibility and the legal implications’, UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 1(10, 22-43. 
79 See, e.g., Richardson G, (2010), ‘Mental Capacity at the Margin: The Interface Between Two Acts’, 
Medical Law Review, 18, 56–77. 
80 See Tisdall K, Baker R, Marshall K, Cleland A, (2002), Giving due regard to children's views in all 
matters that affect them Voice of the Child Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995:  Feasibility Study, 
Scottish Government, available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/09/14938/7710; 
(Australian study) Parkinson P and Cashmore J, (2008), The voice of the Child in Family Law disputes, 
OUP. 
81 Norrie K McK, (2013), The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (3rd edition), W Green, at p 
137. For an early discussion on the voice of the child within a legal context, see Marshall K, (1997), 
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My publications: capacity generally 
 
It is this rather “crude” approximation (or interpretation) of child capacity in Scots 
law with which my relevant child-related publications are concerned.  As with rights, 
I have not theorised about the concept, or construct, of capacity itself.  I have 
suggested, though, insofar as “capacity to neglect” is concerned, that capacity might 
(as an evolving legal concept relating to delictual liability) be broadly construed as 
meaning simply “ability” as per the broad child psychology approach adopted by 
Professor David Wood et al.82 However, in adopting a traditional legal research 
approach (see Part (IV) below) my principal focus has been a critical analysis of 
various factors – found in statute or observed by courts – believed to shape legal 
perceptions of child capacity in Scottish civil law (see, in particular, Chapters 1 and 2 
below).83  
 
Little has been written about what child capacity means by Scots lawyers or 
academics,84 and my principal sources were: (i) the report and consultation material 
of the Scottish Law Commission (the body responsible for our current statutory 
provisions about child capacity85 found in the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 
1991); (ii) judicial observations about capacity (from Scottish courts, and persuasive 
observations from elsewhere 86 ); (iii) relevant literature on child capacity and 
development from other disciplines.87 Capacity in respect of each specific area 
addressed in my publications, including disempowered adults, is discussed below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Children’s Rights in the Balance: The Protection Participation Debate, Stationary Office Books at pp 
94-100 and chapter 6. Other professions have addressed competency and consent issues better: see, e.g., 
Buchanan A, (2004), ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent’, Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, 920, 415–420. However, it has begun to be recognised that child development should be better 
addressed in law. See, e.g., Elliot C, (2011), ‘Criminal responsibility and children: a new defence 
required to acknowledge the absence of capacity and choice’, Journal of Criminal Law, 75(4), 289-308. 
82 Publication 6 at p 204. 
83 See Publications 1, 2 and 3, discussed in Chapter 1. 
84 Examples of the limited legal literature available include: Barr A and Edwards L, (1992), ‘Age of legal 
capacity: further pitfalls: Part 1: Succession and trusts’, Scots Law Times, 10, 77-83; Barr A and 
Edwards L, (1992), ‘Age of legal capacity: further pitfalls: Part 2: Litigation and damages’, Scots Law 
Times, 11, 91-95; Nichols DI, (1991), ‘Can they or can’t they? Children and the Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Act 1991’, Scots Law Times, 34, 395-40. 
85 Scot Law Com, (1987), Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils and Minors, No 
110. 
86 See, e.g., Houston, Applicant (1996 SCLR 943); G v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College 
Governors [2011] EWHC 1452 (Admin). 
87 See, e.g., Punch P, (2002), ‘Research with Children: The Same or Different from Research with 
Adults?‘, Childhood, 9(3) 321-341; Buchanan A, (2004), ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and 
Consent’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 920, 415–420; Tan JOA and McMillan JR, (2004), 
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Child capacity: instructing a solicitor and forming a view 
 
Certainly, the relevant sections of current legislation governing the child’s capacity in 
civil law88 are particularly vague. This is discussed in Publications 1, 2 and 8. 
“Capacity” (or “legal capacity” as it is termed in the Act) is not defined in the Age of 
Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”).   
 
In their report preceding the 1991 Act, the Scottish Law Commission stated that their 
proposals were “expressly limited to questions of capacity in the private law field” 
leaving untouched “statutory age limits and questions of delictual… responsibility.  
Neither did they intend the 1991 Act to “to affect the actual capacity of a young 
person” who “might still lack capacity for other reasons such as mental disorder, for 
example”. 89  This seems to indicate their intention that “legal capacity” (albeit not 
defined) may well be a unique construct of its own, possessing a separate nature from 
factually determinable “capacity”.  Section 2 of the 1991 Act provides a range of 
scenarios90 in which children may be found capable of making autonomous – and 
legally recognised – decisions.   
 
In some cases, no age of capacity, or presumed capacity, is mentioned in the 1991 
Act.91 Where the child’s capacity to instruct his or her own solicitor is concerned, 
section 2(4A) provides that a child with a “general understanding of what it means to 
do so” may instruct. No guidance is given as to how such “general understanding” 
should be ascertained,92 but 12 is stated as the statutory age at which “sufficient age 
and maturity” to possess such an understanding is presumed.  As Sutherland observes, 
it is somewhat “curious” that “the 1991 Act is silent on the question of who assesses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘The discrepancy between the legal definition of capacity and the British Medical Association’s 
guidelines’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 30, 427-429. 
88 Excluding delictual responsibility: 1991 Act, s 1(3)(c). This is discussed in Publication 6. N.b. the age 
of criminal prosecution is currently 12 years: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41. 
89 Scot Law Com, (1987), Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils and Minors, No 
110, at para 3.136. 
90 These include, e.g., common transactions (s 2(1)); making a will (s 2(2)); consenting to adoption (s 
2(3)); consenting medical/surgical/dental procedures (s 2(4)), including storage of gametes (s 2(4ZA)); 
instructing a solicitor (s 2(4A/B). 
91  E.g. common transactions (s2(1)) and consenting to medical treatment (s2(4)). 
92 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”), s 2(4A) and also s 2(4B), which 
provides that a child who has legal capacity in terms of s 2(4A) “shall also have legal capacity to to sue, 
or to defence, in any civil proceeding”. 
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the child for this purpose” – thus, leaving the determination in the hands of family 
lawyers in practice.93  
 
Further, that this vague capacity test mentions the age of 12 produces “noticeable 
circularity,”94 since there is now a widely held view that children below this age will 
lack capacity to instruct. Norrie submits that:  
 
“[T]he phrase “age and maturity” must be take as a single unified concept 
the substantive content of which is mental capacity, so that a child aged 
12 years or more is presumed to have the mental capacity.” 95 
 
This interpretation seems eminently sensible, but exactly what constitutes “mental 
capacity” in law – and how it should be measured – remains unclear. Scottish courts 
do not habitually instruct experts in cases concerning young children or children who 
may or may not be capable of expressing a view on the point of “mental capacity”, 
unless illness or distress is a highly visible factor.96  Lawyers do not generally record 
the basis upon which they make individual assessments about whether a child 
possesses “capacity to instruct” them,97 and challenges to assessments of child 
capacity are (perhaps as a consequence) rare.98   
 
Further, the language of the 1991 Act was repeated in later legislation: 12 years is 
also stated in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 as being the age at which the child is 
presumed to possess “sufficient age and maturity to form a view”.99 The commonality 
of language found in statute therefore creates the unfortunate impression that the 
capacity to instruct a solicitor and the capacity to form a view are one in the same 
thing.100 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Sutherland, E.E, Child and Family Law, 2nd ed., Thomson / W Green, p 511. 
94 Norrie K McK, (2013), The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (3rd edition), W Green, at 
pp 341. 
95 Norrie K McK, (2013), ibid, at pp 341-42. 
96 See, e.g., J v J 2004 Fam LR 20 (discussed in Publication 2). 
97 The requirement that all professionals dealing with children and young people be appropriately trained 
facilitating effective participation of children is discussed at para 49 of the UN Committee’s General 
Comment No.12 (2009), discussed further in Chapter 1. 
98 Perhaps, e.g., where a child is ill, disabled or sufficiently distressed to such an extent that 
medical/psychiatric reports are obtained – this can be done by order of court (H v H (Contact Order: 
Views of Child), 2000 FLR 73). 
99 Section 6(1)(b). 
100 This perhaps adds another dimension to the traditional perspective of children as “adults in-waiting” 
(see Arneil B, (2002), Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal Theory, 
chapter in MacLeod C M and Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children, OUP) 
Children may also, it seems, be perceived as “children in-waiting to be older children, who are in turn in-
waiting to be adults”! 
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Capacity and younger children  
 
Perhaps it is telling that there is no substantial body of case law in Scotland 
concerning the expression of views by children (whether to lawyers, reporters, social 
workers or other professionals) below the age of 12 years in the Family Law court 
process.  Issues surrounding ascertaining the views of younger children are a focus of 
Publications 1 and 2 in particular.  
 
However, within the reported judgments we have, there is reason to believe that some 
genuine attempts to facilitate participation of young children are being made. In 
Shields v Shields101 (discussed in my publications), the Inner House set aside the 
decision of the lower court on account of judicial failure to ascertain whether a child, 
who was only 7 years old when protracted proceedings began, wished to express a 
view.  The Inner House also went on to say that enabling children to express views on 
more than one occasion in ongoing litigation was part of the court’s “continuing 
duty”102 to children.  
 
When considering who should take the child’s views (and how and when), Lord 
Marnoch did not believe that this should always fall within the remit of lawyers – or, 
indeed, should always involve the completion of the legal F9 form.103 Instead, he 
said:  
 
“… if, by one method or another, it is “practicable” to give a child the 
opportunity of expressing his views, then, in our view, the only safe 
course is to employ that method... In particular, where younger children 
are involved or where there is a risk of upsetting the child, other methods 
may well be preferable.”104 
 
In other words, the individual child’s needs and personal characteristics should 
determine how his views are sought.  Issues of “sufficient… age” or “legal capacity” 
were clearly not at the forefront of the court’s rationale. The Inner House simply said 
that article 12 of the UNCRC, rather than the article 8 of the ECHR, was “the proper 
starting point”105 and left the door open for wide-ranging methods.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 2002 SC 246. See also City of Edinburgh Council v H (A Child) 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 51 for a decision 
in which the views of a child below the age of 12 years (10½) were adhered to.  
102 Shields, ibid, at para 11.  In Shields, the case had been ongoing for almost 2 years. 
103 F9 forms are discussed in Publication 2. 
104 Shields, ibid, at para 11 
105  Shields, ibid, Lord Marnoch, para 6 
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Child Capacity and the alienated/manipulated child 
 
Certain terms (i.e. the ‘alienated/manipulated child’, the ‘anti-contact movement’) are 
used in this thesis to refer to scenarios in which a separated parent seeks, for no well-
founded reason, to frustrate any continuing bond or relationship between their child 
and the other parent.106 Such parental behaviour negatively impacts on the young, 
whether the children affected are old enough to express a view or not.107  
 
Where an ‘alienated’ child, does express a view, he or she is almost certain to be 
doing so in an environment that is “intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate 
for his or her age”.108 Such an environment impacts principally upon the child’s right 
to express a view freely. Judges and lawyers have also focused on the impact 
alienation/manipulation can have on a child’s capacity (or perceived capacity) to 
express a view and a growing body of UK-wide case law exists on this point.109 This 
was discussed in Publications 1 and 3 in particular and considered further in Chapter 
1 of this thesis. 
 
Child capacity and consent to medical treatment 
 
Possessing capacity to instruct a solicitor, or to express a view, in Family Law 
proceedings is one of the broad dynamics of the concept of capacity I have explored 
in my published work. A second dynamic concerns the capacity of those below the 
age of 16 years to consent to certain medical or surgical treatments.  This is addressed 
in Publication 8. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 It is worth observing that it can also be the ‘contact parent’ who seeks to undermine the relationship 
between a child and his or her residential parent (see: B v R, 2009 Fam LR 146). 
107 As discussed in Chapter 1, a range of writing, and a variety of views arising from a breadth of 
disciplines, exists on this topic. See, e.g., Bruch CS, (2001), ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome: Junk Science 
in Child Custody Determinations’, 3 European JL Reform 383; Baker AJL, (2008), ‘Parental Alienation 
Syndrome – The Parent/Child Disconnect’, 8 Social Work Today (6) 24; Massarella F, (2008), ‘Polarised 
parents’, Fam LJ, 73(Feb), 22; Lowenstein L, JP, 2008, 172(20), 322; Davies H, (2012), ‘Affinities, seeing 
and feeling like family: Exploring why children value face-to-face contact’, Childhood, 19(1), 8-23. 
108 UN Committee, General Comment No. 12, para 34. See, Sutherland, discussion in Child and Family 
Law, ibid, at p 511 around child instruction of solicitors. 
109 Recent cases include: B v S (Contempt: Imprisonment of Mother) [2009] EWCA Civ 548; Re S, 
Children [2010] EWCA Civ 447; Re L-W (Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact) 2010 EWCA 
Civ 1253; G v B 2011 S.L.T. 1253; K (Children)(Suspension of Contact) [2011] EWCA Civ 1064; B v B 
2011 Fam LR 141; M v S 2011 S.L.T. 918; Re H (A Child) (Contact: Adverse Findings of Fact), [2011] 
EWCA Civ 585; Re E (A Child) [2011] EWHC 3521 (Fam). N.b. the criticisms made of lawyers’ tendency 
to simply label a wide range of family disputes concerning the cessation of contact as being ‘alienation’ is 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, below. 
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Child capacity in the field of medicine is a matter that is also governed by the Age of 
Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991. The Scottish Law Commission consulted with 
the medical and nursing profession prior to making its recommendations and drafting 
the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) bill. The 1991 Act thereafter replaced the 
former common law position in which, as a matter of “accepted [clinical] practice,”110 
parental consent alone was necessary for the medical treatment of those below the age 
of 16 years. The aim of the 1991 Act was therefore to remove this “unrealistic and… 
rigid”111 approach which effectively negated childhood capacity in respect of medical 
decision-making.  
 
Much has been written from a medical-legal ethics perspective about ascertaining 
capacity to consent, and whether such capacity also includes the capacity to refuse 
consent, throughout childhood.112 As far as the English legal system is concerned, 
there remains a degree of ambiguity as to whether an: 
 
“… ability to consent to treatment [carries with it] an ability to refuse 
treatment.” 113 
 
In Scottish legislation, once the child is deemed “capable” of making a medical 
decision (arguably, whether this involves consenting or refusing treatment) in terms 
of the 1991 Act,114 it seems that there is no requirement that the child’s decision be in 
his best interests.  Further, unlike capacity to express a view or to instruct a solicitor, 
there is no minimum age (or presumed age) at which children are deemed to possess 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Scot Law Com, (1987), Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils and Minors, ibid, 
paras 2.6 – 2.9: the consent of parents (or guardians) was also routinely sought in respect of medical 
treatment for those between the ages of 16 and 18 years before the 1991 Act came into force – a 
widespread practice without any legal foundation (para 2.8).  
111 Ibid, at para 3.62. 
112 See, e.g., Donnelly M, (1995), ‘Capacity of minors to consent to medical and contraceptive 
treatment’, Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland, 1(1), 18-21; Appelbaum PS, Lidz CW and Klitzman R, 
(2009), ‘Voluntariness of Consent to Research A Conceptual Model’, Hastings Center Report, 39(1): 
30–39, at 32, available at: 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/HCR/Detail.aspx?id=3126; Gilmore S and Herring J 
(2011), ‘”No” is the hardest word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, 23(1), 3-25; Cave E and Wallbank J, (2012), ‘Minors’ capacity to refuse treatment: a reply to 
Gilmore and Herring’, Medical Law Review, 20(3), 423 – 449.  Much of the more recent literature is 
concerned with child capacity to consent to medial trails and research and the GMC and Medical 
Research Council have drawn up guidelines concerning child capacity to consent: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/6469.asp.   
113 Per Balcome LJ in Re W(A Minor)(Medical Treatment)[1992] 4 All ER 627 at 653. See also recent 
Nuffield Foundation project on children’s informed consent in England by Cave, E, information 
available at: http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/adolescents-and-informed-consent.  
114 Age of Legal capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(4).  
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capacity.  Instead, capacity depends entirely upon the child’s appreciation of “the 
nature and possible consequences of the [particular] procedure or treatment”.115  
 
“Rationality”116 rather than reasonableness would appear to be the major component 
of this particular capacity determination. Thus, in Scotland, while there is yet little 
authority, the position certainly seems to be that “legal capacity” is equal to prima 
facea medical autonomy, for it is: 
 
“[P]atently illogical that [those under 16 years] should be granted a 
general power to decide on medical treatment only to have this power 
removed when uncomfortable situations arise.”117  
 
This is not so in other jurisdictions, such as England118 and Australia, where the 
child’s best interests (or, welfare) effectively ‘trump’ his or her capacity, as discussed 
in Chapter 3 with reference to publications concerning treatment for transsexuality. 
 
Child “capacity to neglect”: Delict  
 
Delict falls outwith the scope of current Scottish statutory provision governing “legal 
capacity” 119 in childhood. The rationale of our lawmakers in excluding statutory 
regulation of capacity in respect of delictual liability was that establishing such 
liability is not a legal matter, but rather: 
 
“[a] question of fact, depending on the child’s mental capacity and the 
nature of the act… there is little direct authority on the liability of 
younger children… guidance may be drawn from contributory negligence 
cases in which children have been held capable… from the age of about 5 
onwards.” 120 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Section 2(4A).  
116 See main text at note 72 above. 
117 Houston Applicant 1996 SCRL 943, at 945. 
118 For a recent English judgment in which the “best interests” of two children, aged 11 and 15 years, 
were used to overrule their refusal to consent to the MMR vaccine, see: F v F [2013] EWHC 2683 
(Fam). 
119 Being expressly excluded from the terms of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 1(3)(c). 
The current, common law, position is that there is no minimum age below which a child will be found 
incapable of delictual liability: Walker, (1981), The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd ed), Greens, p 493, 
c.f. the law in other jurisdictions, particularly the majority of American States which favour a minimum 
age of liability (notably 5 or 7): see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Tentative 
Drafts), Aug 2008, Chapter 3: The Negligence Doctrine and Negligence Liability, at p 1. Final version 
published in March 2011, reviewed at: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/a-restatement-third-of-torts-
liability-for-intentional-harm-to-persons-reflections-on-professor-bublicks-thoughts. 
120 Delict (liability both of children and potentially their parents on their behalf) formed a separate 
review in the Scottish Law Commission’s report (no 110).  See chapter 5 of the report, quote in text 
taken from para 5.1, citing McKinnell v White 1971 SLT (Notes) 61. 
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My final publications (Publications 5 and 6) exploring the dynamics of childhood 
capacity are therefore concerned with legal issues arising from the child’s interaction 
with the wider world.  
 
Considerable multi-disciplinary literature121 exists on children’s developing capacity 
to engage with the world around them. However, Scottish courts have rarely engaged 
with such literature or research when reaching decisions about childhood capacity to 
neglect in contributory negligence proceedings. This is the case notwithstanding the 
court’s responsibility to consider the extent of the child’s capacity to understand 
“cause and effect relationships” and to exercise “self-regulation”122 when determining 
questions of both liability and apportionment of damages.  Unusually, in Morton v 
Glasgow City Council, Sheriff Kearney referred to the evidence of an expert chartered 
psychologist to address questions about:  
 
“the ready propensity of children to indulge in risky activities without 
applying their mind to the degree of risk involved and the lack of 
expertise of such children [particularly teenagers] in assessing risk”. 123 
 
Such an approach is uncommon. Most courts simply use ‘native intelligence’ (i.e. 
judicial assumption) to determine the capacity of children to neglect.124 
 
Delict became an area of research interest because (unlike criminal law, for 
example125) it is an area of Scots law in which the child and his capacity to act, or 
assume responsibility, is under-researched by lawyers.126 Thus, childhood “capacity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See, e.g., Wood, D. (1998), How Children Think and Learn (2nd ed), Blackwell; Kennedy D, (1998), 
Reconstructing Childhood’, Thinking: the Journal of Philosophy for Children 14(1), 29-37; Buchanan A, 
(2004), ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 
920, 415–420; Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), London Routledge; Garon, 
N. & Moore, C. (2004), ‘Complex decision-making in early childhood, Brain and Cognition’ 55, PLoS 
ONE 158–170; Gofin, R., Donchin, M. and Schulrof, B. (2004), ‘Motor ability: protective or risk for 
school injuries?’ Accident Analysis and Prevention 36, 43–48; Lindon, J. (2005), Understanding Child 
Development: Linking Theory and Practice, Hodder Education.  
122 Quotes taken from Perrochet, L. & Colella, U. (1993), ‘What a difference a day makes: age 
presumptions, child psychology, and the standard of care required of children’, 24 Pacific Law Journal 
1323 at 1339. 
123 2007 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 81, at para 1. 
124 See, e.g., N (A child) v Newham LBC [2007] CLY 2931, per Lantham J at 2931. C.f. Morrongiello, 
A. (2006), ‘Finding the daredevils: Development of a Sensation Seeking Scale for children that is 
relevant to physical risk taking, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38,1101–1106. 
125 Criminal Law is similarly excluded from the terms of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 
by s 1(3)(c).  
126 See, English text: Freeman M, (1983), Rights and Wrongs of Children, Pinter (London), and 
American article: Much of the discussion, however, is historic – see, e.g., Bohlen, F.H. (1924), Liability 
in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Michigan.Law.Review. 
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to neglect” 127  when “slips, trips and bangs” 128  arise (in the school and wider 
community environs) is therefore a focus of two publications discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Capacity and disempowered adults 
 
Whereas the exercise of capacity in childhood has long been a subject of contention 
in law,129 the cognitive capacity of adults to make decisions of a legally valid nature 
is assumed (unless steps are taken to question it130). Where adults are concerned, the 
language of capacity can also “underpin the enjoyment of a range of fundamental 
rights.”131 Accordingly, capacity can pertain to possessing the ability to access these 
basic rights by making the same sorts of personal decisions as other adults in society 
– and to have those decisions given legal effect.   
 
The realisation of the “right to marry and to found a family”132 goes to very heart of 
personal and family life: it is, however, a right that is qualified.  The individual’s 
capacity to marry and found a family is dependent upon “the national laws governing 
the exercise of this right.”133 Much has been written, and much continues to be 
written, about this particular right by scholars across a breadth of disciplines.134 It is 
also worth observing that, notwithstanding the diminution in the importance of 
marriage as a social, sexual, reproductive and economic status, possessing the 
capacity to decide to marry (or not) remains a “vital”135 right for most human beings.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 A term coined in Scotland in Campbell v Ord and Maddison (1873) 1 R 149, at 149, per Lord Justice 
Clark Moncrieff. 
128  This is discussed in publications 5 (education) and 6 (wider community). 
129 See, e.g., Erskine at I, vii, 14, in observing “a pupil [i.e. a boy under 14 and a girl under 12] has no 
person in the legal sense of the word. He is incapable of acting, or even of consenting”; Report on the 
Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils and Minors, Report 110, 1987, chapter 1. 
130 There is, however, a growing body of disability rights/capacity literature See, e.g: Becker L, (2005), 
‘Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability’, Ethics, 116, 9–39. 
131 Lewis O, (2011), ‘Advancing legal capacity jurisprudence’, supra, st p 700. 
132 Quote from this taken from article 12 of the ECHR, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. It should be noted that the right to found a 
family is not (nor has it been considered to be for more than 30 years) dependent upon first exercising 
the right to marry: Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330. 
133 Ibid.   
134 See, e.g. (i) anthropologists: Weston K, (1998, 2nd ed), Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship, 
Columbia University Press; (ii) philosophers: Corvino J and Gallagher M, (2012), Debating Same-Sex 
Marriage, Open University Press (USA): (iii) sociologists: Heaphy B, Smart C and Eiarsdottir A, 
(2013), Same Sex Marriages: New Generations, New Relationships, Palgrave Macmillan. 
135 Heaphy B, Smart C and Eiarsdottir A, (2013), Same Sex Marriages: New Generations, New 
Relationships, ibid, at p 8.  
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Until relatively recently, transsexuals were unable to marry in their “acquired 
gender”136 in the UK, for they lacked the requisite capacity, in terms of UK law 
governing the sex and gender of spouses, to do so.137 While same-sex couples have, 
since December 2005,138 been permitted to enter into a legally recognised civil 
partnership, they cannot, as yet, marry – although this is soon set to change.139  
 
I have, to date, written about the capacity of transsexuals in Scots (and wider UK) 
law, notably in respect of the right to marry and to obtain full legal recognition of a 
desired gender status. My main sources for Publication 7, which considered the broad 
approaches of medicine, the law and society over a century, were: (i) primary legal 
materials: case law and statute; (ii) medical, ethical and social research and 
publications.140 This was an area in which few, if any, lawyers were researching in the 
UK.141 
 
Publication 7, which is discussed in Chapter 3, is set within a wider research interest 
concerning adults disempowered in Scots law by reason of gender identity and/or 
sexual orientation. My current research focus in this area is the capacity of certain 
groups within the LGBT community to marry (having regard to the recently passed 
bill in the Scottish Parliament and the parallel English legislation142). 
 
Conceptual Framework: Conclusions  
 
Here, in Section (II), the conceptual framework for the critical analysis of my 
published work has been developed through discussion, and definition, of “rights”, 
“status” and “capacity”. The broad construction and use of the each of these three, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Insofar as UK citizens are concerned, “acquired gender” is defined in s 1(2)(a) of the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 as “the gender in which the person is living”.   
137 See, e.g., historic judgments: Rees v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 622; X, Y 
& Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143. 
138 The Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force, for the most part, on 5 December 2005. 
139 The current Marriage and Civil Partnership Bill passed Stage 3 on 4 February and the Act is expected 
to come into force later this year.  
140 See, e.g., Zhou J.N. (1995), ‘A sex difference in the human brain and its relation to transsexuality’, 
Nature, 378, 68-70; Karaian L, (2013), ‘Pregnant men: repronormativity, critical trans theory and the 
re(conceive)ing of sex and pregnancy in law’, Social and Legal Studies, 22(2), 211-230. 
141 As observed later in this thesis, the prominent transsexual campaigner and Professor of Equalities 
Law at Manchester Metropolitan University, Stephen Whittle OBE, has published to promote reform, 
rather than providing a critical academic analysis of the legal response (see, e.g., S Whittle, ‘Standpoint’ 
(2003) 12 Journal of Gender Studies 137).  
142 Including transsexuals, notably the issues arising in respect of the (now passed) Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) bill and the sections/Schedule to the bill concerning the provisions that will allow 
transpeople to acquire a gender recognition certificate without first having to be divorced. The parallel 
English legislation (Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013) received Royal Assent on 17 July 2013.  
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interconnected concepts within the context of my work has been set out. My 
publications are concerned with legal entitlement to rights, the possession of status 
and the exercise of capacity insofar as these relate to areas of the individuals’ 
personal and family life. 
 
My research has also been placed within the relevant legal (and, where appropriate, 
wider) literature concerning rights, status and capacity. My publications accordingly 
form a contribution, from the perspective of an academic Scots lawyer, to the steadily 
growing body of work concerning rights, status and capacity for certain categories of 
individual in underdeveloped and emerging areas of Scots law.  
 




(III) My Research Method: traditional legal research (benefits and 
disadvantages) 
  
My published work forms a systematic, coherent study aimed at addressing lacunae 
or uncertainties in related fields of law, and my work has been disseminated in a 
range of journals and textbooks. I adhere to traditional legal research methodology.  
Accordingly, the method, or approach, used is that of conventional legal research, 
principally involving the review and analysis of primary and secondary sources of 
law, legal policy documentation and other materials arising from the practice of law.  
My research is directed towards aiding the interpretation and application of existing 
law and, where believed appropriate, discussing legal development and reform. The 
research outcomes of my published work fall within the Edinburgh Napier University 
definition of applied research.143  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 “Applied research,” as outlined in the University Strategy (2009-15), with particular reference to 
directing that research towards having an international significance and which makes a “measurable 
impact” on the economic, social and cultural needs of Scotland and other relevant countries. 
Recognition, development and enforcement of educational, personal and professional status and 
remedies for individual citizens form a legally enforceable agenda throughout the international 
community. 
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Traditional Legal Research Methods 
 
More than two decades ago, Richard Posner, the leading American jurist and legal 
theorist, observed that law was: 
 
“not a field with a distinct methodology, but amalgam of applied logic, 
rhetoric… and familiarity with a specialized vocabulary and a particular 
body of texts, practices and institutions.”144 
   
It is likely that many contemporary legal scholars would disagree with Posner’s view. 
Yet, clarification of exactly what is meant by traditional legal research methods is no 
easy task; this is largely due to the organic evolution of legal rules and discourse over 
centuries.145   
 
In particular, lawyers are educated and encouraged to reach conclusions that are 
client-centric, rather than framing hypotheses acknowledging contrasting positions. 
Esptein and King (2002) compared the respective approaches of legal and scientific 
PhD candidates and found that the typical research methodology of each discipline is 
to some extent reflective of the overall purpose and aim of the profession itself. They 
observe the broad paradox that exists: “a [lawyer] who treats a client like a 
hypothesis would be disbarred”, whereas, in science, a PhD candidate “who 
advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored”. 146 Traditional legal research 
is a method that has intuitively developed in an environment in which legal 
academics had no cause to reflect on research processes or, indeed, “to justify or 
classify” their research methods within a “broader research framework”.147  There is, 
in consequence, no great (or particularly coherent) history of discussion by lawyers 
about legal research methods.  
 
Insofar as my publications are concerned, the term “traditional legal research” can be 
understood principally to refer to “doctrinal legal research”,148 being conventional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Posner R, (1988), ‘Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline’, University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 38: 333 at 345. 
145 See, Kelly JM, (1992), A Short History of Western Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, chapters 3, 4, 9 
and 10.  
146 Epstein L and King G, (2002), ‘Empirical research and the goals of legal scholarship: the rules of 
inference’, University of Chicago Law Review, 69:1, at p 9. 
147 Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’, Deakin Law Review, 17: 84 – 118, at 84.  See also, Bartie S, (2010), ‘The Lingering Core of 
Legal Scholarship’, Legal Studies, 30(3), 345-352. 
148 McConville M and Chui WH, (2007), Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, p 19. 
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legal research in which the main aim is to examine an area of law and to critically 
analyse how it applies.149  This can be distinguished from what has been termed 
“non-doctrinal” legal research. Non-doctrinal legal research is an umbrella term for a 
wider grouping (variously labelled and defined) of research that is specifically 
directed towards one or more of the following: identifying problems, discussing law 
and social policy, and promoting reform.150  However, as Chynowth (2008) observes, 
“some element of doctrinal analysis will be found in all but the most radical forms of 
legal research”.151 Thus, while it is recognised by most commentators that doctrinal 
and non-doctrinal legal research are not mutually exclusive categories (research 
projects may contain elements of both152), most research tends more towards one or 
the other.  Although there are certainly non-doctrinal elements in all of my published 
work,153 it is, for the most part, most accurately described as doctrinal legal research.  
 
Last year, two Law professors, observed that, in an increasingly interdisciplinary and 
competitive research climate: 
 
“academic lawyers are beginning to realise that the doctrinal research 
methodology needs clarification for those outside the legal profession”.154   
 
This presents as a challenge for a discipline in which the ability to conduct legal 
research is considered to be a latent skill that all lawyers possess in some degree. 
Even among contemporary academic lawyers and legal research students, adherence 
to traditional legal research methods is neither routinely explained nor justified. In 
2010, Deanne and Hutchinson examined a range of traditional legal theses from eight 
leading Australian Universities, focusing on those described as being based on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 It should be said that, while this is a mainstream view, there is not universal agreement. Glanville 
Williams, for example, in the seminal text Learning the Law, (12th ed; 2002), at pp 206-7, makes further 
distinctions in doctrinal legal research. 
150 See chapters 1 and 2 of McConville M and Chui WH, Research Methods for Law, supra. See also 
Martha Minow, (2006), Dean of Harvard Law School, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship – A Field Guide’, 
Workshop for Law Teachers, in which Minow suggests that there are in fact 9 legal research groupings, 
or methodologies, materials posted online at: https://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle631minow.pdf.  See 
also, e.g., “reform-oriented research”; “theoretical research”; “fundamental” research, per Hutchison T, 
(2010), Researching and Writing in Law, (3rd ed.), Lawbook Co. 
151 Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Build Environment, Wiley-Blackwell, at pp 30, 31. 
152 D Manderson and Mhor R, (2002), ‘From Oxymoron to Intersection: an Epiemiology of Legal 
Research’, 6 Law, Texts, Culture, 169, as discussed in chapter 1 of McConville M and Chui WH, (2007), 
Research Methods for Law, supra.   
153 For example, in Publication 5, I critically analysed medical, social and statistical sources and 
discussed legal reform. However, this was carried out with the overall research aim of examining a 
developing body of law and its application. 
154 Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, supra, at p 84-5.  
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“doctrinal legal methodology”.  They found that only 27% of those contained a 
methodologies chapter, a further 33% contained only a brief methodology statement, 
and 40% of the Law theses examined did not discuss methodology at all in the body 
of the thesis.155However, notwithstanding the ingrained and widespread dearth of 
methodological discussion, doctrinal legal research remains “the most accepted 
methodology in the discipline of law.”156   
 
As a process, doctrinal legal research involves first asking forms of research 
questions that are concerned with what the law is (and often why the law is as it is) in 
a particular area or legal context.  Thereafter, primary sources of legal doctrine (such 
as statute and case law) and secondary sources (such as any existing commentary on 
the law) are located, ingathered and a research database is created and documented. 
Sources are examined and placed in a hierarchy according to legal rule, and the 
boundaries of the research project are clearly established. A critical evaluation of 
source material is then conducted with reference to established legal norms.  Thus, as 
with other methods of research, the doctrinal legal researcher should: 
 
“review literature… consider any resource implications involved… 
define and justify the [primary beneficiaries]; collect valid data; use 
appropriate analytic methods; and base interpretations on the data… 
having collect[ed] as much data as is feasible… in a manner that avoids 
bias.” 157 
 
Traditional legal research is termed within the wider academic community to be 
desktop research that is a study of “core law” data (i.e. documents): it is sometimes 
called ‘black letter’ research.158  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Deanne F and Hutchison T, study of 60 higher degree traditional law theses from leading Australian 
Universities published in 2010 on the Australasian Digital Thesis Program website (now archived with 
findings available by searching the discontinued website pages of the National Library of Australia’s 
Trove Service: http://trove.nla.gov.au/). The study is discussed in Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), 
‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, supra at p 99. 
156 Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, supra , at p 102. 
Chynoweth P, (2008), takes this statement one step further in ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and 
Ruddock L supra, states, at p 37, that “the normative process of doctrinal analysis is the defining 
characteristic of most legal scholarship”, whether traditional or not (italics added). 
157 McConville M and Chui WH, (2007), Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, p 41. 
158 This term derives from the gothic black type traditional used in law statutes of formal legal 
documents. Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, supra, at p 
94. See also Doherty M and Leighton P, (2004), ‘Research in Law: who funds it and what is funded? A 
preliminary investigation’, 38(2), Law Teacher, 182, at 182.  An overview/analysis of how different 
forms of research in law might be considered to rank within (and outwith) the legal community: 
Campbell K, Goodacre A and Little G, (2006), ‘Ranking of UK Law Journals: An analysis of the 
Research Assessment Exercise 2001 Submissions and Results’, 33 Journal of Law and Society, 335. 
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Analysis: benefits and disadvantages 
 
Doctrinal legal research has also been described as a research method involving 
“interpretive, qualitative analysis”.159  However, it has been argued that such a 
definition is not “sufficiently delineated for the current [interdisciplinary] research 
environment.”160 For those not cognisant of legal paradigms and norms, it presents as 
a discrete research method that is, simply, inadequately rationalised.161  A further 
issue that can frustrate colleagues in other disciplines is that legal researchers do 
borrow – sometimes with little or no explanation – aspects of research methodologies 
used in other disciplines, including logical, normative, empirical, hermeneutic and 
argumentative practices.162 Equally, legal scholars can be overwhelmed by a broader 
research community that is fluent in research methodology discourse and that has 
long perceived legal researchers as “not really academic… arcane… narrow and 
arrogant.”163   
 
This perception of legal scholarship is understandable, because natural scientific and 
social scientific research is reliant upon the ingathering of empirical data:  
 
“either as a basis for its theories, or as a means of testing them… [so that] 
the validity of the research findings is determined by a process of 
empirical investigation.”164  
 
However, where the science of law is concerned, the starting point is to consider a set 
of legal rules that are normative in nature (i.e. dictating how individuals should, 
rather than actually do, behave).165  There is, accordingly, no attempt in traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L (eds), supra, at pp 30; 37. 
160 Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, Ibid , at p 118. 
161 See, Campbell K, Goodacre A and Little G, (2006), ‘Ranking of UK Law Journals: An analysis…’. 
Ibid. See also, Bartie S, supra, for a general discussion of traditional black-letter law research (i.e. 
research that looks at the letter of the law – on a page, rather than research approaches of data collection 
etc.). This traditional legal research approach represents a stark contrast to, e.g., the systematic and 
replicable manner (and method) underpinning content analysis, as discussed in Bryman A, (2012), Social 
Research Methods, (4th ed.), Oxford University Press.  
162 This is reflected in the somewhat erratic range of categories into which law has been placed by 
research and funding bodies: e.g. the UK REF, law has been categorised with Social Sciences, whereas 
in other jurisdictions (e.g. the USA) law is grouped with Arts and Humanities: 
http://bcs.bedfordstmartins.com/resdoc5e/.  
163 Becher T, (1981), ‘Towards a definition of disciplinary cultures, Studies in Higher Education, 109-
122, at p 111. Becher goes on to describe, at p 111, legal research itself as being “unexciting, 
uncreative… a series of intellectual puzzles among large areas of description”. 
164 Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L, supra, a p 30. 
165 Kelsen H, (1967), chapter in Knight M (ed./translator), The Pure Theory of Law, University of 
California Press: California, as discussed by Marmor A, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’, The Stanford 
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legal research to comprehend, explain or predict human behaviour. It has (perhaps 
rather unhelpfully) been observed that, instead:  
 
“legal science is the systematic and ordered exposition of legal doctrine 
in the works of juristic commentators [which] can be understood only by 
reference to its own self-conception.”166 
 
Doctrinal legal research, adopts an “internal, participant-orientated epistemological 
approach to its object of study”.167  In other words, it is research that is in, rather than 
about, law.  Traditional legal scholarship has, for centuries, explored and defined 
what the law actually is, or is believed to be: as such, it forms is an important 
contribution. Various benefits 168  and disadvantages 169  of the doctrinal research 
method can be observed. Three of what appear to be the more challenging 
disadvantages of the method are discussed below. 
 
First, what might be termed the ‘narrow’ nature of doctrinal legal research can be 
seen both as a benefit, and also as a disadvantage. The focus and direction of such 
legal research is primarily inward-looking, rather than directed to a range of other 
disciplines. Many research findings provide invaluable, and highly specific, guidance 
for those deciding upon challenging legal issues, including judges and legal 
practitioners.170 Yet, by seeking to debate, or develop a consensus within the legal 
community, doctrinal research does not immediately relate to any exterior reality. 
Some commentators, accordingly, argue that doctrinal legal research is of debatable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/lawphil-theory/.  
166 Simmonds NE, (1984), The decline of Judicial Reason: Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order, 
Manchester University Press, at p 1. 
167 Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L, supra, a p 30.a t p 30. See Hart 
HLA, 2nd ed., (1997), The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law, chapter I and IV for an in-depth discussion 
of these concepts. 
168 For a succinct apologetic of the benefits, purpose and value of traditional legal research, see: 
Pendleton M, (2007),‘Non Empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship – choosing, researching and 
writing a traditional scholarly article’, chapter in McConville M and Chui WH, Research Methods for 
Law, supra. See also, Garner BA, (1995), The Elements of Legal Style, (2nd ed), New York: Oxford 
University Press, chapter 1. 
169 For a fascinating, albeit dated, generalised overview of criticisms that might be made of traditional 
legal research in comparison with a range of research methodologies employed by colleagues in other 
disciplines see Becher T, (1981), ‘Towards a definition of disciplinary cultures’, Studies in Higher 
Education, 109-122.   
170 See, e.g. the work of Elaine E Sutherland (a leader in the field of Child and Family Law in Scotland, 
and a doctrinal legal researcher) is routinely cited by law and policymakers, including Scottish (and 
Supreme UK) courts in reaching decisions on novel and difficult legal judgments. In Brixey v Lynas (No. 
1) 1997 SC(HL)1, a landmark case on parental rights, the House of Lords cited Sutherland’s doctrinal 
legal research, a p 5. 
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value, for it risks severing the law from its context and seeks to solve problems 
without properly considering anything that is not ‘law’.171  
 
The global research climate is one in which competition for research funding is high, 
and great value is justifiably placed on interdisciplinary knowledge sharing. Many 
contemporary legal doctrine scholars would, nevertheless, argue in their defence that 
in “establishing the nature and parameters of the law”,172 they frequently do take into 
consideration materials and perspectives that are non-legal.  This might include, for 
example, reference to social research, medical reports or to historical publications 
contextualising a particular legal issue or judgment. 173 However, the characterisation 
of doctrinal legal scholarship as being inward-looking must, it is submitted, be 
accepted. This does not mean that doctrinal legal research is valueless or (in itself) 
incomplete – it simply means that such research requires to be considered as a 
contribution, from one particular perspective, to broader interdisciplinary discourse.   
 
Lack of objectivity is a second criticism, and certainly a potential disadvantage, of 
doctrinal legal research. Such a research method can be viewed as a largely 
subjective process whereby both statute and the deductive, or inductive, 174 decisions 
of judges are critically analysed by a researcher. Experimental data is not collected or 
tested, which means that “the validity of doctrinal research findings is unaffected by 
the empirical world”.175  When a legal researcher analyses legal principle in a manner 
consistent with legal scholarship as a whole, the research findings are usually reliant 
on the expertise and experience (i.e. the ‘voice’) of that particular individual.   
 
Various safeguards exist within legal scholarship, which include the expectation that 
critical analysis of law should be carried out by a trained expert in that particular area 
of legal specialism, is peer-reviewed and is often considered as a call for reasoned 
responses from other experts. In that sense, doctrinal legal research findings can be 
seen as an attempt to generate or enrich wider legal debate in which a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Hoecke MV, (2011), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which kind of research for what kind of 
discipline?, Hart Publishing, preface vii. 
172 Hutchison T, (2010), Researching and Writing in Law, (3rd ed.), Lawbook Co. at p 37. 
173 An example of this is Publication 4, which forms part of a textbook on Children’s Rights in Scotland.  
My doctrinal legal research involved consideration of, e.g., governmental policy and statistics. 
174 McConville M and Chui WH, (2007), Research Methods for Law, supra, at p 22. On legal reasoning, 
generally see Wilson AW, (1984), Introductory Essays on Scots Law, (2nd ed.), W Green and Son Ltd. 
175 Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L.. supra, a p 30.a t p 30. 
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perspectives might emerge. The same might, of course, be said of (considerably less 
subjective) scholarly research in other disciplines. 
 
The criticism about the lack of objectively is sometimes linked to a third criticism 
about the merit of the doctrinal research process, since it is a process in which often 
only tentative conclusions about law are reached. In response, legal scholars argue 
that – notwithstanding the rather cautious conclusions of much doctrinal legal 
research – the method remains valuable because it: 
 
“requires a specific language, extensive knowledge and a specific set of 
skills involving precise judgment, detailed description, depth of thought 
and accuracy… according to accepted discipline standards and rules.”176 
 
Within law it is recognised, that conclusions sometimes require to be tentative 
because, unlike some other sciences, “ultimately law may be knowable but it is not 
necessary predictable.”177 
 
There are different ways in which the law can be known and understood. Research 
on, in and about law can take many approaches: traditional legal research is one 
research approach. Other, non-traditional, forms of legal research include, for 
example, the use of empirical legal research. This type of research is gathering 
momentum, largely because it adopts the more interdisciplinary “scientific model of 
discovery through empirical research”.178  Since this is concerned with the operation 
and impact of the law in context, (i.e. “law in the real world”179), it is more 
immediately accessible to a wider audience.   
 
Empirical legal research will certainly be the preferred method of research in some 
circumstances.  This might include, for example, complex legal or socio-legal issues 
already identified that require to be addressed effectively by lawyers and a range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Hutchinson T and Duncan N, (2012), ‘Defining and Describing What We Do…’, Ibid , at p 116. 
177 McConville M and Chui WH, (2007), Research Methods for Law, supra, at p 21. 
178 Pendleton M, (2007),‘Non Empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship – choosing, researching and 
writing a traditional scholarly article’, chapter in McConville M and Chui WH, Research Methods for 
Law, supra, at p 160. 
179 See, e.g., Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research (The Nuffield Foundation, 2006) publication: 
Genn H, Partington M and Wheeler S, ‘Law in the Real World: Improving our Understanding of How 
Law Works’, full report and summary available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-
legal/empirical/docs/inquiry_summary.pdf.  The report noted, with concern, the general dearth of 
empirical legal research and legal research training. 
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other professionals, who more fully comprehend the issue than lawyers.180 Doctrinal 
legal research, on the other hand, provides a “systematic exposition of [legal] rules, 
intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules, explains areas of difficulty… 
and recommends any changes found wanting.” 181  This generates a more complete 
understanding of legal construct and principle for those who must make, interpret and 
implement Scots, or wider UK, law. 
 
Many of the disadvantages, or perceived disadvantages, of traditional doctrinal legal 
research can also be seen as disadvantages of traditional non-doctrinal legal research. 
Thus, all such research might to some extent be considered narrowly focused, lacking 
in objectivity and likely to yield tentative outcomes. It is certainly true that legal 
scholars can learn much from the explicit manner in which other disciplines have 
constructed and defended a range of research methodologies.182 However, while 
traditional legal research cannot, and certainly should not, form the sole basis upon 
which legal, political, economic and social issues are debated, such research 
nonetheless remains a valid, and valuable, contribution. 
 
Traditional legal research: my publications  
 
As stated above, my work is largely doctrinal legal research. However, my 
publications also contain elements of non-doctrinal legal research (i.e. research that is 
one or more of the following: problem-based; policy-based; law reform-based183). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 A good example of this is Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court 
Proceedings when Parents Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, chapter in 
Freeman M (ed), Law and Childhood Studies, Open University Press. The research that underpinned this 
chapter involved both (i) a review of the relevant statute and case law, and also (ii) the findings of a 
study of the experience (involving separate in-depth interviews) of various children and residential 
mothers in respect of child participation in contested Family Law proceedings (contact cases) in which 
there is a history of domestic abuse. Here, the doctrinal and empirical research had been undertaken 
because the issues concerned had been highlighted in previous empirical studies undertaken in Scotland, 
and elsewhere. The research was undertaken by the CRFR, University of Edinburgh, in collaboration 
with Scottish Women’s Aid. 
181 Pendleton M, (2007),‘Non Empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship – choosing, researching and 
writing a traditional scholarly article’, supra, at p 159. 
182 As Paul Chynoweth, (2008), observes, in ‘Legal Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L, supra, at p 
37, given the “failure of the legal research community to adequately explain itself to its peers in other 
disciplines… it can hardly complain if those peers then judge it by standards other than its own”. 
183 It should be noted that a range of terms exist in the sub-categorisation of “non-doctrinal” research – 
essentially, all terms are referring to legal research that is not strictly “doctrinal” and so arguably 
involves more considered and detailed planning of methodological screening criteria and result 
synthesis. The terminology I have adhered to is from McConville M and Chui WH, Research Methods 
for Law, supra.  Other legal scholars, e.g., have termed “doctrinal legal research” as “pure” or “applied” 
legal research that involves a consideration of legal theory or black letter law, and “non doctrinal 
research” are including “applied” legal research that considers law in context, discusses, e.g., the policy 
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This is because, in ascertaining what the law is and why it is as it is, particular 
problems have been identified and further, particular research questions (i.e. 
problem-based research) formed about particular issues observed to arise. For 
example, in Publications 1 and 2, I set out to examine what the law was, generally, in 
respect of the expression of views (and the instruction of solicitors) by children in 
Scottish private family law proceedings.  Throughout the process of collating data, 
particular questions about the expression of views began to form and research 
findings about how courts had approached these matters were built into the structure 
of the publications 184  
 
Similarly, existing policy, medical and social research have formed part of the source 
material analysed where this best contextualises the law.  For example, in Publication 
7, concerning legally disempowered transsexuals, reference was made to general 
terminology used in legal, policy, medical discourse in section C; the influence of 
medical progress in section D; the effect of social developments in section E and 
general reference throughout to submissions made to the UK Parliamentary forum on 
Transsexualism.  Finally, where my critical analysis of the law has, in turn, begun to 
generate particular considerations of law reform (i.e. reform-based research) this has 
become a focus of my legal research and critical analysis.  For example, in 
Publications 4 and 6, when the extent to which Scots law fails to measure up to its 
international obligations are discussed, particular and general reforms are either 
discussed or proposed. 
 
Thus, my publications concerning the child in the family disputes (which are the 
focus of Chapter 1) are primarily doctrinal research about the ascertaining, recording 
and use of the child’s view in the Scots Family Law court process. However, in these 
publications I also explore specific issues and questions of difficulty that arise for 
legal academics and practitioners.  My publications concerned with the child in his or 
her wider community (the focus of Chapter 2), contain reform-based, critical analysis 
of aspects of both the law of Delict and Education law.  The reform-based discussion 
was included because, further to undertaking doctrinal analysis of the law, the law 
was considered to be inadequate or outdated in some respects. My publications about 
the disadvantaged adult, and young, transsexual (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of law reform and is moving towards “interdisciplinary” research: see Chynoweth P, (2008), ‘Legal 
Research’, in Knight A and Ruddock L (eds), Advanced Research Methods, supra, at p 29.  
184 Concerning, e.g., the child’s age; state of wellbeing etc, Publication 1, pp 123-127. 
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required to address a volume of material about relevant social, legal and medical 
developments – both in Scotland and elsewhere.  
 
The criticisms, and limitations, of my work are symptomatic of traditional legal 
research itself. I have not to date explored or evaluated the impact of the law in 
society (or upon certain groups in society). Other colleagues have undertaken such 
research.185 Publications 1 – 8, forming the body of evidence in support of this thesis, 
are intended, primarily, to inform the legal profession and a wider readership wishing 
to become better acquainted with certain complex and problematic areas in 
contemporary Scottish law. 
 
 
(IV) Reflective Commentary of my Overarching Research Theme and Research 
Strands   
 
I demonstrate in the following five chapters that my published work is independent, 
significant and original and has made a “distinctive contribution to knowledge”.186  
Publications submitted in support of this thesis are considered in a single chapter 
where this synthesises my connected research outputs. Research falling within my 
overarching theme has been subdivided into two, at times interconnected, research 
strands: 
 
Research Strand 1: Critical Analysis of the Legal Status and Capacity of ‘the Young’ 
 
In Scots law, and in other jurisdictions, it has long been recognised that the young are, 
on account of physical and mental immaturity, deserving of “special safeguards and 
care, including appropriate legal protection” and provision.187  Being ‘young’ is a rather 
imprecise status, arguably a category comprising both children and older young people.  
In accordance with modern authorities on the Law of Persons in Scotland, my research 
adopts  “as its starting point” the approach of contemporary statute and policy, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Examples of research, and wider materials, cited include, e.g: (i) statistical data: Publication 4 (school 
attendance figures in the current statutory regime); (ii) wider interdisciplinary discourse: Publication 6, 
Section E; (iii) empirical research (medical): Publication 7, section D(3); and (iv) public 
consultation/debate involving law and policy-makers: throughout Publication 7, e.g., the debate UK 
Parliamentary forum on Transsexualism and legal reform is discussed. 
186 Edinburgh Napier University Research Degree Regulations, Section D15.9(e).  
187 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (the ‘UNCRC’), ratified by the UK Government on 
16 December 1991, coming into force in the UK on 15 January 1992 (words taken from the Preamble). 
	   46	  
generally “applies the term ‘child’ to everyone under the age of 16”.188  However, in 
some contexts, notably the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and certain 
protective domestic provisions, the term ‘child’ extends to persons up to the age of 18 
years and beyond.189   
 
Insofar as my published work is concerned, the term ‘child’ is applied to individuals 
below 16 years of age, while the term ‘young person’ refers to those between the ages 
of 16 and 18 years.190  The generic phrase, the young, is used in this thesis in a wider 
sense to refer to all individuals below 18 years of age. 
 
In contemporary Scots law, humans possess passive legal capacity from birth.191  
Active legal capacity (i.e. the ability to enforce personal rights and seek remedies in 
law192) gradually develops during childhood until, at the age of 16 years, full capacity is 
attained for most legal purposes.193  It is this incremental assumption of capacity 
throughout childhood, and in some respects beyond the age of 16 years, that generates 
particular uncertainties in respect of the legal status of the young.     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Wilkinson, AB, and Norrie, K McK, Parent and Child, W Green, 1999, Chapter 1, page 1 (para 1.01). 
The term “child”, in Scots common law, suffered for want of a precise definition. Historically, the young 
were divided into “pupils” (girls from 0-12 years; boys from 0-14 years) and “minors” (girls from 12 – 
18 years; boys from 14 – 18 years).  In the Scottish Law Commission’s 1987 Report on the Capacity and 
Responsibility of Minors and Pupils (Report No 110), the Commission had its their remit for 
consideration persons below the age of 18 years, however (save for “prejudicial transactions”, which 
were addressed in ss 3-4 of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991) for almost all purposes, it 
restricted its consideration to those below 16 years. It is, accordingly, generally understood that a person 
below the age of 16 years is, for most contemporary “private law” purposes, a “child”. 
189 The Preamble of the UNCRC (full text of Convention available at: 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publication-pdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf). Insofar as 
domestic statute is concerned, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 refers to those below the age of 18 years 
as being “children” for certain purposes. The term “child”, occasionally, also applies to those beyond the 
age of 18 years: see, e.g, the definition of “child” in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 1(5), for the 
purpose of the parental duty of aliment; Section 15(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, extending the 
definition otherwise to those “under the age of eighteen years”). Those below the age of 18 years are also 
considered to be “children” for the purposes of adoption: Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s 
28(4).  Certainly, it can be assumed that, until a person reaches the age of 16 years (Age of Legal 
Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 1) he or she will generally be considered in Scots law to be a “child”.  It 
is harder to be precise about the elusory period between 16 and 18 years of age (i.e.“kidulthood”) and 
this issue is addressed in Chapter 4, which canvases Publication 8, ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’. 
190 See, e.g. the definition of “young person” found in s 135 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1985, as “a 
person over school aged [i.e.16] who has not yet attainted the age of eighteen years”.  Chapters 1 and 2 
of this thesis are concerned with children, whereas in Chapter 4, the focus is largely young people (i.e. 
those between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age). 
191 Professor Thomson describes this, at p 207 of his latest edition of Family Law in Scotland (6th ed, 
Bloomsbury, 2011) as the passive enjoyment, from birth, of a “plethora of legal rights” which, on 
account of a lack of active legal capacity, cannot directly “be enforced throughout childhood”. 
192 Discussions about the capacity and status of childhood in other disciplines (e.g. see excellent article 
by Cassidy, C, (2012), ‘Children's Status, Children's Rights and Dealing with Children’, 20 Int'l J Child 
Rts. 57) were not the focus of my published work.  See discussion in thesis Introduction at “Section 
(II)(c) Capacity” above.   
193 Sixteen is age at which, e.g., a person may marry or enter into a civil partnership: (Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977, s 1; Civil Partnership Act 2004, Part III.   
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It is certainly true that children and young people have benefitted from the legal 
recognition of certain of their rights, and from being afforded greater status and 
capacity through domestic legislation194 in Child and Family Law in recent years.  
However, the contemporary status and capacity of the young in other fields of law, such 
as Delict is unclear.  Consideration of inconsistencies in the legal perception, and 
treatment, of the young in different fields of law is one of my enduring research 
interests. 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis provide a commentary of my published work concerning 
the young.  First, in Chapter 1, the operation of the law in respect of the exercise by the 
child of her right to express a view within the context of family life is considered.  
Thereafter, in Chapter 2, I discuss the rights and capacity of the young in the sphere of 
education, and within the wider community.   
 
Research Strand 2: Critical Analysis of Legal Status and Capacity of Disempowered 
Adults  
 
I have also considered inconsistencies in legal provision, and in some cases the 
perceived need for reform, in respect of certain disempowered categories of adult.  
Emerging, if rather piecemeal, provisions affording greater status and rights to the 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transsexual (‘LGBT’) community is a growing research 
interest.  Debate and discussion surrounding the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and the 
ongoing difficulties generated for transgendered people (particularly those living in 
Scotland) by the terms of the 2004 Act, has been a particular research focus.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4, provide a commentary of published work principally concerning 
disempowered adults. Chapter 3 examines one comprehensive publication about the 
rights, status and capacity of transsexuals.  In Chapter 4, one publication demonstrating 
an intersection between my research about disempowered adults and the young is 
critically appraised.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 came into force in September 1991 and began a 
steady flow of statutory reform, largely concerned with protective and participative rights, in respect of 
the rights of the young in the course of private family disputes and state intervention in family life (see, 
e.g., the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, Part I and II, as amended, and (most recently) the recent 
Children’s Hearing (Scotland) Act 2011). 
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The significance, originality and impact of my published work (i.e. my overall 
contribution) is discussed in Chapter 5. 
  











Critical Appraisal of Cited Published Works 
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1.1.  General Introduction to Publications 1, 2 and 3  
 
The following publications are discussed in the present chapter:    
 
(i) Publication 1: ‘“A child is, after all, a child”: ascertaining the ability of 
children to express views in family proceedings’, SLT, 2008, 18, 121-127 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘A child is, after all, a child’), 
 
(ii) Publication 2: ‘“Moral actors in their own right”: consideration of the views 
of children in family proceedings’, SLT, 2008, 21, 139 -142 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Moral actors in their own right’),  
 
(iii) Publication 3: ‘“Dear Judge, I am writing to you because I think it's 
pathetic”: Re A-H (Children)’, EdinLR, 13(3), 2009, 528 – 533 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Re A-H (Children)’). 
 
Each of the above publications has as its primary focus the legal status and capacity of 
the young in the context of underdeveloped and emerging areas of Child and Family Law.  
In other words, the outputs considered in this chapter pertain to the first strand of my 
overarching research theme.  In particular, Publications 1, 2 and 3 critically analyse the 
operation of the law in respect of various contemporary challenges arising when the 
child195 exercises the right to express a view in litigation about her private family life.     
 
First, in ‘A child is, after all, a child’, various factors observed in recent years by the 
judiciary throughout the UK as being capable of affecting the ability of children to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 The term “child”, for the purpose of ‘private’ family law, takes its meaning from Part I of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, and broadly means a person “under the age of sixteen years”: ss 1(2)(a); 2(7); 11(2) (see 
also ss 1(2)(b); 15(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, extending the definition otherwise to those “under 
the age of eighteen years”). It should be noted that Scottish courts have, to date, only made ‘section 11’ orders 
in respect of those under the age of 16 years.  It is possible in theory, albeit unlikely in practice, that a court 
might make an award in terms of s 1(2)(b) of the 1995 Act relating to the exercise of parental responsibility of 
guidance, such a responsibility continuing until the child reaches the age of 18 years. 
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properly participate in family proceedings196 were identified, categorised and their overall 
significance in Scots law evaluated.  Thereafter, in ‘Moral actors in their own right’, 
practical considerations governing the occasions on which, and means by which, a child’s 
views may be taken during proceedings were discussed with reference to judicial 
rationale and the operation of the relevant legislation.  
 
Publications 1 and 2 (‘A child is, after all, a child’ and ‘Moral actors in their own right’) 
were connected articles, published in Scots Law Times, Scotland’s best-known 
practitioner Law journal.197  Both articles arose from a paper I delivered at a 2008 
‘Central Law Training’ event and were written with legal practitioners, court-appointed 
Child Welfare Reporters and social workers in mind.  The publications addressed 
increasingly problematic practical issues arising in UK family proceedings that had not 
before been comprehensively critiqued in a Scottish legal journal publication.198  I also 
used the feedback from practitioners at the training event regarding the (then) current 
issues of concern in child-related law practice. 
 
Secondly, in Publication 3, ‘Re A-H (Children)’, consideration was given to the 
“proactive case-management role”199 of the judiciary in contemporary, “intractable”, 
contact disputes in which “the child, rather than the parent, is (ostensibly at least) the 
non-compliant individual.”200  ‘Re A-H (Children)’ was written in 2009 and submitted to 
the Edinburgh Law Review, a peer-reviewed legal journal with a primary readership of 
University teachers and students.201  The journal was considered appropriate because the 
issues raised in Publication 3 were comparative (Re A-H is an English judgment202) and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 The term “proceedings”, for the purpose of the present chapter, refers to private family proceedings, i.e. 
proceedings between parents (private individuals) concerning their children.  In Scotland, such proceedings are 
raised, as a matter of course, under Part I of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. Public law proceedings about 
family life, involving the State, are not the focus of Publications 1, 2 and 3 and so are not discussed in the 
present chapter.  
197  Scots Law Times, comprising “case reports, articles, book reviews… news and case commentaries”: Quotes 
in this and information about journal taken from the W Green/Sweet & Maxwell webpages: 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/wgreen/scots-law-times.htm.  
198 Central Law Training is “the UK’s leading provider of post qualification training and accreditation for 
professionals working in the legal sector”: http://www.clt.co.uk/About-CLT.  
199 Publication 3 at p 528 citing In Re M (A Minor) (Contempt of Court: Committal of Court's Own Motion) 
[1999] Fam 263 at para 31 per Ward LJ. 
200 Quotes taken from Publication 3 at p 530. 
201 The Edinburgh Law Review is an academic journal directed towards setting “the law of Scotland in an 
international and comparative context” by providing comprehensive “analysis of developments in legislation 
and of court decisions”. Quote taken from the EUP Publishing webpages: 
http://www.euppublishing.com/journal/elr.  The Edinburgh Law Review is published in three volumes per 
annum: Publication 3 was accepted for publication and forms a critical case commentary in the Analysis 
section in the September 2009 volume of the journal.    
202 Reported at: [2008] EWCA Civ 630, [2008] 2 FLR 1188. 
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due to the emerging nature of debate on its subject-matter, the discussion, and research 
outcomes, were more tentative.203  
 
The following sections provide a critical overview of each area outlined in the chapter 
structure on page 3 above.  In section 2, research rationale and independence will be 
summarised.  In section 3, the subject-matter of, ‘A child is, after all, a child’, ‘Moral 
actors in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H (Children)’ will be contextualised and overall 
research premise and aims will be examined.  Thereafter, in sections 4 and 5, the 
approach adopted, and research outcomes of Publications 1, 2 and 3 will be critically 
evaluated.  Concluding chapter observations about the contribution of each publication to 
literature concerning rights, status and capacity will be made in section 6.  
 
 
1.2. Rationale and Independence of Publications 
 
My programme of applied legal research is directed towards promoting knowledge 
exchange of both (i) practical utility and (ii) academic merit.  Insofar as the first strand of 
my research theme (analysis of the capacity and status of the young) is concerned, the 
publications selected as the focus of the present chapter help to illustrate these two 
motivations. 
 
First, as a former practitioner, I research and write, observationally, about aspects of legal 
life in which I specialised in practice for a number of years.  I have, accordingly, written 
about cases in which my own recommendations as court appointed Child Welfare 
Reporter, or Curator Ad Litem, have been a determinative factor in the court’s decision-
making process.  I have also academically critiqued significant judgments that have either 
changed, or advanced, the Law in Scotland in which I personally represented the 
individuals involved.204  In so doing, I have been able to give a reasoned, and I hope 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 E.g: Issue raised in Publication 3, as follows: “is it impracticable that weight be given to the views 
expressed by children in [tortuous] family proceedings” in which the child’s views “seem rooted in 
manipulation and fallacy”?  Answer: “It would be sad, and somewhat perverse, if… recent Scottish provisions 
allowed obstinate residential parents to frustrate contact arrangements merely by being more disobliging… It 
certainly seems, in Re-A-H (Children), a case in which Wall LJ described the parents as “warring parties” that 
C herself was her mother’s strongest weapon and surest protection against coercive judicial orders.” 
204 E.g: Fourman v Fourman 1998 Fam LR 98 (I represented child party minuter, the only case of its kind 
reported in Scotland: discussed in all major Scottish Family Law textbooks, and in my own Publications 1 and 
2); Guild v City of Edinburgh Council, 2002 SCLR 92 (I represented the parents of a child with “special 
educational needs” in the first case of its sort – Judicial Review – raised in Scotland: see Publication 4); City of 
Edinburgh Council v W 2002 Fam LR 67 (I represented grandparents seeking parental responsibilities and 
rights in a highly complex and contested adoption process in which Article 6 arguments advanced prevented 
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useful, insight into the mechanics of the practice of law that I would not have been able 
otherwise to provide.   
 
Secondly, as an academic, I seek to contribute to, and where appropriate generate, debate 
and discussion in my areas of research.  In particular, I write about emerging and 
expanding areas of uncertainty and difficulty with which lawyers (whether Advocates, 
solicitors, court reporters and, indeed, sheriffs and judges) “wrestle… in family 
disputes”.205  This is a particularly important part of my research, since I teach Child and 
Family Law to undergraduate and postgraduate students, provide ongoing training to the 
profession and comment whenever I can on relevant legal developments. 
 
The rationale behind Publications 1 and 2 (‘A child is, after all, a child’ and ‘Moral 
actors in their own right’) was practitioner-orientated: to resolve, through an 
academically reasoned analysis of case law and statute, general child-related problems 
arising, on an increasing basis, in the practice of law.  Publication 3, submitted to a peer-
reviewed journal, was written with a more academic audience in mind. The intention of 
‘Re A-H (Children)’ was to raise the profile of a single (and as yet unresolved) area of 
growing concern in Child and Family Law, perhaps generating academic discussion and 
debate.   
 
In section 3 and 4, below, a critical analysis of the premise and aims of Publications 1, 2 
and 3 will be given with reference to the legal framework (and the general legal 
uncertainty) existing in Scots, and UK, law at the time of publication insofar as the 
child’s views and her status in family proceedings was concerned. A discussion of the 
broader socio-legal literature and debates concerning children’s rights generally, and the 
right to be heard by children in Family Law proceedings, has also been included in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the granting of orders in respect of adoption.  The judgment was, again, the first of its kind reported in Scotland 
and is discussed in most Family Law textbooks in Scotland). 
205 Publication 1, at p 121. 
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1.3. Publications 1, 2 and 3 – Contextualising the Premise and Aim(s)  
 
(i) Families and Family Law in contemporary Scotland 
 
‘Family’ is a wide and, it seems, constantly evolving genetic, biological and social 
construct to which every human being belongs.  Family Law is an important field of law 
because it is concerned with regulating personal relations between family members. The 
boundaries of Family Law change over time because what society perceives (and accepts) 
as a family unit changes. Family Law in Scotland has undergone a period of extensive 
statutory reform throughout the last three decades – and more is set to come.206  
Accordingly, contemporary personal relationships, and the means by which these 
relationships are regulated in law, are wide-ranging.207  The changing nature of families 
and Family Law impacts upon the regulation of relations between parents and each other 
and between parents and their children.208 
 
Personal relationships today are also more likely to be impermanent than was historically 
the case.  In Scotland, for example, around 10,000 spouses divorce per annum: there has 
been little change in these statistics since 2008.209  Throughout the UK as a whole, almost 
half of all marriages end in divorce – and almost half of those divorcing have children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 This reform process began in Scotland with Scottish Law Commission report 135 (‘Report on Family Law’) 
in 1992, and continued through the coming to force of several significant pieces of legislation including: 
Children (Scotland) Act 2007; Gender Recognition Act 2004 and Civil Partnership Act 2004 (both of these 
Acts are UK-wide); Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006; Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK-wide Act).  The programme of reform in contemporary family life 
is set to continue following the introduction of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill in December 
2012. 
207 There is also a steady increase in recorded same-sex relationships and civil partnerships in the UK: see, e.g 
“Civil partnerships are 5 times more popular than expected, figures show”, The Guardian, 31 Jul 2012: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/jul/31/civil-partnerships-popular-expected-figures.  The Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill, which will provide for same-sex marriage, passed Stage 3 on 4 February 
2013.  
208 In particular, who is perceived to be a “parent” in law – this depends on the statutory purpose concerned, but 
insofar as private family proceedings are concerned, the principal definition was, and still is, found in s 15 of 
the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The changing nature of families and Family Law is a theme common to most 
jurisdictions, see: Sutherland, E.E., (2012), ‘Imperatives and challenges in child and family law: commonalities 
and disparities’, chapter in The Future of Child and Family Law: International Predictions, Cambridge 
University Press, at pp1-48. 
209 A slight downward trend has taken place in the last few years (circa 2% on average). According to National 
Statistics, between 40 and 50% of marriages in the UK end in divorce (current figure is around 42% for 
Scotland). The most recent figures from the Scottish Government (late 2010) can be found at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-Justice/DivDiss/; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
20794505.  There are a number of organisations, such as the Family Law Association (‘the “FLA”’), which are 
committed to providing a service that is collaborative, insofar as possible, avoiding confrontation and seeking 
to minimize conflict for adults and children in the midst of family breakdown: 
http://www.familylawassociation.org/.  
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under the age of 16.210  More children are now born to unmarried parents211 than to 
married parents in Scotland,212 although comprehensive contemporary Scottish statistics 
about the number of cohabitants or “about the rate of cohabitation breakdown is not yet 
available.”213  Certainly, children are more likely than ever before to experience the 
breakdown of a parental relationship.214  Thus, research about the rights of children, and 
how best to support and listen to children involved in litigation between separating 
parents generates wide-ranging legal, and social, benefits. 
 
(ii) Linking my contribution about children in Family proceedings to broader socio-legal 
literature and debates 
 
The notion that children should have the right to be actively involved in Family Law 
proceedings (or in any other process affecting them for that matter) is “a very modern 
one… fraught with controversy.”215  
 
There is certainly widespread support throughout socio-legal literature for the realisation 
of children’s rights – in particular, the child’s right to participate.216 However, certain 
commentators remain vociferously opposed to “tak[ing] children’s rights seriously”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 The divorce rate in the UK is highest for the 40-44 age range, an age at which adults are very likely to have 
children under the age of 16 years: see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20612080.  
Statistic also indicate that almost half (49%) of those divorcing in the UK have children under the age of 16 
years old. 
211 Statistics available (from 2009) at One Parent Families Scotland at: http://www.opfs.org.uk/files/one-parent-
families_a-profile_2009.pdf  
212 The first official returns from the Scottish 2011 Census have indicated this, as reported by The Times on 18 
Dec 2012: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/scotland/article3634439.ece. Census information available 
(as results are released) at: http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/en/.  
213 Most recent “Gender Audit of Statistics…”, available on the Scottish Government website: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/03/27104103/5.  Recent (Nov 2012) UK-wide data from the 
Office for National Statistics indicates that around 2.9 million people cohabit in the UK: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20174078.  
214 Much has been written on this recently. See, e.g., ‘Census 2011: the typical family is not what it used to be’, 
The Observer, (England and Wales returns), 27 Mar 2011: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/mar/27/census-
family-housing-ageing-population.  
215 MacLeod CM and Archard D (eds), (2002), The Moral and Political Status of Children, OUP, pp 3; 5.  
A range of theories to underpin the recognition of rights (whether moral, legal or political) that children 
may be found to possess (Brighouse H, (2002), ‘What Rights (if any) do Children have? chapter in 
MacLeod C M and Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children, OUP). 
216 See, e.g., Hill M, Davis J, Prout A and Tisdall EKM (2004) ‘Moving the Participation Agenda Forward’, 
Children and Society, 18(2), 77-96; Taylor N, Tapp P and Henaghan M, (2007), ‘Respecting Children’s 
Participation in Family Law Proceedings’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 61-82; Parkinson 
P and Cashmore J, (2008), The voice of the Child in Family Law disputes, OUP ; Quennerstedt A, (2010), 
‘Children, But Not Really Humans? Critical Reflections on the Hampering Effects of the “3 p’s”’, 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 18, 619-635; Reynaert D, Bouverne-De Bie M, Vandevelde S 
(2012), ‘Between ‘believers’ and ‘opponents’: Critical discussions on children’s rights’, International 
Journal of Children’s Rights, (20), 155-168. 
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while others do not accept that children can (or should) themselves be rights-bearers.217  
Freeman observes that the debate about whether, and to what extent, children have rights 
at all is tied to deeper issues concerning power and marginalisation, since:  
 
“For the powerful, and as far as children are concerned adults are always 
powerful, rights are an inconvenience.  The powerful would find it easier 
if those below them lacked rights. It would be easier to rule, decision-
making would be swifter, cheaper, more efficient, more certain.”218 
  
In 1989,219 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child became an international turning 
point in the global recognition of children’s rights. 220 The Convention remains the 
primary point of reference in most contemporary children’s rights discourse. A number of 
themes and debates have emerged throughout the last two decades in rights-based 
children’s literature. Reynaert et al (2009) carried out a review of children’s literature to 
date and grouped the themes/debates into three categories, discussed below.221 The broad 
categories identified by Reynaert et al have also been identified (albeit not always 
defined using exactly the same language222) by others writing on children and their rights. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Quote taken from Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 5, at p 5. See, e.g., Griffin’s (who, e.g., believes that infants 
do not have ‘human rights’) discussion in his chapter (2002), ‘Do Children Have Rights?’ in The Moral and 
Political Status of Children: New Essays, Archard D and Macleod C (eds), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 19–30; Guggenheim M, (2005), What’s wrong with children’s rights?, Harvard University Press. 
218 Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously, ibid, at p 8.  See 
also: Federle KH (1994), ‘Rights flow downhill’, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 2 343-368 
(c.f. O’Neil, who advocates that children’s “main remedy” to being without rights “is to grow up”, O’Neill 
O, (1998), ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’, Ethics, 98, 445-463.   
219 The UK signed the Convention on 19 April 1990 and ratified it on 16 December 1991 – the Convention 
came into force throughout the UK on 15 January 1992: http://www.unicef.org.uk/UNICEFs-Work/Our-
mission/UN-Convention/.  
220 See, e.g: Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: The Protection Participation Debate, 
Stationary Office Books; Fortin J, (2003), Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, (2nd ed.), LexisNexis/ 
Butterworths; Archard D and Skivenes M, (2009), ‘Balancing a Child’s Best Interests and a Child’s 
Views’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 17, 1-21. 
221 Reynaert D, Bouverne-De Bie M and Vandevelde S, (2009), ‘A review of children’s rights literature 
since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’, Childhood 16(4), 518-
534. 107 scholarly articles were reviewed, dating from 1989 – 2007, so the review is a little outdated. 
222 See, e.g., Freeman M, (1983), Rights and Wrongs of Children, Pinter (London), who divides his text into 
chapters, which include those addressing (i) the evolution, framework and ‘enforcement’ of children’s 
rights (chapters 1, 2, 5); (ii) best interests versus child’s views (Chapters 6 & 7); (iii) child autonomy is an 
ongoing theme throughout the text and in particular in chapters 1, 3 & 7.  See also Archard’s grouping of 
children’s rights-based themes in his text, Archard D, (2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), 
London Routledge. 
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Socio-legal literature about realising children’s rights: linking my contribution to the 
debate 
 
The first category identified by Reynaert et al is concerned with what has been termed the 
“global children’s rights industry”. The principal discussions here are about the 
“standard-setting, implementation and monitoring” of children’s rights. An “enormous 
amount of literature”, 223 spanning a range of disciplines, was observed to exist. Much of 
this literature is concerned with the interpretation of the terms of the UNCRC and activity 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 
Certainly, for Scotland, and Scots law, recognition, implementation and monitoring of 
Convention rights is a particularly topical debate. No doubt influenced to some degree by 
the impending UNCRC progress report, the Scottish Government recently affirmed the 
need to take steps to “[make] children’s rights real” through the imposition of a new 
statutory regime regulating child-related public policy and practice.224 A government bill 
concerning these matters (the Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill 2013) has just 
been passed in the Scottish Parliament.225 This means that questions surrounding the 
implementation of UNCRC rights in law and policy will be a prominent children’s rights 
debate in Scotland for many months to come.  My contribution to this ongoing debate is 
in doctrinal analysis of areas of domestic law and policy affecting children.226   
 
In particular, my contribution to literature about the implementation of children’s rights 
(in particular, Article 12 of the UNCRC) can most clearly be seen in Publications 1, 2 and 
4.  Publications 1 and 2, discussed in the present Chapter, focus on the domestic statutory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Quotes from this and previous sentence taken from Reynaert D et al, (2009), supra, pp 518; 526.  For 
helpful literature on this broad theme, see, e.g., Veerman P and Levine H, (2000), ‘Implementing 
Children’s Rights on a Local Level: Narrowing the Gap between Geneva and the Grassroots’, International 
Journal of Children’s Rights, 8(4): 373-384; Beeckman K, (2004), ‘Measuring the Implementation of the 
Right to Education: Education versus Human Rights indicators’, International Journal of Children’s 
Rights, 12(1), 71-84; Reynolds P, Nieuwenhuys O and Hanson K, (2006), ‘Refractions on Children’s 
Rights in development Practice: A View from Anthropology – Introduction’, Childhood, 13(3), 291-302. 
224 Quote take from the UNCRC report in 2012, “Do the Right Thing” Progress on the Scottish 
Government’s progress in terms of respecting the rights of children and young people in Scotland, available 
at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0039/00392997.pdf.  See also the Scottish Government Response 
to ‘A Scotland for Children’ Consultation, at p 2 available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00416972.pdf, pending the next examination by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child of the UK, scheduled to take place in 2014. For details on the 
reporting process, see: http://www.togetherscotland.org.uk/about-childrens-rights/monitoring-the-uncrc/.  
225 See the Children and Young People (Scotland) bill, passed on 19 Feb 2014, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/07/7181. Consultation and research material supporting the 
bill is also available via the previous Scottish Parliament link.  
226 See, e.g., Publication 4, which is concerned with implementation of the child’s Convention rights in the 
field of Education Law.   
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framework implementing the child’s right to express a view in the context of Family Law 
proceedings. Here, I contributed to existing legal scholarship in the field.227 Publication 4, 
which is discussed in Chapter 2, is an evaluation of “the extent to which the terms, and 
spirit, of the [UNCRC] are honoured in Scots Education Law”.228 My publications, based 
upon traditional legal research methods, are therefore intended to provide a critical 
analysis, with reference to judicial precedent, of how particular rights are (or are not) 
incorporated in contemporary Scottish statute.  
 
Socio-legal literature about autonomy and participation: linking my contribution to the 
debate 
 
The second category of literature suggested by Reynaert et al pertains to the child’s 
“autonomy and participation rights”.229 Here, policy-based discussion centres on the 
realisation of child competency (or, capacity) across one or more contemporary processes 
affecting him or her.  Policy-making (in a range of government and community-based 
exercises) and research involving children are examples of two such areas.230 Where 
more theoretical discourse is concerned, contemporary scholars challenge traditional 
perceptions of children as mere “adults in waiting.”231 Suggested remedies to commonly 
occurring autonomy/participation problems (such as “tokenism, unresolved power 
issues… and [a lack of] inclusion” of “disabled children, ethnic minority groups and 
younger children”) are also debated under this broad category heading. 232 A focus of 
much of the literature is how adults can learn to engage meaningfully with children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 See, e.g., Sutherland, E.E. (1996), ‘A Voice for the Child’, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, 
41910), 391-393. 
228 Quote taken from Publication 4, p 210. 
229 Reynaert D, Bouverne-De Bie M and Vandevelde S, (2009), supra, at 518.  For a philosophical 
discussion on this theme, see: Callan E, (2002), ‘Autonomy, Child-Rearing, and Good Lives’, in The Moral 
and Political Status of Children: New Essays, Archard D and Macleod C, supra. 
230 See, e.g., Melton GB, (2005), ‘Building Humane Communities Respectful of Children; the Significance 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’, American Psychologist, 60(8), 918-26; Hill M, Davis J, 
Prout A and Tisdall EKM (2004) ‘Moving the Participation Agenda Forward’, Children and Society, 18(2), 
77-96. 
231 Matthews H, Limb M and Taylor M, (1998), ‘The Right to Say: the Development of Youth 
Councils/Forums within the UK’, Area, 30(1), 66-78 at 67. For wider literature see, e.g., Arneil B, (2002), 
Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal Theory, chapter in MacLeod C M and 
Archard D (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children, supra. 
232 Reynaert D, Bouverne-De Bie M and Vandevelde S, (2009), supra, at 521. For helpful literature on this 
theme see, e.g., Potter J, (2006), ‘Rewriting the competency rules for children: full recognition of the young 
person as rights bearer’, Journal of Law and Medicine, 14(1), 64-85; Brighouse H, (2003), ‘How should 
children be heard?’, Arizona Law Review, Fall 45(3), 691-711; Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2007), ‘What 
Responsibility do courts have to hear children?’ International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 43-60.   
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across a range of processes in a manner that is respectful of the child and his or her 
evolving capacities.233 
 
Where Family Law processes are concerned, the body of empirical research that exists 
concerning the participation of children within Family litigation (from Scotland and 
elsewhere) is insightful.234 Some research findings are so widely accepted that they seem 
to have passed into the realm of common-sense. 235 We have long known, for example, 
that continued parental conflict (before and after separation) is “most harmful” to most 
children.236  With other research findings this is not yet the case: it is only in more recent 
years that pre-adolescent children have generally been perceived as having capacity to 
make reasoned choices within the litigation process.237 A critical analysis of judges’ and 
sheriffs’ written judgments also indicates that a range of factors are considered by our 
judiciary to impact upon a child’s capacity (or perceived capacity) to express a view in 
Family proceedings.  
 
My Publications 1, 2 and 3, which are the focus of this Chapter, are concerned with these 
judicial determinations of child capacity to participate (whether by expressing a view or 
instructing a solicitor) in Family litigation. From a traditional legal scholarly perspective, 
I have identified the factors that affect judicial decision-making concerning the 
ascertaining, expression and impact of children’s views. These factors have then been 
analysed with reference to the statutory framework governing the substantive and 
procedural decisions of courts. My publications can be contextualised within the wider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Article 5 and 14 of the UNCRC. For literature, see, e.g., Punch P, Research with Children: The Same or 
Different from Research with Adults? Childhood, 2002, 9(3) 321-341.  
234 See, e.g., Laing K and Wilson G, (2010), Understanding Child Contact Cases in the Sheriff Court, 
Scottish Government report: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/12/08145916/0; Scottish 
Government Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: A Scoping Study of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use 
of Bar Reports, Whitecross RW (2011); Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in 
family law disputes: the views of children, parents, lawyers and counsellors’, research findings available at: 
http://www.mentalhealthacademy.net/journal_archive/aifs099.pdf., (2007), Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, 19(3), 283. 
235 Tisdall K, Baker R, Marshall K, Cleland A, (2002), Giving due regard to children's views in all matters 
that affect them, Voice of the Child Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995:  Feasibility Study, Scottish 
Government, available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/09/14938/7710; Some of the 
research about the legal profession is quite dated: Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: 
The Protection Participation Debate, Stationary Office Books; Smart C and Neale B, ‘(2000), ‘It’s my life 
too: children’s perspectives on post-divorce parenting’, Family Law, 30, 163-169. 
236 See, e.g., Crosby-Currie CA, (1996),‘Children’s involvement in contested custody cases: practices and 
experiences of legal and mental health professionals’, Law and Human Behaviour, 20, 289-311; James A 
and Prout A (eds.), (1997), Constructing and reconstructing childhood: Contemporary issues in the 
Sociological Study of Childhood, (2nd ed.), London: Falmer Press. 
237 Thomas, N, (2007), ‘Towards a Theory of Children’s Participation’, International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 15, 199-218; Trinder L, Jenks C and Firth A, (2010), ‘Talking Children into being in Abstentia?’ 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 234. See also: Cleland A ‘Children’s Voices in Legal Proceedings’, in 
Cleland A and Sutherland E (2009), Children’s Rights in Scotland (3rd ed.), W Green. 
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debates concerning autonomy and participation as follows: they critically appraise how 
contemporary law governing the expression of views by children in Scottish Family 
proceedings has been, and might be, interpreted and applied.  
 
Socio-legal literature about children’s versus adults’ rights: linking my contribution to 
the debate 
 
A third, broad, category of children’s rights’ literature identified by Reynaert et al is that 
concerning the long-standing debates surrounding ‘children’s rights versus parents’ (or 
adults’) rights, and ‘views versus best interests’.238  Here, the emergence both of the self-
determined child and a “shift in parenting” practices have been “important concern[s]” 
for contemporary children’s rights’ scholars.239  It has been observed that focusing too 
intently on the competing rights of parent and child generates negative outcomes. In 
particular, “antagonistic power relations between children and parents” creates 
“legitimacy for the State to take over parental responsibilities for the sake of the child”.240 
And, where individuals submit to the decision-making processes of the State (e.g. the 
judicial process), they are each expected to adhere to the decision made – with which 
they may be profoundly unhappy.241  
 
The experiences of children and adults within Family Law are also, it seems, very 
different. Adults involved in litigation have the outcome(s) of litigation formally 
intimated to them.  This is done through the court issuing either an interlocutor intimating 
the decision or a full legal judgment being issued. In the case of represented adults, this 
will be sent to their solicitors, whereas a party litigant will be sent court papers direct. 242  
Adults also have a range of mechanisms accessible to voice their dissatisfaction with any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 As highlighted in the landmark case, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 
AC 112. See Archard D and Skivenes M, (2009), ‘Balancing a Child’s Best Interests and a Child’s Views’, 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 17, 1-21.  
239 Reynaert D, Bouverne-De Bie M and Vandevelde S, (2009), supra, at 524.  See also: Howe RB, (2001), 
‘Do Parents have Fundamental Rights?’, Journal of Canadian Studies, 36(3), 61-78 (quoted in Reynaert); 
Some commentators argue that a rights-based approach only “generates adversarial interests in decision-
making”: Benporath SR, (2003), ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability: On Just Relations between Adults and 
Children’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37(1), 127-45. See also Brennan S, (2002), ‘Children's 
Choices or Children's Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?’ in The Moral and Political Status of 
Children: New Essays, Archard D and Macleod C (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 53–69. 
240 Vandenbroeck M and Bouverne-De Bie M, (2006), ‘Children’s Agency and Educational Norms: A 
Tense Negotiation’, Childhood, 13(1), 127-143 at 132.   
241 The perception of one child, who certainly felt let down by the Family Law process is discussed in: 
Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings when Parents 
Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, chapter in Freeman M (ed), Law and 
Childhood Studies, Open University Press (pp156-173).  
242 Current Court rules and practice (and guidance for party litigants): http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/home.  
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legal process or its outcome, ranging from judicial and extra judicial steps connected to 
the proceedings themselves to making a formal complaint to an external body such as the 
Scottish Legal Complaints Commission.  
 
However, where children are concerned, the experience is rather different. The law 
imposes no requirement that courts explain why particular decisions are being reached or 
what these decisions mean – even where children participate in the process.  Tisdall et al 
(2002; 2012) found that children involved in litigation were generally were given too 
little information on the court process and were often not kept informed about the 
ongoing process. As a consequence, children routinely did not understand why delays 
took place or why certain decisions were made (and in some cases what the decisions 
actually were). 243   Serious issues were observed to remain where the “quality of 
children’s experiences” of the Scottish Family Law court process were concerned.244   
 
Further, traditional Family Law places a high degree of reliance on “autonomy, ‘voice’, 
and rationality”, 245 and there is a danger that some (particularly younger) children’s 
views are routinely sidelined. Tisdall and Morrison (2012) observe that a failure to fully 
engage with children or to provide feedback to them also creates a “vacuum [that] can be 
filled by the child’s own ideas and interpretations or by the perspectives of others”. 246 
The practice of giving children no explanation for the outcome of litigation which is, in 
fact, about them is also indicative of a process in which the child’s rights can consistently 
be ‘trumped’ by adult rights – or certainly by what adults determine serves the child’s 
best interests.  Accordingly, while: 
 
“Scotland can be considered a success story, in its legislation and the 
evolution of its reported case law”, and “children’s participation is… testing 
traditional attitudes towards children, childhood and family law”, the success 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Tisdall K, Baker R, Marshall K, Cleland A, (2002), Giving due regard to children's views in all matters 
that affect them Voice of the Child Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995:  Feasibility Study Scottish 
Government, available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/09/14938/7710. 
244 Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F (see (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings…’, supra 
(quotes from p 170). 
245 Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings…’supra, at 
170. See also literature from elsewhere, e.g., James A and McNamee S, (2004), ‘Turn Down the Volume? 
Not Hearing Children in Family Proceedings’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 189; Potter M, (2008), 
‘The Voice of the Child: Children’s Rights in Family Proceedings’, International Family Law Journal, 
3(Sept), 140. 
246 Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings…’supra, at 
167. 
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remains “qualified by certain trends that may undermine or sideline some or 
many children’s views”. 247 
 
My contribution to the wider discussion about children’s rights versus adults’ rights, and 
the child’s view versus the child’s best interest, is a doctrinal legal one, which can be 
seen in Publications 1, 2, 3 and 8.248  The focus of each publication is critical analysis of 
what the contemporary law actually is and how the child’s right to be heard is represented 
through statute and case law. Thus, in Publications 1 and 2, I explored the child’s right to 
express a view within the context of a Scottish statutory framework in which the child’s 
best interest (or “welfare” as it is termed in statute) is the court’s “paramount 
consideration”.249  
 
In Publication 3, I considered a scenario described by the court as an “intractable contact 
dispute”250.  Here, the court was seeking (and, by its own admission, failing) to resolve a 
family dispute in which children and their parents were “effectively at stalemate”251 over 
the question of paternal contact.  The child involved (“C”) had been misinformed by her 
mother about both the “intentions of her father”, who was seeking contact with his 
daughter, and “the nature of family proceedings”.252 C, caught between two parents 
described by the court as “warring parties,”253 had become alienated from her father. The 
court’s proactive case-management role in such Family Law litigation is a focus of my 
contribution. 
 
In this subsection, the broader socio-legal literature and debates have been discussed, and 
my own contribution has been linked to those debates. My work can be seen as having its 
primary focus upon the interpretation and application of the child’s right to be heard in 
substantive and procedural Scots Family Law.  In the following subsection, guidance 
provided by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child concerning how 
the child’s right to be heard can best be translated into domestic law, policy and practice 
is discussed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Ibid, quotes taken from pages 158 and172-3 respectively. See also the findings of Scottish Government 
Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: A Scoping Study of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use of Bar 
Reports, Whitecross RW (2011), in particular Chapter 5 (paras 5.18-5.40) of the report, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/07142042/0. 
248 In Publication 8, which is the focus of Chapter 4, considered the child’s views and best interest in the 
context of complex medical decision-making. 
249 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(a). 
250 Re A-H (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 630, para 5 of judgment, quoted in Publication 3 at p 529. 
251 Ibid, quoted in Publication 3 at p 530. 
252 Publication 3, at p 530. 
253 Re A-H (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 630, para 21 of judgment, quoted in Publication 3 at p 532. 
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(iii) Article 12 and Family Law: the framework governing the participation of the child 
 
The child’s right to express a view – and to have that view heard – is found in article 12 
of the UNCRC.  The right to be heard has been described by the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (“the Committee”) as “one of the fundamental values of the 
Convention”.254  The right is particularly significant, because it recognises the child as an 
independent being with an inherent and valuable contribution to make.  Thus, in addition 
to possessing a range of quiescent rights that derive from being vulnerable or dependent 
on adults, the child is empowered through article 12 to exercise a positive “influence on 
his or her life”.255 
 
In its General Comment on the right of the child to be heard, No. 12,256 the Committee 
also highlighted the dual function of article 12.  First, it provides the child with a free-
standing right to express a view (should the child wish to do so) in all matters affecting 
him or her. Secondly, article 12 establishes an overarching principle to inform the 
“interpretation and implementation”257 of all other Convention rights.  In other words, 
article 12 is in itself a lens through which every other article should be read, understood 
and effected.258  
 
The progress made to date by State parties towards ensuing the permeation of article 12 
across a range of processes affecting children has been “broadly conceptualized” with 
reference to the term “participation”.259  While “participation” is not mentioned in the 
Convention itself in respect of the child being heard, it has been aptly described as a:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”, General 
Comment No. 12 on Article 12, CRC/C/GC/12, 20 July 2009, hereinafter referred to as “General Comment, 
No. 12”. Quote taken from para 2, and text available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=5&DocTypeID
=11.   
255 General Comment, No. 12, para 18.  The Convention rights are commonly referred to with reference to 
the three “ps”: Provision, Protection and Participation (see note 4 of General Comment, No. 12). 
256 General Comment, No. 12, supra. 
257 Para 17 of General Statement No. 12: article 12 is “one of the four general principles of the Convention, 
the others being the right to non-discrimination, the right to life and development, and the primary 
consideration of the child’s best interests” (italics added). 
258 This reiterates the view expressed by the Committee in its earlier General Comment No. 5 (2003) on 
general measures of implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC/GC/2003/5), para 
57 of which refers to “Article 12 of the Convention… [requiring] due weight to be given to children’s 
views in all matters affecting them, which plainly includes implementation of “their” Convention.” It is 
worth observing that the four overarching principles of the Convention are not explicitly stated in domestic 
legislation. 
259 Para 3 of General Statement No. 12.  The extent to which children’s rights are respected throughout 
these processes is subject to ongoing scrutiny.  See, e.g., Tisdall EKM, (2012), ‘Taking Forward Children 
and Young People’s Participation’, in Hill et al (eds), Children’s Services: working together, Harlow: 
Pearson (pp151-162). 
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“very good term for that what results from expressing views, listening and 
giving due weight to the views, interests and goals of the child.” 260 
 
It has, however, been observed by the Committee that a number of widespread barriers to 
participation exist, and that State parties generally require a “better understanding of what 
article 12 entails, and of how the article should be implemented” fully in legislation, 
policy and practice.261  In General Comment, No. 12, the Committee also stressed that 
professionals providing services to, and working with, children and young people262 
should be better trained “on article 12, and its application in practice”.263  This opinion is 
shared by many commentators on children’s rights.264  While most agree that discussing 
“children’s rights is almost inconceivable without considering the Convention”, debate 
continues about the extent to which “‘old’ childrearing paradigms” of controlling adults 
and “protected” (rather than participating) children have persisted in practice.265  
 
The Committee envisaged that certain “literal” measures for participation would be put in 
place by State parties. These measures include establishing valid processes to assess child 
capacity 266 to express a view freely in all matters affecting the child (recognising that not 
all children will wish to verbalise their views). Such processes should enable the child, or 
the group of children,267 concerned to express a view directly, or through a representative 
person or body (e.g. a parent, teacher or lawyer), in a “manner consistent” with national 
law.268  Further, States were explicitly “discourage[ed]… from introducing age limits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Krappmann L [writing at the time as a member of the UN Committee on Rights of Child], (2010), ‘The 
Weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the child)’, International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 18, 501-513, at p 502 (the term “participation” is used in articles 23 and 40). 
261 Paras 4; 8 of General Comment, No. 12. Barriers are observed by the Committee include “long-standing 
practices and attitudes… political and economic barriers” and further barriers relating to the characteristics 
of “certain groups of children, including younger boys and girls…” (para 4) 
262 These people include, e.g., “lawyers, judges, police, social workers… psychologists, caregivers, 
residential and prison officers, teachers…medical doctors...civil servants…”(para 49). 
263 Para 49.  
264 See, e.g., Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: supra. For a more recent discussion, 
see: Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings when Parents 
Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, chapter in Freeman M (ed), Law and 
Childhood Studies, Open University Press (pp156-173). 
265 Reynaert D et al, ibid, at p 529. See also Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take 
Children’s Rights seriously’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 5-23. 
266 In General Comment, No. 12 the Committee also noted the practical “distinction” between the individual 
child’s right to be heard and “the right to be heard as applied to a group of children” (paras 9; 10). 
267 The challenges in implementing the right to be heard in respect both of the individual child and groups 
of children is the focus of Part III of General Comment No. 12.  
268 Ibid, Paras 34-39. “The method chosen should be determined by the child (or by the appropriate 
authority as necessary) according to her or his particular situation” (para 36). 
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either in law or in practice that would restrict the child’s right to be heard in all matters 
affecting him or her.”269 
 
Insofar as Scots Law processes are concerned, certain established perceptions have 
shaped the “consistent manner” in which our legal system approaches the expression of 
views by children. Two of these perceptions are briefly considered here with reference to 
the Committee’s General Comment No. 12: (i) the impact of the child’s age upon his or 
her perceived ability to express a view, and (ii) the apparent tension between the child’s 
best interests (or welfare) and what might be his or her views. 
 
Where (i) the impact of the child’s age is concerned, the requirement that the child’s view 
is given due weight “in accordance with age and maturity”270 does not mean that younger, 
perhaps less articulate, children should be ignored.  The Committee has, in particular, 
been keen to stress that article 12: 
 
“imposes no age limit on the right of the child to express her or his views, and 
discourages States parties from introducing age limits either in law or in 
practice which would restrict the child’s right to be heard in all matters 
affecting her or him.” 271 
 
A significant focus of General Comment No. 12 is hearing the child in the context of 
“judicial proceedings” concerning “key issues” affecting the child. Paragraphs 50 – 64 
list the “main issues” in which the requirement to hear the child in legal proceedings is a 
“specific [State] obligation”. 272 As might be expected, child contact and residence 
disputes (i.e. private Family Law litigation following parental relationship breakdown) 
appear at the top of the “main issues” list.  However, the processes governing legal 
proceedings in Scotland (and elsewhere) have been constructed over centuries by adults – 
with adult actors in mind.  The notion that children might be distinct, and autonomous, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269  Ibid, Para 20.  See also references to “play, body language” and other forms of childhood 
communication, discussed at para 21 and in the the UN Committee’s General Comment No 7 on 
Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood (2005), available: 
 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/GeneralComment7Rev1.pdf.  
270 Paras 28-31. A broad definition of “all matters” is adopted by the Committee, who observed (at para 27) 
that the Open-ended Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights “rejected a proposal 
to define these matters by a list” which might have the effect of limiting the definition. 
271 Para 21. 
272 These include proceedings about divorce and separation cases in which “custody and access are 
determined by the judge either at trial or through court-directed mediation” (para 51); public care 
proceedings and adoption (paras 53- 55); cases in which the child is an offender (paras 58 – 61) or a 
witness (62 – 64). 
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actors (even in Family Law proceedings) is a very modern one.273  Within the litigation 
process, the age of 12 was imposed by Scottish statute almost 20 years ago as being the 
age at which children are “presumed” capable of possessing the maturity to form “a 
view”.274 Twelve is also the childhood age most commonly referred to in contemporary 
statute as a benchmark for maturity within the legal process.275 
 
The initial, and continued, imposition of an age presumption in Scottish statute for 
expressing a view in Family proceedings is controversial. It is perhaps not surprising that 
lawyers (being required to make one-to-one decisions about children’s participation 
within the judicial process) broadly support the degree of certainty provided by statutory 
reference to a particular age.276 Non-lawyers, in contrast, tend to favour there being no 
age benchmark. Commentators from various disciplines have cautioned against the 
“institutionalisation of chronological age” as the key factor for determinations of 
childhood status and capacity.277 James and James (2012) note that age is: 
 
“a less useful concept” than many others in defining and marking the stages 
and status of childhood “for a number of reasons” and that the “mapping of 
an age- and stage-based categorisation schema onto children’s social 
intellectual and psychological development, irrespective of social context, is 
now regarded as problematic.”278 
  
A reliance on age alone may accordingly  “diminish [the] validity [of younger children’s 
views and]… confuses validity with accuracy.”279   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 “Recognis[ing] children as a distinct client group” has been one of the challenges for the legal 
profession: Cleland A, Sutherland E (1996), Children’s Rights in Scotland (1st ed.), W Green, chapter 4; 
(3rd ed.), (2009).  
274 Exactly what constitutes “a view” is not defined in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (see s 6(1)(b); s 
11(7)). A general consensus seems to be that expressing a “view” is much the same thing as expressing an 
“opinion”: see UNICEF Fact Sheet on the Right to Participate: http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Right-to-
Participation.pdf.  
275 It is, e.g. the current age of criminal prosecution (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41) and the 
age at which a child can refuse to consent to his or her adoption, instruct a solicitor or draft a will (Age of 
Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, ss 2(2); 2(4A); 2(3)). 
276 See, e.g., Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: supra, at p 85. The Appendix to this 
book contains a copy of a survey sent out in the early years following ratification of the Convention about 
children’s participation in the legal process in Scotland. For a more recent study, see: Scottish Government 
Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: A Scoping Study of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use of Bar 
Reports, Whitecross RW (2011), ibid. 
277 See (e.g. sociologists) and Hockey J and James A, (2003), in their text Social Identities Across the Life-
Course, Basingstoke/Palgrave, chapters 1 -3. The authors observe, at p 64, that “what is means to be a 
child… has become highly contextualized (sic) in relation to… age”.  
278 James A and James A, (2012), Key Concepts in Childhood Studies, 2nd ed, Sage Publications, age is 
noted, at p 1. 
279 Quotes taken from Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: supra, at p 85.  Children’s 
Rights Alliance for England, The State of Children’s Rights in England 2013, Review of Government 
progress during 2013 in implementing the UNCRC in England, at p 27, e.g., the report makes reference to 
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It is true that while the presumed age of capacity to express a view in Family Law is 
currently set at 12 years, this is specifically stated in section 6(1)(b) of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995 to be “without prejudice”280 to the right of ‘mature’ younger children 
to express a view.  However, the onus (arguably a difficult one to rebut281) remains on 
children below the age of 12 years to demonstrate that they possess the maturity, 
notwithstanding their young age, to express a view.  Further, it is not entirely clear what 
section 6(1)(b) means. Family lawyers are not generally trained in child development or 
in how to measure such ‘premature maturity’. Family Law is a legal field beset by high-
running family emotions, acrimony and client complaints.282 It is not unreasonable to 
speculate that reaching the age of 12 has become the general requirement before any kind 
of meaningful child participation in Family litigation is guaranteed by lawyers intent on 
avoiding a whole new category of age-related client complaints.  
 
Some would, of course, dispute that children below the age of 12 are routinely excluded 
from the Family Law process, since younger children often have contact and residence 
proceedings intimated upon them by way of an F9 form. The validity of such intimation 
is, however, a matter of ongoing debate: concerns about tokenism and possible parental 
influence have been expressed about the F9 process.283  Others observe that the Scottish 
Family court system is flawed – perhaps to the extent that meaningful participation is not 
guaranteed for any child or any age.284 The reality is that, for the legal profession, 
throughout which systemisation is endemic, the more open-textured approach towards the 
expression by children of views envisaged by the UN Committee has arguably been 
frustrated.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the “lack of involvement” of younger children and “tokenistic” taking of their views, report available: 
http://www.crae.org.uk/ . 
280 Children (Scotland) Act 1991, s 6(1)(b). It should be noted, however, that it is common practice of court 
reporters to take the views of children between the ages of 5 and 12 years old (the weight given to these 
views is of course a separate matter): see Scottish Government Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: A Scoping 
Study of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use of Bar Reports, Whitecross RW (2011), ibid. 
281 This has long been recognised to be the case (whether in respect of expressing a view, instructing a 
solicitor or becoming a party) in England and in Scotland. See, e.g., Re A (A Minor)(Independent 
Representation) [1993] 2 FCR 437 (per Booth J, at p 440); Shields v Shields, supra (child age 7 too young 
to express a view at the start of proceedings). 
282 The Scottish Legal Complaints Commission most recent Annual Reports show (as is the norm) that 
Family lawyers attract the greatest volume of complaints of any other named business category: 
http://www.scottishlegalcomplaints.com/media/47185/slcc_review_201213__-_final_proof.pdf.  
283 See, e.g., Scottish Government report, Laing K and Wilson G, (2010), Understanding Child Contact 
Cases in the Sheriff Court, paras 7.7 - 7.8, available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/12/08145916/0. 
284 For a discussion of the system and process, see e.g., Tisdall K, Bray R, Marshall K, and Cleland A, 
(2004) ‘Children’s Participation in Family Law Proceedings: A step too far or a step too small?’ Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law, 26(1): 17-33. 
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Insofar as (ii) the ‘child’s best interests versus the child’s view’ debate285 is concerned, in 
Scotland (as with other jurisdictions286), the best interests of the child287 is stated to be the 
primary focus of Family Law disputes concerning the child. Article 3 of the Convention 
is concerned with the best interests of the child, requiring States parties to ensure 
protection for the child, always “taking into account the rights and duties of his or her 
parents”.288  It is, of course, possible that this broad, welfarist requirement (i.e. respect for 
parental rights and parental views) might conflict with respect for the child’s own views. 
However, the Committee stressed in General Comment No. 12 that:  
 
“There is no tension between articles 3 and 12, only a complementary role… 
one establishes the objective of achieving the best interests of the child and 
the other provides the methodology for reaching the goal of hearing… the 
child … there can be no correct application of article 3 if the components of 
article 12 are not respected.”289 
 
The extent to which State parties recognise, and appropriately balance, what the 
Committee considers are the essentially complementary roles of articles 3 and 12 in legal 
and other fora has been a point of ongoing discussion in Scotland, and elsewhere, since 
the Convention came into being. The relationship between the two articles has been 
observed by one of the leading Children’s Rights lawyers in the UK as “puzzling” on 
account of how the potential conflict between the child’s wishes, and what adults think is 
best for him, or her, can be effectively managed in law.290  Some commentators have 
suggested that the ‘best interests of the child versus the views of the child’ debate is, in 
reality, a part of a wider debate about ‘children’s rights’ versus adults (essentially, 
‘parents’) rights’ and that, in law: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 A sound overview of this debate is given in Part III of David Archer’s foundation text: Archard D, 
(2004), Children, Rights and Childhood (2nd ed), London Routledge. 
286 See, e.g., section 28(2) of the South African Constitution, which provides that “[a] child’s best interests 
are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” 
287Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: “in all actions concerning children… the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” (Article 3(1)).  The Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 
11(7)(a) goes further than the Convention, stating that the court “shall regard the welfare of the child 
concerned as its paramount consideration”. 
288 Article 3(2). 
289 Para 74. 
290 Freeman, M (2007), ‘Article 3. The Best Interests of the Child’, in Alen A, Vande Lanotte J, Verhellen 
F, Ang E, Verheyde M (eds), A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p 6.  See also: Freeman M (1996), Children’s Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective (Issues in Law and Society), Dartmouth, an early comparative text addressing emerging issues 
concerning the implementation of the Convention by a range of State parties, including the UK, Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Holland, New Zealand and Russia; Lansdown G (2006), ‘International developments in 
children’s participation: lessons and challenges’, in Tisdall EKM, Davis JM, Hill M, Prout A (eds), (2006), 
Children Young People and Social Inclusion, Policy Press, a text containing chapters spanning 
“participation in many forms” (at p139). 
	   69	  
 
“The parent-child dichotomy debate is characterized by the search both for 
the best judicial procedure and for a legal compromise that protects the rights 
of both the children and the parents and defines the role of the state.” 291 
 
It has been persuasively argued that the Convention itself addressed the problems 
generated by the parent-child dichotomy debate with reference to the construct of the 
“evolving capacity of the child.”292 The Committee was clear that age should not be the 
only determinant of this evolving capacity and, in General Comment No. 12, made 
reference to a range of factors that can impact upon capacity:  
 
“Research has shown that information, experience, environment, social and 
cultural expectations, and levels of support all contribute to the development 
of a child’s capacities to form a view. For this reason, the views of the child 
have to be assessed on a case-by-case examination.”293 
 
Thus, each child should be considered as an individual, rather than merely a human being 
of a particular age. Generally speaking, as the child develops towards adulthood, legal 
(and other) processes should recognise that he or she becomes gradually more 
autonomous and parental rights recede. However, it is clear from the terms of General 
Comment No. 12 that, regardless of age or perceived capacity, children deserve no less 
respect as service-users than adults (including their own parents) involved in the litigation 
process.294 This ought to be the case regardless of whether the child expresses views that 
accord with what adults consider serve his or her “best interests”.  It is, however, 
arguable that, since the child’s best interests (or, “welfare”, as it is termed in Scots 
Family Law) are the court’s “paramount consideration”, every other consideration is 
secondary.295 The Scottish approach has much in common with England: the ‘best 
interests of the child versus the child’s views’ is an ongoing theme of children’s rights 
literature in the UK (and elsewhere).296 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Reynaert D et al, ibid, at p 525.  It is worth noting that the authors cite various scholars who criticise the 
“dichotomization of children’s rights vs parents’ rights” as being a “myopic focus” on rights to the 
detriment of other more collaborative (and less legally focused) approaches to adults and children. 
292 Hammarberg T (1990), ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – and How to Make it Work’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 12(1), 97-105. 
293 Para 29. 
294 The overall treatment of children as service users is part of the UNCRC Committee reporting/report card 
process of State parties. See: “Do the Right Thing” Progress on the Scottish Government’s progress in 
terms of respecting the rights of children and young people in Scotland, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0039/00392997.pdf.  
295 Quotes from Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(a). 
296 See, e.g., Eekelaar J, (1986), ‘The Emergence of Children's Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
6(2), 161–182, at 166-171; Archard D and Skivenes M, (2009), ‘Balancing a Child’s Best Interests and a 
Child’s Views’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 17, 1-21; Zermatten J [then Chair of UN 
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In the closing paragraphs of General Comment No. 12, the Committee provided a 
detailed, practical overview of the characteristics required by article 12 of all processes 
“in which children are heard and participate.”297 A key characteristic noted was training 
of adults to listen, and to work “jointly with children… engaging children effectively in 
accordance with their evolving capacities.”298  Among the other characteristics stated 
were: (i) an “inclusive” process which is “transparent” (involving, e.g., full access to 
(appropriately prepared) and “relevant” information about the purpose of participation 
and the process itself); (ii) a “child-friendly” mechanisms for ascertaining, recording and 
feeding back on views expressed in an “accountable” manner.299  This means, in 
particular, informing children:  
 
“as to how their views [however expressed] have been interpreted and used 
and, where necessary, with the opportunity to challenge and influence the 
analysis of the findings.” 300 
  
The lack of any routine practice whereby feedback is given to the children is not the only 
criticism that can be made of Scottish Family Law processes. Certain steps have been 
taken over the last two decades (e.g., the Law Society of Scotland introduced a Child 
Law Specialist Accreditation for Family Lawyers in the early 1990s), but there remains 
inadequately formalised training for practitioners’ Child Law specialism in Scotland. 
While it has been observed that Scotland appears to state the child’s participation more 
positively in legislation than elsewhere in the UK, and overtly acknowledge the child’s 
view in case law,301 Tisdall and Morrison (2012) observe that this apparent: 
 
“success story… must be qualified by certain trends that may undermine or 
sideline some or many children’s views: a fixation on ‘voice’ and a façade of 
fixed, rational, autonomous views.”302 
 
In the following subsection, the focus of my discussion shifts to issues surrounding the 
expression of views by children within the current Scottish statutory framework. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Committee on Rights of Child)], (2010), ‘The Best Interests of the Child Principle: Literal Analysis and 
Function’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 18, 483-499; Cassidy C, (2012), Children’s Status, 
Children’s Rights and ‘dealing with’ Children’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 20, 57- 71. 
297 Paras 134-136. 
298 Para 134(g). 
299 Quotes taken from para 134, paras (a) to (i). 
300 Para 134(i). 
301 Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings when Parents 
Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, chapter in Freeman M (ed), Law and 
Childhood Studies, Open University Press (pp156-173), at pp 158; 170. 
302 Ibid, p 172-173. 
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(iv) Expressing a view in the context of Scottish Family Law proceedings 
 
As long as children are old enough to be aware of legal proceedings concerning their own 
care and upbringing, the prevailing thinking in Scotland in 2008/9 (and currently) is that 
children can, and should, have any views they wish to express considered in those 
proceedings.303  As observed in Publication 3, “so far as Scotland is concerned, the need 
to have regard to the views of children in family disputes is a relatively recent and much 
applauded legal development.”304  This development followed the coming into force in 
September 1991 of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, and the subsequent 
requirement placed upon the court by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 to have regard to 
the views of the child capable of expressing views (and desirous of doing that) in family 
proceedings.305   
 
These statutes seek to reinforce the “right” to express a view enshrined in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Standard judicial practice since 1995 has been to 
ascertain whether the capable child wishes to express a view and to have regard (to 
whatever extent thought appropriate in the situation concerned 306 ) to any views 
expressed.  This is considered preferable to the former law in which “children's views… 
were not routinely sought and court orders regulating the care and upbringing of children 
were often granted [in opposition to] the child's wishes”.307 
 
However, it is one thing to pass an Act giving a child the “right” to have his or her view 
given due regard if and when expressed.  It is quite another thing to put in place practical, 
and effective, machinery308 to govern when a child’s views should be taken (for example, 
the Court of Session required to rule on whether a child below 3 years of age was too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘the UNCRC’), as translated into 
domestic legislation through a number of statutory provisions, including ss 6; 11(7)(b) of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, s 2(4A) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 etc.  
304 Publication 3, at p 531. 
305 Part I of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 came into force in November 1995. 
306 Here, the term used in the legislation to equate to “appropriate” is “practicable” (see s 11(7) of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995), as discussed in the main text below. 
307 Publication 3, at p 531, in particular referencing Blance v Blance 1978 SLT 74; Brannigan v Brannigan 
1979 SLT (Notes) 73. Cf Porchetta v Porchetta 1986 SLT 105; Russell v Russell 1991 SCLR 429. 
308 While this has been the subject of, it seems quite extensive, discussion in other disciplines it has been 
relatively little discussed by lawyers. See, e.g, Tisdall EKM, (2012), ‘Taking Forward Children and Young 
People’s Participation’, in Hill et al (eds), Children’s Services: working together, Harlow: Pearson (pp151-
162); Cassidy, C, (2012), ‘Children's Status, Children's Rights and Dealing with Children’, 20 Int'l J Child Rts. 
57;  Tisdall EKM and Morrison F, (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings when Parents 
Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, chapter in Freeman M (ed), Law and 
Childhood Studies, OUP (pp156-173). 
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young to express a view309).  Further, where a court accepts that a child’s views are to be 
taken, other considerations come into play, such as the manner in which that view should 
be sought, and recorded.310 Is it, for example, acceptable that a court reporter attempts to 
obtain the “independent view” of a child at the home of a residential parent who strongly 
opposes that child seeing the other parent in a contact dispute?311 
 
Finally, what should we do with the views expressed by children?  What weight should 
they carry – particularly in cases where the views of the child do not accord with what is 
generally perceived to be in her best interests?  Can such views be decisive, or at they 
merely one factor to which the court gives a nod in its overall decision-making 
process? 312   Also, does Article 6 313  mean that the parent’s right (as a party to 
proceedings) to be made aware of anything relevant to the judge or sheriff’s decision-
making in a family case trumps the child’s wish that his or her views remain 
confidential?314  These questions seemed to me to be both pressing and significant at the 
time ‘A child is, after all, a child’, ‘Moral actors in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H 
(Children)’ were published.  Some of these questions have yet to be addressed 
comprehensively by our legislature or judiciary. 
 
Accordingly, the overarching premise of Publications 1, 2 and 3 was that it was becoming 
increasingly clear that contemporary Scots Family Law lacked: (i) a clear diagnosis of the 
range of practical difficulties that were arising in respect of recognising the right of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Stewart v Stewart, 2007 SC451, per Lord Wheatley in the Inner House, who giving the court's opinion, 
observed: “At the time of the proof, the child was under three years old, and it was clearly within the sheriff's 
discretion to take the view that to seek the views of a child of that age would be wholly impractical …” This 
case is discussed in Publication 1,’A child is after all a child’. 
310 Steps have certainly been taken with the legal profession over the last decade in Scotland to better train 
members of the judiciary interacting with children but whether this is enough has been questioned by 
leading academics: Raitt F (2007), Hearing Children in Family Law Proceedings: Can Judges Make a 
Difference?, Child and Family Law Quarterly 204-224. Also, the general dearth of training given to Court 
Welfare Reporters (i.e. those producing “bar reports” in family proceedings, during which children 
regularly express views) was highlighted in a recent Scottish Government Study:  Child Welfare Hearings: 
A Scoping Study of the Commissioning, Preparation and Use of Bar Reports, Whitecross RW (2011), 
available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/07142042/0. It should be noted that various 
organisations, such as the “FLA” (Scottish Family Law Association”) provide training, but that this training 
is not compulsory. 
311 See, e.g., In F v F, 2004 Fam LR 20, an expert reporter was heavily criticised by the Inner House for 
submitting, among other things, a report based on conversations with the children which took place in their 
mother's home when she was in the environs. The court described the report as “inevitably one-sided and partly 
biased”.  This case is discussed in Publication 2, ‘Moral actors in their own right’. 
312 This is discussed in Publication 2 at p 141 onwards. 
313 Of the European Convention on Human Rights, text available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf. The Right to a fair hearing is found, within the civil court context, in 
Article 6.1. 
314 Discussed in Publication 2 at p 142, with particular reference to Dosoo v Dosoo (No 1), 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 
86; and McGrath v McGrath, 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 9.   
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young to express a view in family proceedings; (ii) proper classification, or 
contextualisation, of these difficulties within the existing theoretical framework of the 
law; (iii) a possible, practical, way forward in terms of the application of broad legal 
principle and precedent to these difficulties.  The overarching aim of these publications 
was, therefore, to promote knowledge exchange in order to generate “identifiable 
benefits”315 to relevant professionals, the academic community and perhaps even Scottish 
and UK society as a whole.  
 
Next, in section 4 of this chapter, consideration is given to the approach adopted, using 
traditional legal research methods, toward these publications.  
 
 
1.4.  Observations on Approach Adopted in Publications 
 
In this section, my general approach to researching and writing up ‘A child is, after all, a 
child’’, ‘Moral actors in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H (Children)’ is outlined and 
critiqued.  
 
(i)  General Approach of Publications 1 and 2  
 
The focus of Publications 1 and 2 (‘A child is, after all, a child’ and ‘Moral actors in 
their own right’) were the difficulties increasingly facing practitioners coming into 
contact with children in complex and often high conflict family proceedings. 316   In 
particular, Publications 1 and 2 addressed the uncertainty surrounding the exercise by the 
child of her “right to express” a view in respect of “all matters affecting” her.317  
Questions to which no satisfying answer had been suggested in Scots law were posed and 
conclusions drawn with the intention of providing guidance to family practitioners.     
 
In Publication 1 (‘A child is, after all, a child’), the statutory framework (and 
international source of our domestic statutes) was outlined and a critical commentary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Edinburgh Napier University, “Research, Knowledge Transfer and Commercialisation Strategy 2009-15” 
(Amended 01 March 2012) – “Vision, Mission and Values”, at p 5, available: 
http://www.napier.ac.uk/randkt/documents/rktc_strategy.pdf.  
316 Publication 1 at p 123. 
317 Quotes taken from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘the UNCRC’), Article 12.  
The Domestic provisions which currently give effect to the Convention right were outlined in detail in 
Publication 1 and are discussed in the main text below. 
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provided.318  Thereafter, various “problem” children were grouped and the particular 
“practical, ethical and academic difficulties surrounding the expression of [their] 
views”319 addressed.  Thus, using the practical difficulties that had come to my attention 
through examining existing judicial rationale and using feedback provided by 
practitioners, four main “problem” categories were identified.  Corresponding publication 
sub-headings given: (1) “the manipulated or unduly influenced child”; (2) “the disturbed 
child”; (3) “the child affected by disability”; (4) “the underage child”.  In respect of each 
category, issues surrounding assessing competence, obtaining views and evaluating the 
level of credence that should properly be given to any views expressed was analysed.320   
 
In Publication 2, ‘Moral actors in their own right’, the occasions on which it might be 
either “practicable”321 or impracticable to take a child’s views were canvased and the 
“problematic issue of ensuring that proper regard”322 be given to any views expressed 
was explored.  The “wide range of means by which a Scottish child's views may 
legitimately be ascertained and managed in different circumstances”323 were outlined and 
evaluated.  These means were observed to be wide-ranging, although their use was 
cautioned in certain cases (e.g. the pitfalls of a child minuting into process324 where his or 
her views merely repeat those of an adult party).  The publication also addressed 
questions surrounding the “weight attributed to the child's views”, and the difficult issue 
of whether or not “confidentiality” could, or should, be afforded for such views.325 
 
‘A child is, after all, a child’ and ‘Moral actors in their own right’ were highly structured 
publications in which headings were used in an effort to target particular areas of 
difficulty and provide intellectually satisfying and practical answers.  In hindsight, I think 
that this approach was effective. I would not change the method by which I managed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Publication 1, at p 121 onwards. 
319 Publication 1, at p 123 - 126. 
320 Publication 1. p 123-126. 
321 The term “practicable” is taken from s 11(7)(b) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, and also from the 
judgment of Lord Marnoch in Shields v Shields, 2002 SC 246, at para 11: “… if, by one method or another, it is 
“practicable” to give a child the opportunity of expressing his views, then, in our view, the only safe course is 
to employ that method.” 
322 The statutory term “regard”, taken from s 11(7)(b)(iii) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995,  is discussed in 
Publications 1 and 2 insofar as the views of the child are concerned, see Publication 1 at p 122-3 and 
Publication 2 at p 139 onwards. 
323 Publication 1, p 139. 
324 Meaning that the child becomes a party, or litigant, to the case in her own right. 
325 Publication 1, at 142. 
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research material, nor the manner in which I approached, and set out, my research 
findings.326 
   
(ii)  General Approach of Publication 3 
 
The aim of Publication 3, ‘Re A-H (Children)’ was to further develop one emerging 
theme identified in Publications 1 and 2: “uncooperative litigant behaviour” in family 
proceedings, with particular emphasis upon “recalcitrant” children.327   
 
Re A-H (Children) struck me as a curious, and potentially significant, decision: a likely 
forerunner of similar cases to come in the UK.  My reasoning was that the Court of 
Appeal, in 2009, faced a very modern dilemma: a “teenager [who] simply would not 
obtemper any contact award granted”.328  The teenager (who was a 13 year old “child”329 
at the time of the judgment) had also written the court a letter entitled “Dear judge, I am 
writing to you because I think it’s pathetic…”  Wall LJ, who delivered the court’s 
opinion, took the highly unusual step of reproducing the child’s letter in his judgment.  
The opening words of the letter formed the longer title of Publication 3.330  The court’s 
dilemma in Re A-H (Children) was compounded by two matters: (i) the teenager’s letter 
revealed her “complete misapprehension”331 about both the intentions of her parents and 
the nature of family proceedings and (ii) since her views had been formed, and behaviour 
strongly encouraged, by one parent the teenager’s whole position was entirely “rooted in 
manipulation and fallacy”.332  The case was perhaps an example of one of the worst 
manifestations of the (apparent) operation of the child’s right to express a view. 
 
The judgment in Re A-H (Children) was set within a wider legal framework in the last 
section of the publication.  In particular, the new English statutory compliance framework 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 These publications are relatively recent.  It is certainly relieving to see an improvement in my research 
approach, presentation and structure over the course of the three years between Publications 1 and 2 and my 
first academic publication: ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”, discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
327 Quotes taken from Publication 3, at p 529.  
328 Quotes taken from Publication 3, at p 532. “Obtemper” means adhere to (i.e. the order was granted by the 
court and the party to whom it referred did not obey its terms).  This is the subject of further discussion in the 
text below. 
329 The teenager, ‘C’, fell within the parallel English legislation (ss 9(6); 9(7); 105 of the Children Act 1989) 
which provided that, as she was below the age of 18 years, she was a child and that, generally, 
contact/residence orders could be made in respect of her while she was below the age of 16 years (s 9(7)).  
Similar Scottish provisions are found in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (ss 1 and 2). 
330‘”Dear Judge, I am writing to you because I think it's pathetic”: Re A-H (Children)(Contact Order)’, 
Edinburgh Law Review, Vol 13, 2009, 528. 
331 Ibid, judgment at para 19. 
332 Quotes taken from Publication 3, at p 529. 
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and the (then) recent amendments to the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 were observed333 
to require that the court consider whether it is appropriate to grant a contact order when 
parties are unable to “co-operate … as respects matters affecting the child”. 334  
Consideration was give to the possible impact of these statutory provisions on 
’recalcitrant child’ scenarios and conclusions suggested.  
 
‘Re A-H (Children)’ was split into three sections: “(A) The (contemporary) intractable 
contact dispute; (B) “’Just’ or ‘Right’ means nothing but what is in the interest of the 
stronger party; (C) “So the question returns and abides: what, if anything, can we do?”  
As with Publications 1 and 2, a very tightly structured approach was adopted in the 
publication. 
 
The overall approach adopted in ‘Re A-H (Children)’ was, to a large extent, dictated to by 
word-count restraints.  In order to meet the requirements of the Edinburgh Law Review’s 
Analysis section, the publication, inclusive of footnotes, could not exceed 2,000 words.335  
This was the first time I had written an analytical case commentary, and such a succinct 
output. However, restraint is sometimes beneficial: in revisiting the publication I cannot 
see that there was anything significant lacking in content.  Also, any further content 
would have been directed to a wider purpose than a critical case commentary alone. 
 
In section 5 below, the research outcomes of these publications will be critically 
evaluated. 
 
1.5.  Reflections on Publication Research Outcomes 
 
It is not possible in this thesis, or desirable, to revisit the gamut of research outcomes in 
‘A child is, after all, a child’’, ‘Moral actors in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H (Children)’ 
concerning complex family proceedings and the young.  Many of the areas addressed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 These provisions are found in English and Scottish legislation, respectively, as follows: Children Act 1989, 
s 11J onwards; Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7A)-(7E).  Domestic abuse, or violence, was not a feature of 
Re A-H (Children). 
334 Publication 3, at p 532, referring to the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 11(7D)(b). (n.b. the Justice 1 
Committee decided against inserting compliance orders of the sort found in English legislation in Scottish 
legislation when the provisions of the recent Family Law (Scotland) Bill (now the 2006 Act) were debated). 
335 This remains the case. See, Edinburgh law Review, submissions notes: 
http://www.euppublishing.com/page/elr/submissions.  
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these publications have, in any event, remained static in Scots law over the last four 
years.336   
 
The Manipulated Child and the ‘Anti-Contact Movement’: discussion leading on from 
Publications 1 and 3 
 
Courts “impose solutions and stifle constructive dialogues”.337 Family proceedings are, as 
with all litigation, adversarial and often lengthy in nature. The Family court process itself 
can, accordingly, contribute to increasing parental polarisation and hostility – which in 
turn can place the child under increasing pressure.338 A paradox (predicable, but troubling 
nonetheless) has been observed concerning the participation of children in Family Law 
proceedings: 
  
“The more weight that is given to the children’s views, the greater the danger 
that they will be exposed to pressure from parents and manipulation, and the 
more likely they are to experience damaging loyalty conflicts.”339 
  
In this section, the publication outcomes of Re A-H (Children)’, ‘A child is, after all, a 
child’, ‘Moral actors in their own right’ pertaining to the manipulated child will be 
developed further.  In Publications 1 and 3 in particular, ascertaining what should be done 
with the view expressed by a child believed to be “manipulated or unduly influenced” 
was presented as a difficulty perceived as commonly encountered in the context of 
Family Law proceedings. Cashmore and Parkinson (2009) observed in their Australian 
family court-based research that “about half” of the parents they spoke to believed 
(whether rightly or wrongly) that the other parent was a “potential manipulator” of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 This is true, for example, insofar as confidentiality issues surrounding the expression by children of views in 
private family proceedings: Dosoo v Dosoo (No. 1) 1999 Fam LR 80; (No.2) 1999 Fam LR 130 and the other 
cases discussed in Publication 2 remain the leading authorities since there have been no further judgments of 
note on this issue. There have also been no further significant judgments on the views expressed by very young 
children in Scotland (i.e. the Stewart v Stewart, 2007 SC451 debate). 
337 ‘Children as victims of the Divorce Process’, chapter in Freeman M, (1983), Rights and Wrongs of 
Children, Pinter (London), at p 227.   
338 See, e.g., Smart C, Wade A, and Neale B, (1999), ‘Objects of Concern? – Children and Divorce’, Child 
and Family Law Quarterly, 11(4): 365-376; Smith AB, Taylor N and Tapp P, (2003), ‘Rethinking 
children’s involvement in decision-making after parental separation’, Childhood, 10(2), 201–216; 
Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law disputes: the views of 
children, parents, lawyers and counsellors’, research findings available at: 
http://www.mentalhealthacademy.net/journal_archive/aifs099.pdf. See also, Hunter R, (2007), ‘Close 
Encounters of a Judicial Kind: “Hearing” Children’s “Voices” in Family Law Proceedings’, (2007), Child 
and Family Law Quarterly, 19(3), 283. 
339 Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law.., ibid, at p 5. See also: 
Bradford K, Burns-Vaughn L and Barber B, (2008), When there is conflict: Interparental conflict, parent-
child conflict, and youth problem behaviours’, Journal of Family Issues, 29, 780-805. 
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child.340  As observed in Publication 1, a parent can be responsible for influencing a child 
against the other parent.341 It was also observed in Publication 1 that, in more extreme 
cases, courts have found that parental influence can be so intense that it amounts to 
“indoctrinat[ion]”342 of the child concerned.    
 
Such cases are usually characterised by recurrent court hearings about the child’s living 
arrangements, over many months or years, during which a number of measures are 
attempted, including, e.g., instructing welfare reports, the involvement of child 
psychologists, repeated orders of court (sometimes including coercive orders).  Sections 8 
– 14 of the Children Act 1989, as amended, contain a raft of provisions to address non-
compliance with court orders and other recalcitrant parental behaviours. In Scotland, 
there are no statutory mechanisms specifically created to address such parental conduct: 
common law remedies, such as admonishment, motions for finding a party in contempt 
are the remedies most commonly used. The child himself, or herself, can easily become 
lost in such judicial processes.343  However, the intractable nature of such high conflict 
litigation can be manifested by the manipulating parent’s use of the child’s expressed 
‘view’ both as a “weapon” against the other parent and as “protection against coercive 
judicial orders”.344 As might be expected, research has long-shown that ongoing parental 
conflict manifesting in a number of ways (from parents “using their children to carry 
hostile messages” to parents who “prohibit discussion of the other parent, or express 
verbal and physical aggression… toward the other parent in the presence of the 
children”345) is detrimental to children. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Publication 1, at p 123. Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law 
disputes…’ ibid. at p 21. 
341 Publication 1, at p 123, referring to W (Contact: Joining Child as a Party) 2003 Fam Law 225. In 
Publication 2, at p 140 onwards, general discussions about the communication, recording and weight given 
to children’s views is discussed. 
342 This was noted in Publication 1, quoting from K (Children) [2005] EWCA Civ 1691 at para 7. 
343 Cashmore J and Parkinson P, ((2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law.., ibid) observe, at p 16, 
that parents and other adults “can often play a gatekeeping role” which might significant restrict the child’s 
realistic participation in what the adults consider to be cases that are, perhaps, too difficult or stressful for 
them. This is also a criticism that has long been made (generally) in Scottish Family proceedings, see: 
Tisdall K, Baker R, Marshall K, Cleland A, (2002), Giving due regard to children's views in all matters that 
affect them, supra. 
344 Publication 3, at p 532. Here, the studies have long-shown that implicit or explicit parental conflict 
involving the child and his or her views or perceived views, is linked to a range of negative consequences 
for children and young people: ‘The use of Children’s Wishes’; Bradford K, Burns-Vaughn L and Barber 
B, (2008), When there is conflict: Inter-parental conflict, parent-child conflict, and youth problem 
behaviours’, Journal of Family Issues, 29, 780-805.  
345 See, e.g., Kelly, JB, (2003), Changing Perspectives on Children’s Adjustment Following Divorce: A 
View from the United States, Childhood, 10(2), 237 - 254 at 242. 
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Managing such disputes is problematic for all professionals concerned. 346  This is 
particularly true for Judges and Sheriffs who must oversee the process – with an 
increasingly watchful eye on the public purse.  Following Lord Reed’s criticism of the 
Scottish court system in B v G (2012), discussions about drastically improving case 
management, avoiding protracted Family cases, are high on the judicial and Government 
agenda.347  Seeking to bring a resolution that both respects the child’s right to be heard 
and retains his or her best interests as the paramount consideration is the court’s aim. 
Such complex, seemingly intractable, disputes were the focus of Publication 3. 
 
Here in Section 1.5, consideration of this area of particular and growing concern to the 
legal profession in Scotland, and elsewhere, is developed further.348 I seek, in the 
subsection below, to acknowledge that there are a range of perspectives about such cases 
and that, as some have argued, we still understand relatively little about them. This lack 
of knowledge generates problems of a theoretical and practical nature.349 Thereafter, I 
will seek to identify and critically analyse a range of judicial attitudes observable in UK 
court judgments towards these extreme cases involving children believed to be alienated 
from one parent as a result of deliberate, prolonged and intense manipulation. This 
discussion directly leads on from the observations made in Publications 1 and 3. 
 
Counter-arguments to the ideas of the ‘Anti-Contact Movement’ and the ‘Manipulated 
Child’ in academic literature 
 
The intractable cases outlined in the above subsection concern children who are believed 
to have been systematically alienated from one parent by the other. Here, it must be 
acknowledged that courts deal with family cases in a manner that provides only a 
snapshot of family life at a given (and very difficult) time. Courts, and lawyers, are 
sometimes criticised for failing to take on board important factors before simply 
classifying wide-ranging and complex family disputes as ‘systematic alienation’. There 
are other factors (e.g. a residential parent seeking to protect the child from latent, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 In Re A-H, for example, the involvement of a range of professionals (including, e.g., CAFCASS) to 
support the child, C, her mother and her father, had done little to resolve the dispute or to reduce the tension 
and conflict: judgment at par 21, discussed in Publication 3 at p 532. 
347 [2012] UKSC 21.  
348 See, e.g., D Smith, (2011), ‘Fought all the way’, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (‘JLSS’), 56(2), 
44 - 46; Morris G, (2009), ‘Family: Children’s Voices’, 159 NLJ 1721; Shaw M and Bazley J, (2011), 
‘Effective strategies in high conflict contact disputes’, Fam. Law, 41(10), 1129-1137. 
349 Bruch CS, (2002), ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children – getting it wrong in child 
custody cases’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 14(4), 381, at p 381-2. There is no universal definition of 
the syndrome (if indeed such a syndrome exists).  See thesis discussion in main text below. 
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destructive, behaviour of the other parent) that should be explored first.  Further, 
Johnston (2003) argues that the notion that children who are ‘alienated’ from their parents 
at the time of litigation is not necessary one that reflects any permanent reality: in the 
cases she studied, contact was often re-established at a later point in time.350 
 
Such cases typically involve a dispute over contact arrangements: they have often been 
categorised within legal process as “(parental) alienation”, 351 or “implacable hostility,”352 
cases. The phrases ‘anti-contact movement’ and ‘manipulated child’, used in this thesis, 
are not therefore intended to refer to (or to undermine) children who are “realistically 
estranged” 353 from one parent and are supported in that choice by the other parent.  One 
example of a realistic/healthy estrangement might include a child who is the victim of 
domestic abuse or violence carried out by the non-residential parent. 
 
Nor are the phrases ‘anti-contact’/ ‘parental alienation’ intended to refer to, or to 
undermine, the child involved in family proceedings who, for personal reasons (whether 
explained or not), does not wish contact with a parent.354 The UN Committee made it 
clear in its General Comment No. 12, first, that it is the child’s view (rather than any 
explanation for that view) that is being heard355 and, secondly, that the child has no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Johnston JR, (2003), ‘Parental Alignments and Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in Children 
of Divorce,’ Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 158-170.  
351 ‘Alienation’ is, e.g., the term used by Henaghan (2012) in his chapter based on empirical research of 
these cases in the Family Court process in New Zealand: ‘Why judges need to know and understand 
Childhood Studies’, in Freeman M (ed), Law and Childhood Studies, Open University Press (pp156-173). 
Others have used the term ‘parental alientation’ (although it is worth noting that this term and also 
discussions surrounding a “syndrome” are controversial): Gardner R, (2001),The Parental Alienation 
Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Family Law Quarterly 
527; Warshak R, (2003), ‘Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look at the Disputes and the Evidence’, 
Family Law Quarterly, 37(2), 273-301. Gardner has a great many critics, see, e.g., Bruch CS, (2002), 
‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children – getting it wrong in child custody cases’, Child and 
Family Law Quarterly, 14(4), 381, at 399, “PAS as developed and purveyed by Richard Gardner has 
neither a logical nor a scientific basis.”   
352 This is a term used to refer to such cases (sometimes featuring in the Law Report headnote). Notable 
recent reported UK cases include: Re L-W (Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact) 2010 EWCA 
Civ 1253; G v B 2011 S.L.T. 1253; K (Children)(Suspension of Contact) [2011] EWCA Civ 1064; B v B 
2011 Fam LR 141; M v S 2011 S.L.T. 918; Re E (A Child) [2011] EWHC 3521 (Fam). 
353 Johnston JB and Johnston J, (2001), ‘The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome’, Family Courts Review, 39: 249 at 263. See also: Morrison F, Tisdall EKM, Jones F, Reid A, 
(2013), ‘Child Contact Proceedings for Children Affected by Domestic Abuse’, A report to Scotland’s 
Commissioner for Children and Young People, (CRFR, University of Edinburgh, CL@N Childlaw), 
available at: http://clanchildlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Child-contact-proceedings-SCCYP-
report.pdf. 
354 See, e.g., chapter by Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court 
Proceedings when Parents Divorce or Separate, supra.  In the chapter, the experiences of “Claire”, from p 
166 onwards, indicate that children may havedeeply held views about not seeing a parent at a particular 
time but be unable to articulate those views in a way that is acceptable to the court.  
355 General Comment No. 12, para 19 onwards (“Literal Analysis of article 12). 
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responsibility to prove his or her view to be ‘reasonable’ by any adult standard.356 
Thirdly, the Committee observed that the child can only effectively be heard in a “child 
friendly”357 environment – i.e. in the case of Family proceedings, not one that is 
constructed on adult litigation paradigms of ‘averment’ and ‘evidence’. Judges and 
lawyers should, then, be criticised when they focus on a perceived necessity that the child 
rationalise, or defend, his or her views rather than simply listening to the child and taking 
any views expressed into consideration. There is a danger that the child’s views are 
simply ignored on account of the “disjuncture between what [the child] and the court 
[perceive] to be valid reasons for contact to stop”. 358 
 
However, in the case of an alienated child, the court considers that the views expressed 
do not represent what the child might feel if her or she were able, with true freedom, to 
express a view. 359  Consequently, the court seeks to determine whether the views 
expressed by an alienated/manipulated child “should be put to one side”.360 Setting aside 
the views of the child altogether, for any reason, is extremely controversial.361 Doing so, 
arguably, represents the imposition on the child of what adults think that the child should 
be thinking in these circumstances – citing the ‘best interests’ as the rationale. 
Undermining the views of children in this manner, whatever the situation and however 
uncomfortable or unpleasant these views may be for adults to accept, is treading on 
dangerous territory.362 Accordingly, the categorisation of the views of a child perceived 
as manipulated or alienated as being views that are immediately of suspect value is the 
first, broad, ‘counter argument’ that might be made against the existence of any such 
categorisation. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Ibid, para 20. 
357 Ibid, para 34, 134(c), 134(h). Para 34 states that a child “cannot be heard effectively where the 
environment is intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for her or his age. Proceedings must be 
both accessible and child-appropriate…” 
358 See, Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ibid, p 167. 
359 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), In the Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to 
Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent Divorce, (2nd ed.), Springer: New York, 
discuss what systematic alienation comprises in Chapter 13 – they, in fact, reformulate the “phenomenon” 
of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ as the ‘alienated child’, thus ensuring the child is at the centre of the 
issue. 
360 UNCRC, Article 12 (1). Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood 
Studies’, ibid, at p 43. 
361 See, e.g., Johnston JR, (2003), ‘Parental Alignments and Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in 
Children of Divorce,’ Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 158-170, c.f. Gardner R, 
(2001), The Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody 
Cases, 35 Family Law Quarterly 527.  
362  For general guidance about how to respect the child’ view across a range of scenarios, see: General 
Comment No. 12, para 20. See Krappmann L [then of UN Committee on Rights of Child], (2010), ‘The 
Weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the child)’, International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 18, 501-513.  
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A number of other counter arguments to the idea of ‘anti-contact’ and the manipulated 
child might be made. These arguments generally arise from concerns that the ‘anti-
contact’ or ‘alienated/manipulated child’ labels are applied – in ignorance – within the 
legal process to children involved in a wide range of high-conflict family disputes.363 As 
Johnston and Roseby (2009) observe: 
 
“Too often in divorce situations, all youngsters resisting visits with a parent 
are improperly [branded] “alienated”, and too frequently parents who 
question the value of visitation in these situations are labelled “alienating 
parents”.”364  
 
Two of the main counter arguments to the ideas, or categorisation, of the 
alienated/manipulated child and the ‘anti-contact’ parent will be discussed below, 
namely: (i) that the motivations of children refusing contact with one parent following 
separation and divorce are not always properly explored before the term ‘alienated child’ 
is applied to them, and (ii) that the concept of alienation itself, from a developmental 
perspective, is not properly understood in law. In other words, what judges and family 
lawyers (across a range of jurisdictions) assume constitutes alienation does not measure 
up to the “scientific probity”365 of any such condition. The broad lack of knowledge about 
alienation can be linked to a lack of understanding about how this might best be 
addressed when it does arise within the context of Family proceedings. As Bruch (2002) 
observed, following her research across a range of apparent ‘parental alienation’ family 
cases: 
 
“the vast majority of cases mentioning [parental alienation syndrome 
(‘PAS’)] reveal that one or more of the experts evaluated the case in the light 
of PAS, and there is nothing to suggest that anyone – expert, attorney, judge – 
thought to question whether the theory is well-founded or leads to sound 
recommendations or orders.” 366 
 
Insofar as counter argument (i) is concerned, carefully distinguishing alienated children 
from children who are, instead, resisting contact because they are in the midst of a 
difficult life transition is critically important. This is an exercise at which lawyers are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Bruch argues in her article that a lack of ‘rigorous analysis” about what ‘alienation’ is across the board 
by professionals dealing with children in complex Family Law cases is “endangering” children: (2002), 
‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children – getting it wrong in child custody cases’, Child and 
Family Law Quarterly, 14(4), 381, at p 381-2. 
364 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), In the Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to 
Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent Divorce, (2nd ed.), Springer: New York, p 
364. 
365 Ibid, at 389. 
366 See, e.g., Bruch, ibid, who argues, at p 389-390. 
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particularly skilled.367 “Multiple reasons” can be given as to why children resist contact 
and “only in very specific circumstances does this behaviour qualify as alienation”.368 
Even if it does qualify as ‘alienation’, not all scholars take the view that the alienated 
child’s views should be undermined.369 Kelly, Johnston (1997; 2003; 2004) and other 
leading researchers in the field suggest a range of reasons for resisting contact exist, some 
of which are: 
 
“resistance [that is] rooted in the normal developmental process… high-
conflict transition… resistance in response to the parent’s parenting style… 
the child’s concern about an emotionally fragile custodial parent…[resistance 
relating to] remarriage of a parent.”370  
 
Johnston (2004) concludes by reminding the reader of the inherent complexity of human 
beings; she writes “that most children who resist contact with one parent in favour of the 
other do so as a result of a mixture of many and varied factors”. 371 Like adults, children 
at times express preferences, and experience alignments to and estrangements from, 
people they love. In contrast to this organic process, the alienated child has been 
indoctrinated to persistently express: 
 
“negative feelings and beliefs (such as anger, hatred, rejection, and/or fear) 
toward a parent that are significantly disproportionate to the child’s actual 
experience with that parent.”372   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Although it must be observed here that mental health professionals, upon whom judges and lawyers 
might rely, have not always projected a uniform or properly “evaluative” discussing the approach of 
lawyers and other professionals. Bruch, ibid, at p392, criticises some of the peer-reviewed medical and 
psychological literature for “seriously misstat[ing]” the position, referring to, e.g., Conway Rand D, (1997), 
The Spectrum of Parental Alienation, American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 15(3) 23. 
368 Acklin MW, ‘Concepts, Assessment and Treatment of Children Who Refuse Visitation’, Paper given to 
the Hawaii State Bar Association, 24 July 2008, available at: 
http://dracklin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=41:concepts-assessment-a-
treatment-of-children-who-refuse-visitation&catid=20:journal-articles 
369 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (1997), In the Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to 
Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent Divorce, New York.  Here the writers 
argue, at p 218, that to ignore, or fail to adhere to the alienated child’s wishes wherever possible, would 
only “compound” the child’s “sense of powerlessness… rendering the children unseen and unheard in 
[family] disputes that are fought fraudulently ‘in the name of a child’”. 
370 Acklin MW, ‘Concepts, Assessment and Treatment of Children Who Refuse Visitation’, ibid, citing 
Johnston and Roseby, 1997, discussed above, Wallerstein JS and Kelly J B, (1980), Surviving the breakup: 
How children and parents cope with divorce, New York: Basic Book. 
371 Johnston’s studies are observed by Garber to be “the only scientific and empirical data on the subject 
presently available” (Garber B, (2010), Developmental Psychology for Family Law Professionals: Theory, 
Application and the Best Interests of the Child, Springer Publishing, p 266).  
372 Acklin MW, ‘Concepts, Assessment and Treatment of Children Who Refuse Visitation’, ibid, citing 
Clawar SS & Rivlin BV, (1991), Children held hostage: Dealing with programmed and brainwashed 
children, Chicago: American Bar Association.  It should be noted that the contemporary view seeks to 
address the issue with the alienated child as the “starting place” rather than the alienating parent (Johnston 
JR and Roseby V, (2009), at p 364. 
	   84	  
Such beliefs originate from the alienating behaviours of the aligned parent,373 rather than 
forming a part of the child’s own perceptions or emotional journey. Whether or not the 
aligned parent is being deliberately spiteful and vindictive, his or her behaviour is 
emotionally abusive.374 Lee and Oleson (2001) suggest that understanding whether a 
contact resistant child is in fact alienated “requires that a specially trained mental health 
professional or team of professionals conduct a child-centred systemic evaluation”.375 
Johnston and Rosenby (2009) observe that it can be very hard to determine whether a 
child is estranged or is in fact alienated, since there is often a “considerable overlap 
between the two” as both can “present” in much the same way.376 
 
A second ‘counter-argument’ to ideas of the ‘anti-contact movement’ and the ‘alienated 
child’ is observed above to be: (ii) an apparent lack of understanding of which high-
conflict family disputes should be identified as cases involving alienation. Here, a 
tendency to use the term ‘alienation’ with both a lack of knowledge and “rigorous 
analysis” can lead to lawyers “dramatically overstat[ing]” its occurrence.377 This is 
particularly problematic since, in a family litigation, highly conflicted families are 
already “disproportionately represented”. 378  Bruch (2002) argues that “far greater 
interdisciplinary training and competence in scientific methodology [is] needed” for 
lawyers so that they can scrupulously address assertions of alienation in Family Law 
proceedings.379   
 
Concern about how courts might correctly identify, and properly address issues in 
apparent anti-contact/manipulated child cases is not restricted to the UK. A consensus 
among many researchers is that trained family therapists or counsellors are integral to 
combatting alienation scenarios (Johnston and Roseby, 2009; Parkinson and Cashmore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), In the Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to 
Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent Divorce, (2nd ed.), Springer: New York, 
discussed from p 366-380 (Chapter 13). 
374 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), discuss complex manifestations of alienation in In the Name of the 
Child: A Developmental Approach to Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent 
Divorce, ibid, chapter 13. 
375 Lee S and Oleson N, (2001), Assessing for alienation in child custody and access evaluations, Family 
Court Review, 39(3), 282-298, at p 282.  
376 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), In the Name of the Child, ibid, discuss how best to address this Part 
III of their book “Interventions on Behalf of Children in High-Conflict and Violent Divorce”.  
377 Bruch CS, (2002), ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children – getting it wrong in child 
custody cases’, supra, at 381; 382. 
378 Maccoby EE and Mnookin, RH, (1992), Dividing the Child – Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody, 
Harvard University Press, at 132. 
379 Ibid.  Bruch’s critical analysis of case law extends principally to the USA and England. 
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(2008)). 380  In a recent study by Henaghan (2012), the practices used by the Family Court 
of New Zealand381 in taking the views of children across a range of Family Law cases 
was observed. A sample of the cases involved what were termed “alienation cases”382 
(i.e. anti-contact/manipulated child). As with the UK, these cases were observed to create 
particular difficulties within the Family Court process because:  
 
“the child [had] normally internalized negative views of the so-called 
alienated parent.  A choice [had] to be made as to whether these views should 
be given weight, or whether they should be put to one side…”383 
 
The New Zealand study findings make interesting reading: weight was given to the 
child’s view in only one third of the “alienation cases” (with age and maturity affecting 
weight).384 However, it was found that the more vociferous the child’s views, the less 
likely the court generally was to interfere with those views.385 Childhood researchers are 
not in agreement as to whether this is the correct approach for children who are coping 
with such an “entangled web of parental conflict”. 386  While professional child 
psychologists were routinely appointed in the New Zealand cases by the Family Court, 
not all psychologists “place[d] a strong emphasis on listening to children”.387 Inconsistent 
understanding and approach by professionals in the family court system have been 
observed in a number of jurisdictions.388  It is suggested that contemporary empirical 
research in the UK, and in Scotland, is much needed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 See, e.g., Kelly J B and Johnston J R, (2001), ‘The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome’, supra; Warshak RA, (2003), ‘Payoffs and pitfalls of listening to children’, supra; 
Bradford K, Burns-Vaughn L and Barber B, (2008), When there is conflict: Interparental conflict, parent-
child conflict, and youth problem behaviours’, supra. 
381 The findings of the study, based on 120 Family Court cases between 2005 and 2010, are the focus of: 
Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, ibid. The assumed 
starting place in the study was that these cases had been correctly identified as “alienation” cases, rather 
than another kind of case in which alienation from the contact parent is a healthy step for the child. 
382 “Alienation cases” were stated, at p 43, to be those in which the court had observed that “the child has… 
internalized negative views of the so-called alienated parent”. 
383 Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, ibid, at p 43. 
384 Ibid, at p 48. 
385 Ibid, at p 44. 
386 Quote, ibid, at p 44. Gardner states that the “only way to break the deadlock of alienation is to remove 
the child from the alienating parent and place them with the alienated parent”:  Gardner R, The Parental 
Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Family Law 
Quarterly 527. However, see above for criticisms of Gardner. Johnston and Roseby take the view that any 
conduct which might seem “punitive and coercive” to the child will “[compound his or her] sense of 
powerlessness as [a person in his or her] own right”, at p 149 in Johnston JR and Roseby V, (1997), In the 
Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and 
Violent Divorce, New York.  
387 Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, supra, at p 42-44. 
388 See discussions of, e.g., Bruch CS, (2002), ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children’, 
supra; (USA and UK) and Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law 
disputes: the views of children, parents, lawyers and counsellors’, supra; Parkinson P and Cashmore J, 
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In the next subsection, my discussion about ‘anti-contact’ parents and the 
alienated/manipulated child is linked to the conceptual framework of this thesis. 
 
The Anti-Contact Movement/Manipulated Child: Rights, Status and Capacity  
 
The conceptual framework of this thesis, as it relates to the child’s rights, status and 
capacity has been outlined and developed in the thesis Introduction (“(II) Conceptual 
Framework of Critical Analysis: Rights, Status and Capacity: Child Capacity and the 
alienated/manipulated child”).  As was observed there, where ‘alienated’, or manipulated 
children express views, they are doing so in a broader environment that is likely to be 
“intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for [their] age”.389 This affords no right 
to express a view freely.  The child who has been alienated from one or more members of 
his or her family is also giving his or her view in an uninformed context since he or she 
lacks the proper information upon which to base an informed view. According to the UN 
Committee, the “right to information is essential, because it is the precondition of the 
child’s clarified decisions”.390  
 
Where themes of status and capacity are concerned, children involved in high conflict 
parental disputes are “particularly vulnerable; [since] their internal models of family 
relationships distorted”. 391  In such a context, researchers have long observed that 
alienation experiences can interfere with the child’s capacity to reach decisions.392 Family 
lawyers and judges also face difficult questions about determining a child’s capacity to 
engage in the judicial process in such circumstances.  In Re H (A Minor)(Guardian ad 
Litem: requirement), the court considered whether a child being alienated from one 
parent by another still possessed the capacity to express a view. Booth J said:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2008), The voice of the Child in Family Law disputes, OUP (Australia); Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges 
need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, supra, (New Zealand). 
389 UN Committee, General Comment No. 12, para 34. 
390 Ibid, para 25. 
391 Johnston JR and Roseby V, (2009), In the Name of the Child: A Developmental Approach to 
Understanding and Helping Children of Conflicted and Violent Divorce, ibid, at p 324. 
392 Garber B (with reference to longstanding research (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969), describes alienation as 
“a contamination of the child’s internal working model”: Garber B, (2010), Developmental Psychology for 
Family Law Professionals: Theory, Application and the Best Interests of the Child, Springer Publishing, p 
266; Johnston JR, (2003), ‘Parental Alignments and Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in 
Children of Divorce,’ Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 158-170. 
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“I ask myself, has the [adult] influence been so intense… as to destroy 
capacity…?”393  
 
Critically analysing judicial benchmarks for ascertaining the child’s legal capacity to 
form his or her own views is a focus of my work, as is the extent to which courts balance 
the child’s right to express a view against the child’s best interests.394 Accordingly, my 
discussion of the alienated/manipulated child is linked to the interconnected themes of 
rights, status and (in particular) capacity. 
 
Here in this subsection, consideration of the child who is, or who may be, a victim of 
alienation has been placed within the conceptual framework of this thesis. In the 
following subsection, various judicial approaches of UK Family courts in respect of 
alienated/manipulated child scenarios are critically analysed. 
 
(i)  Alienated/Manipulated Children: the Anti-Contact Movement 
 
In post-separation parental disputes about child-care and upbringing the position in 
contemporary law and practice (before 2008, and to date) seems dictated by common 
sense and basic social compassion.  Accordingly, other than in circumstances where there 
is a clear justification for no contact,395 it is considered important that children retain a 
positive relationship with both parents:396 this is something that the law may be used to 
encourage (and where necessary enforce).  Here, it is worth noting that my research has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 [1994} Fam 11, at para, discussed in Publication 1 at p 123. 
394 See, e.g., Publication 1, p 123 onwards. The child’s view versus the child’s best interest debate a 
particular focus in Section 1.5 below and has been considered above in the context of the broader socio-
legal literature. 
395 See, e.g, K (Children)(Suspension of Contact) [2011] EWCA Civ 1064, in which a parent on the sex 
offenders’ register was refused a contact award.  Similarly, in B v B, [2011] CSOH 127, a mother’s application 
for contact was refused on the grounds that she suffered from “a delusional disorder and had acted and held 
beliefs contrary to her child's best interests”. 
396 The modern authorities for this in Scots law are the cases of White v White 2001 SC 689; J v J 2004 Fam LR 
20, per Lord Abernethy (delivering the opinion of the Inner House): “the normal assumption that children 
would benefit from continued contact with their natural parents” at para 6. Generally speaking, contact with 
family and kin is believed to be a positive feature in children’s lives: E.g., Davies explored the manner in 
which seeing family members enables children to “feel connected to and develop affinities with others”, and 
noted “intra-family conflict” as something in which a number of children she observed found themselves to be 
“indirect participants”, a consequence of which was the “diminished… ability to share contact with estranged 
kin”.  She reflected that “the child\s desire to see a family member can be quashed by a residential parent”, 
resulting in the loss of an otherwise positive relationships between the child and the family member concerned 
(Davies H, (2012), Affinities, seeing and feeling like family: Exploring why children value face-to-face 
contact, Childhood, 19(1), 8-23), at pp 8; 19; 20. 
	   88	  
not so far been concerned with contact proceedings in which domestic abuse is a 
factor.397   
 
Children generally wish to maintain relations with both parents regardless of, even 
blatant, discord between separated parents.  However, as was observed recently by the 
Family Court in England, “a child's views can be shaped by quite subtle behaviour by a 
parent”.398  It can, accordingly, be very difficult for courts to determine in high conflict 
family proceedings whether the child’s ability to form an independent view has been 
undermined by a parent.   
 
Manipulated child scenarios are an unpleasant, and it seems largely unexpected, by-
product of affording children the right to express a view.399  Such scenarios have typically 
arisen in litigation when a child old enough to express a view resides with a parent (‘the 
residential parent’) who, for whatever reason,400 post-separation, is strongly opposed to 
the child spending time with the other parent (‘the contact parent’).  These undue 
influence cases are particularly sad, since children who have previously enjoyed a close 
and loving relationship with a parent then experience complete alienation from that 
parent.401  Such cases can also be extremely complex: children can be “liable to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 It is my intention to research the application of s 11(7A-E) of the 1995 Act in respect of cases in which 
allegations of domestic abuse are made in the future. There is, as yet, relatively little reported case law on these 
provisions. For a recent application of the provisions of s 11(7A-E) of the 1995 Act see, e.g., JB v AG 2013 
G.W.D. 3-96, in which the allegations of “abuse” in that case did not involve physical abuse and did “not 
outweigh other positive factors favouring the continuation of contact”.  The 7 year old child involved in JB v 
AG wished contact with her father. It was held by Sheriff Thornton, notwithstanding some degree of abusive 
conduct on the father’s part, that “it was conducive to her welfare that she should continue to have contact with 
him and that he should continue to have parental responsibilities and rights”. The Centre for Research on 
Families and Relationships is in the process of producing a report on ‘Contact Proceedings for Children 
Affected by Domestic Abuse’ (based on a briefing paper produced, in January 2013, for Scotland’s 
Commissioner for Children and Young People by the Centre’s Fiona Morrison and E Kay M Tisdall), with the 
collaboration of Fiona Jones and Alison Reid of CL@N, briefing paper available at: 
http://www.sccyp.org.uk/downloads/Adult%20Reports/Child_contact_proceedings_March_2013.pdf.  
398 Re N (a child) (religion: Jehovah's witness) [2011] EWHC 3737 (Fam), per Bellamy J, at para 59. 
399 Certainly, the manipulated child scenario seems to have been an unexpected by-product by lawyers, 
whatever other professions might have anticipated.  Neither Article 12 of the UN Convention, as translated into 
substantive domestic statute, nor our contemporary procedural rules provide for the rather awkward scenario of 
parental manipulation. Indeed, as more extreme cases have arisen in Scottish courts, our judiciary has required 
to resort to generic remedies such as the archaic (and, certainly, last resort) common law remedy of contempt 
of court: see, e.g, G v B 2011 S.L.T. 1253.   
400 In more recent years, courts have (particularly in Scotland) assumed, when such manipulative parental 
behaviour appears to be ongoing, that the very worst of intentions exist. See, e.g. the comments of Lord Gill at 
paras 47-49 in G v B, supra: an “attempt by a custodial parent to sever the bond between the other parent and 
child by means of delaying tactics and protracted defiance of a court order, constituted a grave contempt of 
court were… simply part of the manipulative stratagems by which she had frustrated the father's attempts for 
several years to have contact with his child.” 
401 This is, of course, what happened in respect of ‘C’, the teenager in Re A-H (Children), the case that was the 
focus of Publication 2. While the term “parental alienation syndrome” has achieved some recognition, and 
notoriety, world-wide (and has made its way into European case law, most notably Elsholz v Germany [2000] 2 
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vulnerable and impressionable… lacking… insight”,402 particularly when experiencing 
acrimonious family breakdown.  In addition, parental manipulation is often insidiously 
conducted and so can be difficult for lawyers and other professionals to identify – and 
even harder to resolve positively, certainly in the shorter term.403  This was the case in 
2008/9, and it seems that little has changed in contemporary law and society.404 
 
It was concluded in ‘A child is, after all, a child’ that it was “unlikely” that a Scottish 
court would “deem [an otherwise competent 405] child incapable of expressing a view 
simply because of, even very strong, adult manipulation”.  However, the importance of 
recording the child’s views in a location removed from an alleged manipulative parent 
was stressed in Publication 2.406  It was thought that unhealthy adult influence would be 
“addressed [when the court decided] how much weight to attribute to the child’s 
views”.407  It remains the case today that the wishes of clearly manipulated children 
capable of expressing a view are recorded by courts and given regard: the weight such 
views will carry depends entirely upon the judicial approach adopted.  In the research 
outcomes of Publications 1, 2 and 3 it was observed that two, broad trends in respect of 
unduly influenced, competent, children were emerging in UK judicial rationale.   
 
Where the child’s rights, status and capacity are concerned, the broader literature 
indicates that ‘sidelining’ the child’s views in high conflict Family Law proceedings can 
be detrimental to the child’s wellbeing.408  It is also undermining of the child’s status as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
FLR 486, and some English judgments) it is not a term that has been utilised by Scottish courts in family 
proceedings. 
402 Re S (A Minor)(Independent Representation) [1993] Fam 263, per Sir Thomas Bingham, as discussed in 
Publication 1, at p 121. 
403 Some radical solutions to “alienation” have been suggested, although these have not generally found favour 
in UK courts. Lowenstein L, writing in “Parental Alienation Due to a Shared Psychotic Disorder (Folie a 
Deux)” ((2006) 170 JPN 467) recommended “destroying the folie a deux pathological relationship of the child 
and the alienator by removing the child either to the alienated parent or an independent party while the child is 
being provided with therapy…” 
404 See, e.g, the difficulties observed by courts in the recent case that were similar in nature to those cases 
discussed in Publications 1, 2 and 3: Re S (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 447, per Thorpe LJ, at para 12: 
“Plainly the children need respite, not just from litigation but from interrogation, so bringing in a fresh expert 
at this stage has its disadvantages which can only be matched by the greatest sensitivity on the part of the 
expert instructed.” For a similar, recent Scottish judgment, see the judgment of the Inner House in B v G [2010] 
CSIH 83.  
405 The term “competent” here, unless otherwise defined, takes its normal meaning within the context of family 
law and means competent to express a view in family proceedings. 
406 Publication 2, p 140 – 141. 
407 Publication 2, at p 124. 
408 Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), ‘Children’s participation in family law.., ibid, at p 5. See also: 
Bradford K, Burns-Vaughn L and Barber B, (2008), When there is conflict: Interparental conflict, parent-
child conflict, and youth problem behaviours’, Journal of Family Issues, 29, 780-805. See also chapter by 
Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court Proceedings when Parents 
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rights-bearer and, more specifically, of his or her right to participate.409 Any questions 
about the child’s capacity to express a view in such scenarios can become rather circular 
questions concerning the ‘best interests versus the child’s views’ debate.410 Here, the 
concern is that the child who does not say what the legal profession wish to hear (and 
consider ‘reasonable’) in terms of judicious case management of a complex family 
dispute is deemed to be lacking capacity.  
 
The trends observed below, through ‘black letter law’ doctrinal analysis, therefore form 
one contribution from a traditional legal research perspective, to the broader 
interdisciplinary discussions (as outlined in the relevant Sections above) concerning 
children’s involvement in such Family law proceedings. The judicial trends can be 
outlined and reflected upon as follows: 
 
(ii) Trend 1 – Best interests trump child’s views: strive to fix what’s broken     
 
The first, and perhaps more satisfying, judicial trend identified in Publications 1, 2 and 3 
was to refuse to reward obvious parental manipulation and, instead, intervene in an effort 
to resolve issues with some degree of ongoing judicial supervision.  However, a 
significant issue is that this approach was (and remains), on the face of it, dependent upon 
courts granting orders in opposition to the, often strongly expressed, views of 
manipulated children. 411   Accordingly, some Scottish courts (and their English 
counterparts) have made contact orders notwithstanding that children have been entirely 
alienated from the contact parent.  In J v J, for example, a 2004 judgment that remains a 
leading Inner House authority today, Lord Abernethy said:  
 
“The welfare of the children [is] paramount … their views [are] a factor to be 
taken into account … they were liable to be upset at the outset if contact were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Divorce or Separate: Legal Constructions and Lived Experiences’, in Freeman M (ed), Law and Childhood 
Studies, Open University Press (pp156-173).   
409 Freeman M, (2007), ‘Why it remains important to take Children’s Rights seriously International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 15. 
410 Warshak RA, (2003), ‘Payoffs and pitfalls of listening to children’, Family Relations, 52, 373-384; 
Taylor N, Tapp P and Henaghan M, (2007), ‘Respecting Children’s Participation in Family Law 
Proceedings’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 15, 61-82; Quennerstedt A, (2010), ‘Children, But 
Not Really Humans? Critical Reflections on the Hampering Effects of the “3 p’s”’, International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 18, 619-635. 
411 A recent study has cast doubt over whether courts, and other professionals, should rely too heavily upon the 
views expressed by children in the midst of high conflict parental litigation: Weir, K. (2011), ‘High Conflict 
Contact Disputes: Evidence of the extreme unreliability of some children’s ascertainable wishes and feelings’, 
Family Court Review, 49: 788–800. doi: 10.1111/j.1744-1617.2011.01414.x This study is discussed further in 
the chapter main text below. 
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resumed. Their temporary distress … should not stand in the way of what was 
in their long term best interests.” 412 
 
The court in J v J went on to make a contact award in favour of an alienated father, with 
that award being made, explicitly, against the wishes of the children concerned.  In other 
judgments, courts sought through continual involvement and monitoring 413 to mitigate 
the effect of parental manipulation.  At times, courts have employed the services of other 
child-care professionals, such as psychiatrists, psychologists, specialist charities and 
mediators.414  Often this prolonged judicial involvement in family life, having at its focus 
the children’s longer-term best interests, 415  has been contrary to the wishes of 
manipulated children concerned. 
 
The ‘best interests’ versus ‘rights’ of the young debate 416 is one that pervades much of 
Scots law, and it is often in evidence when courts balance a child’s views in family 
proceedings.  It is one thing to impose what is objectively considered best on a child of 8 
or 9 years old, but quite another to seek to do that with a teenager holding strong views.  
This is the stage at which Trend 1 has, in practice, typically broken down.  In Publication 
3, it was noted that the children in J v J, at aged 7 and 10 years old respectively, were 
considerably younger than the teenager in Re A-H (Children) who, at 13 years old, was 
believed to possess more of an “independent mind”.417  It was also observed that family 
courts face an unenviable task in seeking to ensure “that [their] orders are upheld” in 
these cases involving older children, or those on the brink of adulthood.  Unlike the adults 
involved, such children (or, young people) are, it seems, free to ignore without 
consequence family court orders concerning them.418  It is perhaps a dangerous thing to 
endow any rational being with rights to which little accountability or responsibilities 
attach. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 J v J, 2004 Fam LR 20, at para 11.  The case is discussed at p 124 in Publication 1. 
413 Discussed in Publication 1. at p 123, with reference in particular to the case of: W (Contact: Joining Child 
as Party), 2003 Fam Law 225.  
414 This was done in the Re W case and suggested in Re A-H.  In Re S (A Minor)(Independent Representation) 
[1993] Fam 263  the Court of Appeal refused to grant the petition of a 12 year old child to remove his court 
appointed guardian in highly contested proceedings. 
415 For example, the child in Re A-H (Children), under the watchful eye of her mother, had frustrated attempts 
by a court appointed reporter, a formal guardian and by CAFCASS to reconcile her to her father and restore the 
formerly “perfectly happy” relationship they once enjoyed: discussed in Publication 3 at p 529 -530. 
416 The best interests/welfare versus child’s views debate is considered, in respect of medical treatment 
concerning transsexuality and the young in Chapter 4, which is concerned with Publication 8 on Kidulthood 
and transsexuality. 
417 Publication 3, at p 532, referencing para 18 of the court’s judgment. 
418 This is discussed at p 532 of Publication 3.  It was, however, observed in Publication 3 at p 529, that “it is 
generally believed that punishing [any] family member counteracts the court’s primary obligation to have 
regard to the child’s welfare”.   
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It seems, therefore, that ‘Trend 1’, whereby contact orders are granted for the greater 
good 419 against the wishes of manipulated (but competent) children, has its best chance 
of success before the child concerned becomes a teenager.  It was concluded in 
Publication 3 that judicial mechanisms for dealing with “intractable” disputes involving 
manipulated, contact-averse teenagers in civil proceedings are very limited.  In Re A-H 
(Children), Wall LJ observed that the irresolvable “question returns and abides: what, if 
anything, can we do?”420   
 
The research outcome of Publication 3, was a suggestion that, if teenagers cannot be 
compelled to obtemper family court orders, perhaps the interests of older children (and 
the “substantial” interests of the court “in seeing that its orders are upheld”) were best 
served by removing such disputes from the judiciary.  The alternative presented, and 
continues to present, as pointless: “pursuing orders which, it seems, remain[ed] 
unenforceable both north and south of the border.”421  
 
(iii) Trend 2 – Accept the child’s apparent views to reduce ongoing conflict: the contact 
parent loses out 
   
Unlike the first judicial approach towards manipulated children, which seeks to facilitate, 
and even impose, reconciliation upon children and estranged parents, the second trend 
could be termed that of ‘least resistance’.  Or, it might simply be that the court has 
recognised that a point has been reached whereby the “whole family is fed to death with 
litigation”.422  It is often, of course, not merely the ‘contact parent’ who suffers, but 
ultimately the child himself, or herself, who loses a parent, indefinitely (and often a 
perfectly good parent at that423).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 See, e.g, ML v IM, decision of Sheriff McGowan at Falkirk Sheriff Court (unreported) on 30 November 
2011 (available LexisLibrary), in which two children, aged 6 and 7, had previously expressed a desire to a 
court reporter to see their father but suspicions of anti-contact maternal influence had arisen (there were also 
religious issues in the case).  There, the Sheriff took the rather interesting approach of deliberately not speaking 
with the children again with a view to ascertaining the their views.  Being aware of their previously expressed 
views the Sheriff went on to make a contact award. (at para 111). 
420 Judgment at para 11, discussed in Publication 3. 
421 Publication 3, at p 533. 
422 Re S, Children [2010] EWCA Civ 447, Judgment at para 9. 
423 See, e.g, the observations noted in Publication 1 of the court in W (Contact: Joining Child as Party) 2003 
Fam Law 225, concerning the father of a boy who, fuelled by his mother, put an end to a healthy and happy 
relationship with his father by refusing to see him.  Dame E Butler-Sloss opined: “For my part, I would not 
think it right to close the door [on contact],” yet she expressed doubt that the court could “succeed” in restoring 
the relationship.  
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It was observed in the research outcomes of Publications 1, 2 and 3 that some courts 
opted to make no contact award in respect of “indoctrinated” children who had expressed 
strong views against spending time with an alienated parent over a sustained period of 
time.  This was the court’s approach in the 2005 English case of K v K, in which the 
Court of Appeal made no contact award in long-running, high conflict family 
proceedings, instead concluding:  
 
“whatever the cause of the children's hostility towards, and suspicion of, their 
father, it was apparent… that they derived little, if any positive benefit 
from… meetings with him.”424 
 
The children in the case were 8 and 11 years old respectively.  It is worth noting that, 
even when courts follow the ‘least resistance’ trend, and make no formal orders, it is 
more likely than not that some attempt has been made to encourage reconciliation 
between estranged parents and children.425  However, if no contact order is made and the 
family court process ends, the lack of ongoing judicial management of the case means 
that there is no accountability of former litigants for their actions (or, indeed, inactions). 
 
We live in the era of Children’s Rights:426 this is a necessary and positive reality.  There 
is also no doubt that what have been termed “implacable hostility”427 cases present the 
judiciary both North and South of the Border with a wholly unenviable task. However, 
while Trend 2, as adopted by the court in K v K above might, superficially, appear to 
respect the views of the child it is open to criticism because of its failure to address 
underlying psychological issues.  This begs the question today, as it did years before428 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 Publication 2. at p 123, reference made to K (Children) [2005] EWCA Civ 1691.  It should be noted that 
both parents were criticised for their behaviour in the judgment, which concerned a complex factual scenario. 
425 The eventual outcome of Re A-H (Contact) after various failed attempts to resuscitate the parent-child 
relationship was a referral by Wall LJ to a children’s advocacy charity.  This is discussed at p 532 of 
Publication 3. 
426 Although, it should be said that children’s rights have often not fared well under our present statutory 
regime in which the ECHRs has been incorporated into UK domestic law (Human Rights Act 1998) while the 
UNCRC has not. Parents’ rights therefore often have greater significance with “presumptions that paramountcy 
of the child’s welfare will adequately consider the child’s position”: Tisdall EKM et al, (2008), ‘Reflecting on 
Children’s and Young People’s Participation in the UK, International Journal of Children's Rights: Special 
Issue, 16(3), 343-354. See also, Tisdall EKM et al, (2008), ‘Is the honeymoon over? Children and Young 
People’s participation in public decision-making’, International Journal of Children’s Rights (Special Issue), 
16(3); 419-429.  The ‘trumping’ of children’s rights by parental rights can be seen, in particular, in the field of 
Education Law (discussed in Chapter 2). 
427 K (Children) [2005], citation above. Of course, in some cases, a desire on the part of a residential parent that 
there be no contact may be merited, and even desirable: see, e.g, K (Children)(Suspension of Contact) [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1064, in which a father “with a substantial criminal history including a number of sexual offences 
against children and was on the sex offenders register” was refused a contact award which was also opposed by 
the mother of his children. 
428 See, Young I and King P, (1988), ‘Children – the child as client’, LS Gaz, 14 Sep, 85 (20)), by a freelance 
social worker. The article, written before the UK ratified the UNCRC, observed that the psychological impact 
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2008: where courts adhere to views of the manipulated child, are they making decisions 
that are not based on the child’s genuine sentiments at all and, further, ruling in a manner 
detrimental to the child’s best interests?   
 
(iv) Contemporary management of children’s views in intractable disputes: 2008 to date 
 
Since Publications 1, 2 and 3 were published, there have been few significant decisions in 
Scottish courts concerning the management of children and teenagers believed to have 
been unduly influenced by a parent.  In B v B, 2011, a late application to minute into 
process (i.e. become an additional party to his parents’ ongoing litigation429) made on 
behalf of a child who strongly opposed contact with his father was considered.   In 
refusing the child’s application, Sheriff Principal Bowen observed that: 
 
“There was no Scottish authority on the circumstances in which a child of [12 
years old] should enter the process as a party… [t]he court should normally 
be able to have regard to the views of the child without the child entering the 
process… the possibility of harm caused by the additional pressures on him 
outweigh his right to be involved as a party.”430 
 
This rationale is interesting.  It suggests that, although Scottish courts are quite willing to 
hear the views of competent children (whether manipulated or not) they will certainly not 
encourage any great degree of involvement of such children in high conflict family 
proceedings.  The rather pragmatic approach of the court in B v B perhaps paid lip service 
to the ‘rights’ of the child, while being directed towards ensuring his best interest were 
served.  It was also an approach designed to minimise distress likely to be experienced by 
the child who, had he entered proceedings as a party, would have become fully versant in 
unsavory allegations made by either parent against the other.431 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
upon children who participated in adult-litigation was beyond the ordinary skills of a lawyer to address. 
429 B v B 2011 Fam LR 141: “minuting into process”, or (as it is sometimes termed) “becoming a third party 
minuter” means entering into ongoing litigation as an addition party.  It is an unusual step for solicitors to take 
on behalf of child clients.  In B v B, the existing parties to the litigation were the child’s mother and father in a 
contact dispute concerning him. 
430 Judgment at paras 7, 12, 21. It is interesting that Sheriff Principal Bowen observed, at para 12 of his 
judgment: “It was not relevant to take into account the fact that as a party to the action S would have access to 
information which might not be in his best interest to know. As a person with capacity to instruct solicitors, and 
the person most directly affected by the proceedings, he ought to be entitled to know what is said concerning 
him. But part of his discussion with his solicitors would involve discussion about the extent of his involvement 
in his proceedings.” There were also other technical reasons, relating to the lateness of the application, that 
mitigated against the child’s request to minute in being allowed. 
431 This is suggested throughout the court’s judgment, in particular at para 16. 
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In England, there has been more judicial discussion concerning intractable family 
disputes involving competent children who, being influenced by one parent, are estranged 
from the other.432  Some courts have tended towards Trend 1 (‘Best interests trump views: 
strive to fix what’s broken’) while others have tended towards endorsing Trend 2 (‘Accept 
the views to reduce ongoing conflict: the contact parent loses out’). 
 
Insofar as Trend 1 is concerned, an attempt was made to assert a degree of judicial 
authority (or paternalism?) over the exercise of the right of older children to express a 
view in Re S (Contact), in 2010.433  Here, a contact award was made in favour of a father 
in direct opposition to the expressed views of his 12 and 13 year old children who had 
been the victims of “deliberate and willful” manipulation by their mother against contact.  
In granting a contact award in favour of the father the court firmly based its judgment, not 
just upon what it perceived to be the children’s best interests, but upon some notion of 
justice, Thorpe LJ stating:  
 
“if wishes and feelings rule [the children] would be walking away from [their 
father]. But fortunately they do not and children of [this] age have to have 
their lives regulated by adult judgment.”434 
 
This approach would seem most likely to meet with success in respect of children who 
are not inclined to want contact with an estranged parent because they are confused, or 
distressed, as opposed to children who have been entirely brainwashed against that 
parent.435   
 
In marked contrast to the above, rather dogmatic, attempt of Thorpe LJ in Re S to ensure 
that an older child and a teenager 436 obtempered an order of the family court, other courts 
have instead preferred Trend 2, seeking to Accept the child’s apparent views to reduce 
ongoing conflict’.  The rationale of this second trend can be seen in the judgment, in late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Important English cases of note since 2008 include: B v S (Contempt: Imprisonment of Mother) [2009] 
EWCA Civ 548; Re A (Suspension of Residence Order) [2009] EWHC 1576 (Fam); Re L-W 
(Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253; Re S (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 
447, in which a contact order was granted against the express wishes of 12 and 13 year old children who had 
been the subject of maternal obstruction to contact that was “deliberate and willful”. 
433 Re S, Children [2010] EWCA Civ 447. 
434 Ibid, at para 7. 
435 For example, such orders would be likely to work in cases like Re A (Suspended Residence Order) ibid, in 
which, while the children “stated that they did not wish to have contact with their father some contact had 
taken place with “apparent success”.   
436 It should be noted that the judgment of the court in Re S was compassionate and well-reasoned.  Thorpe LJ 
went on to recommend that a “most senior consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist” instead become 
involved in the case to help and support the children.  
Judgment at paras 9 – 11. 
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2010, of the court in Re L-W (Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact).437  There, 
the Court of Appeal was considering appeals against five “enforcement orders”438 
following upon the failure of a 10 year old to attend for court ordered contact with his 
estranged mother in an intractable contact dispute with rather blatant elements of parental 
alienation.  There had been “persistent failure to comply” with contact awards granted in 
the course of prolonged litigation. The court reasoned that, despite the “affront to [its] 
dignity” demonstrated by the failure of the child attending for court ordered contact, it 
was entirely pointless to place:  
 
“… an intelligent 10-year-old in a position in which he can either keep his 
father out of prison by grudgingly going to see his mother or acquire a burden 
of guilt by persisting in his refusal and letting his father go to gaol… 
punishing the father not only cannot solve [the intractable dispute] but will 
exacerbate it.”439 
 
The court observed that, “instead of seeking to restore relations” between mother and son 
by using “the blunt instrument of [judicial] coercion” it would be better leave it be and 
“to let time take its course”.  Munby LJ, who delivered the court’s opinion, noted that it 
seemed “much more likely that [the child] will in his own time find his own way back to 
the affectionate relationship with his mother which both of them wish for. It may not 
happen, of course…” 440 
 
In the 2011 judgment, Re E (A Child),441 the Family Division of the High Court in 
England took the opportunity to issue some practical guidance to lower courts 
determining what appear to be intractable contact disputes.  The guidance included: (i) 
“[identifying] at an early stage those cases with the hallmarks of intractability”; (ii) the 
importance of “judicial continuity” and, where appropriate, the need for (iii) “a 
professional assessment of direct contact”.442  It remains to be seen whether Scottish 
courts will follow this persuasive precedent. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 2010 EWCA Civ 1253. 
438 Since 2008, specific statutory provisions has been made in England (unlike in Scotland) to empower courts 
to impose financial penalties in the event that parents fail to adhere to court orders made about their children in 
family proceedings. The Children Act 1989, as amended, s 11J, provides that where the court is “satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that a person has failed to comply with the contact order… it may make an 
enforcement order”.  The decision in Re L-W was followed in the later case Re H (A Child) (Contact: Adverse 
Findings of Fact), [2011] EWCA Civ 585. 
439 Judgment at para 105. 
440 Judgment at para 124. 
441 Re E (A Child) [2011] EWHC 3521 (Fam). 
442 Per Hedley J at paras 12 onwards in the judgment. The child involved in the case was 8 ½ years old at the 
time of proof. 
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Certainly, there have been noteworthy Scottish developments concerning the judicial 
management of other forms and expressions of psychologically abusive parenting since 
Publications 1, 2 and 3 appeared in the Edinburgh Law Review and the Scots Law Times.  
These are considered in the final sub-section of section 5 below.  
 
(v)  All About Eve (or Adam): a third emerging Trend in intractable family proceedings? 
 
Both judicial approaches in respect of the manipulation/estrangement cases discussed 
above (Trend 1, Best interests trump views: strive to fix what’s broken, and Trend 2, 
Accept the views to reduce ongoing conflict: the contact parent loses out) have as their 
primary focus either the child’s best interests or her views - or, as is often the case, a 
combination of both.  However, although there is not yet a large body of precedent, it 
seems that a third trend may now be emerging in UK courts.  Trend 3, which has as a 
principal motivation typically residential (and patently contact-averse) parents rather than 
children, has manifested itself in two ways.   
 
First, the parent unreasonably and relentlessly opposed to contact is likely to find that her, 
or indeed his, role as the residential parent is placed in jeopardy.443  That courts are 
willing to consider a transfer of a child’s residence from the contact-averse, manipulative 
parent to the estranged parent might be seen as a great (and, perhaps just?) step.  As 
might be expected, there has been a degree of judicial reluctance to change a child’s 
primary residence when the motivation is, at least in part, punishment of a recalcitrant 
parent.  Courts have, accordingly, been keen to stress that such a step would be a last 
resort.  In Re L-W (Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact) the Court of Appeal 
observed that, “short of an actual transfer of residence, the [lower] court had tried just 
about every other method to break the deadlock”.444 
 
Secondly, the entrenched, contact-averse parent is liable to be subject to severe criminal 
penalties445 for failure to obtemper court contact awards.  Increasingly, findings of 
“contempt” are being made.  And, since 2009, these penalties in Scottish cases have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 In, e.g, Re A (Suspended Residence Order) [2009] EWHC 1576 (Fam), the court considered an application 
for the removal of children, aged 8 and 11 from the residential care of their mother, who “vehemently” and 
“unremittingly” opposed contact between the children and their father.  It was held that the children “had 
suffered significant emotional harm as a result of M's conduct in demonising” their father and paternal 
grandparents. In Re L-W (Children)(Enforcement and Committal: Contact), ibid, the residential parent was the 
father. 
444 [2010] EWCA Civ 1253, judgment at para 69. 
445 There is now statutory provision for this in England : the new s 11J of the Children Act 1989.  See, e.g. Re 
H (A Child) (Contact: Adverse Findings of Fact), [2011] EWCA Civ 585. 
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begun to include custodial sentences for parents,446 regardless, it seems, of the age of the 
child concerned.447  Scottish courts, in particular, have been highly critical of the parents 
seeking to alienate their children from the other parent. The Lord Justice Clerk (Gill) 
observed in G v B that the behaviour of the mother of a 6 year old child who had 
repeatedly refused to obtemper a contact award in favour of her child’s father: 
 
“exemplifies yet another attempt by a custodial parent to sever the bond 
between the other parent and their child by means of delaying tactics and in 
due course by protracted defiance of an order of the court… Her defiance not 
only thwarted the respondent's rights but undermined the rule of law. Conduct 
of this kind constitutes a grave contempt of court.”448 
 
This new, hard-line, trend adopted by the Scottish judiciary in respect of such parents in 
prolonged, high conflict cases will doubtless be appreciated by beleaguered Scottish 
family practitioners representing parties in such high conflict disputes.  
 
However, any approach that does not have regard to the status of the child as a vulnerable 
individual deserving to be a very visible part of the Family law process must be 
questioned.449 Care must be taken to ensure that the child’s right to be heard is not lost 
within an evolving judicial ethos in which punishing parents is a primary motivation. 
Such a parent-centric approach (while perhaps appealing to a sense of justice) risks 
reinforcing traditional notions of the child as an “object”450 rather than a participant in 
disputes about him or her.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 The common law “contempt of court” process is invoked in Scotland because, unlike England, there is no 
statutory enforcement process in respect of family court orders.  In the recent Scottish judgment of G v B 
[2011] CSIH 56 a mother of a 6 year old child was jailed for 2 months for failure to obtemper a contact award.  
Her attempt to recall the imprisonment, using the nobile officium, was refused by the Inner House. In M v S 
2011 S.L.T. 918 another attempt by a mother to recall a n order for 3 months’ imprisonment following her 
failure to obtemper a contact award similarly was rejected by the Second Division.  See also other parent-
punishment arising from family proceedings: B v R, 2009 Fam LR 146, in which a recalcitrant contact father, 
who sought to estrange a 12 year old boy from his mother (the residential parent) was also found in 
“contempt”. 
447 See B v S (Contempt: Imprisonment of Mother) [2009] EWCA Civ 548, where the child concerned was a 
baby. In G v B (ibid), the child concerned was 6 years old. 
448 Judgment, at para 47, per LJC Gill. 
449 See, e.g., studies by See Cashmore J and Parkinson P, (2009), Children’s participation in family law 
disputes: the views of children, parents, lawyers and counsellors, research findings available at: 
http://www.mentalhealthacademy.net/journal_archive/aifs099.pdf.  Here the researchers found that, while 
placing children under a spotlight was noted often to be detrimental to them, the findings of the report were 
that everyone was happier when children were asked what they thought and their input (and the outcome of 
the case) was clearly explained to them. 
450 Baroness Hale, (2006), ‘Children’s Participation in Family Law Decision-Making: Lessons from 
Abroad’, Australian Journal of Family Law, 119 at 124. 
	   99	  
In this section, some of the research outcomes of ‘A child is, after all, a child’, ‘Moral 
actors in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H (Children)’ were developed further.  The analysis 
focused on emerging legal developments concerning the views and best interests of 
children and young people insofar as the ‘anti-contact movement’ is concerned.  
 
1.6. Concluding Comments 
 
Here, in Chapter 1, Publications 1, 2 and 3 (‘A child is, after all, a child’, ‘Moral actors 
in their own right’ and ‘Re A-H (Children)) have been critically appraised.  These 
publications were concerned with the first strand of my overarching research theme: a 
critical evaluation of the rights, status and capacity of the young in underdeveloped and 
emerging areas within Child and Family Law.  In particular, this chapter was concerned 
with legal issues impacting upon the young in their private family life, or home 
environment.   
 
Conceptual Framework: Rights, Status and Capacity - Contribution of Publications 1, 2 
and 3 
 
In my Thesis Conceptual Framework (“Introduction (II)”), Publications 1, 2 and 3 were 
placed within the broader academic literature concerning the rights, status and capacity of 
the young and disempowered adults as categories of individuals in underdeveloped and 
emerging areas of law. Publications 1, 2 and 3 were introduced as contributions about 
children resulting from a traditional legal research perspective. The limitations of 
traditional legal research methods were discussed in Section (III) of the Introduction.  
Each Publication sought to identify and critically analyse areas of Scots Civil Law that 
are concerned with matters affecting the child’s rights, status and capacity.  Thus, 
systematically addressing Publications 1, 2 and 3 in turn, I believe their contribution can 
be outlined as follows: 
 
Publications 1 and 2: consider the interpretation and application of relevant statutory 
provisions (i.e. core law data) concerning the child’s right to express a view in Scots 
Family proceedings.  A focus of both publications is the extent to which the child’s status 
as a valid participant with capacity to make personal choices is endorsed in the 
interpretation of statute by our courts.  The approaches adopted by courts, in particular, to 
scenarios in which the child’s capacity to express a view is considered to be undermined 
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were systematically categorised and evaluated. Both publications contribute to the 
existing body of work outlined in the thesis Introduction.  They do so by means of 
traditional doctrinal legal analysis.  In other words, the contribution is one of clarifying 
the law itself and seeking to develop a consensus within the legal community about what 
the interconnected concepts of the child’s rights, status and capacity actually mean within 
the context of ‘black letter’ Scottish Family law. 
 
Publication 3: is concerned with intractable, high conflict Family law proceedings.  The 
publication is non-doctrinal traditional legal research that is concerned with exploring a 
specific issue of difficulty arising in the context of Family cases. The principal focus of 
Publication 3 is the status and capacity of the contact-resistant child observed by the 
court to be misconceived due to parental manipulation. The judicial case management 
role was discussed and limitations in the statutory provisions governing such intractable 
disputes were highlighted.  In particular, it was noted (i) that children do not normally 
hold the status of parties to litigation and so should not be found in contempt for failing to 
adhere to any contact order made, and (ii) there exist differences in approach to 
intractable family disputes North and South of the Border insofar as the weight given to 
the child’s view is concerned. Publication 3 contributes to the existing literature by 
seeking to promote greater understanding about the status of children in high conflict 
cases for judges and lawyers who must make, interpret and implement Scots, or wider 
UK, law. 
 
Next, in Chapter 2, a reflective commentary of my publications concerning children and 
young people in wider society is provided.  
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2.1.  General Introduction to Publications 4, 5 and 6 
 
In the present chapter, the following publications are critically appraised:    
 
(i) Publication 4: ‘The Child’s Right to Education’, chapter in Children’s Rights 
in Scotland (3rd ed.), A Cleland and E. E. Sutherland, W Green (2009), pp 209 
– 231 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Child’s Right to Education’). 
 
(ii) Publication 5: ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs: the Teacher’s Duty of Care’, Juridical 
Review, 2009, 3, 189 – 207 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trips, Slips and 
Bangs’). 
 
(iii) Publication 6: ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’, Juridical Review, 
2010, 3, 195 – 215 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Contributory Negligence and 
the Child’). 
 
The published work above is concerned with the interactions of children and young 
people at school and within the community.  The publications are broad ranging in 
scope and nature.  Insofar as scope is concerned, in Publication 4 (‘The Child’s Right to 
Education’), the extent to which Scots Education Law honours the terms and spirit of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 451 was considered with reference to 
“contemporary statute, policy and practice”.452  In particular, emerging rights and 
remedies provided by the state in public statute for the young within the state school 
environment were critically evaluated.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 According to the UK Government Dept. for Education website, the UNCRC is “presently the most widely 
ratified international human rights treaty” and “the only international human rights treaty to include civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights”: http://www.education.gov.uk/b0074766/uncrc.  
452 Quotes taken from Publication 4, p 209. 
	   102	  
In Publication 5 (‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’) further consideration was given to the young 
in the field of education: pupils’ rights and remedies in the event of personal injury were 
the focus of this publication.  Decisions from a range of jurisdictions concerning “key 
aspects of the educator’s duty” and “what might be termed the ‘teacher’s duty of care’” 
in respect of school pupils were explored with a view to suggesting possible 
contemporary legal approaches in Scotland.453    
 
Finally, in terms of scope, Publication 6 (‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’) was 
a comprehensive study of the young as they interact with wider society.  More 
specifically, I considered “various complexities concerning child victims of Delictual 
wrong in” a wide range of scenarios in which “the defence of contributory negligence is, 
or might be, pled.”454   
 
Insofar as the nature of Publications 4, 5 and 6 is concerned, ‘The Child’s Right to 
Education’ (Publication 4) was a chapter in an academic/practitioner textbook, while 
Publications 5 and 6 were peer-reviewed articles.  The style, themes, content, and word 
count, of ‘The Child’s Right to Education’ were dictated by the general requirements of 
the well-established, 3rd edition, textbook of which it formed part.455  A reflective 
overview of the rights of the young within a whole field of Scots law was, accordingly, 
provided in Publication 4 in 2008 (all within a 10,000-word limit, including footnotes). 
   
In contrast, I was able to write in depth on certain, relatively narrow, issues concerning 
the young and civil law in ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs: the Teacher’s Duty of Care’ and 
‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’.  Since the focus of Publications 5 and 6 were 
areas of growing interest both to litigators and academics, the articles were published in 
the Juridical Review in 2009 and 2010 respectively.  The journal has a wide readership 
of law students, teachers and practitioners 456 and covers a diverse range of legal 
subjects and is published in four volumes per annum.  I had considerable freedom in my 
overall approach towards Publications 5 and 6, since the editor was very flexible in 
respect of word count and article substance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Quotes taken from the Abstract of Publication 5. 
454 Quotes from Publication 6, Abstract. 
455 Each successive edition of Children’s Rights in Scotland, Alison Cleland and Elaine Sutherland eds (3rd ed, 
2009) has been cited domestically and worldwide as a leading authority on its subject-matter. 
456 The journal is marketed as “Scotland's leading refereed law journal” and seeks to form “an authoritative and 
innovative perspective on recent case law” and “a valuable and respected source of reference for use in court 
“Sweet & Maxwell website, Juridical Review Catalogue / Product Details, available at: 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?productid=7122&recordid=475. 
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Next, in section 2, research rationale and independence of ‘The Child’s Right to 
Education’, ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’ and ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’ will 
be outlined.  In section 3, each publication will be contextualised: research premises and 
(key) research aims will be examined.  Thereafter, in sections 4 and 5, the approach 
adopted, and research outcomes of the publications will be evaluated.  Concluding 
chapter observations about the contribution of each publication to literature concerning 
rights, status and capacity follow in section 6.  
 
 
2.2. Rationale and Independence of Publications 
 
Over a decade ago, while in practice, I observed in an article written for the Journal of 
the Law Society of Scotland that Education Law was: 
 
“[A]n underdeveloped area in our legal system. Rarely taught or practised in 
Scotland, it lacks the detail and precision found in more popular legal 
fields.”457 
 
It seems generally accepted that Education Law remains a “complex” legal field, 
governed by a “fragmented framework of regulation” with a general dearth of case law 
existing to provide guidance.458  I continue to contribute to the limited body of legal 
writing concerning ongoing, and emerging, areas of difficulty within Education Law.459  
I also provide professional training460 in the field to Scottish lawyers and educators, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 , ‘The Right to Education’, L-A Barnes, Vol 46(7) June 2001, Journal of the Law Society (Scotland), 
footnotes not reproduced on the online version of the article, article available at: 
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/46-7/1000971.aspx#.UOX36I7w6SI. 
458 Quotes taken from review, by Dr Jane Mair, of Children’s Rights in Scotland Edin LR 2011, 15(1), 153 - 
154, and with reference to my chapter, The Child’s Right to Education’, Dr Mair comments: “It is clear from 
this whole collection that children's rights form a diverse and developing area of law. Some chapters, for 
example Lesley-Anne   Barnes' discussion of a child's right to education, show a very complex and fragmented 
framework of regulation. One of the strengths of the book is that the contributors succeed in illuminating these 
areas even where, as in education, there is “a general dearth of case law”. 
459 Some other Education Law publications not submitted in support of this thesis include, e.g., ‘Ready to 
Learn but disliking being taught’, March 2004, ENQUIRE; ‘When Social inclusion becomes Social exclusion’, 
September 2003, SCOLAG; ‘Fighting the Bullies’, Vol 51(16), August 2006, Journal of the Law Society 
(Scotland); ‘Sticks, Stones and Broken Bones (and legal expenses too?)’, January 2007, SCOLAG Journal 21.  
Most publications are listed on my University webpage, at: http://www.napier.ac.uk/business-
school/OurStaff/BusinessSchoolStaff/Pages/LesleyAnneBarnesMacfarlane.aspx .    
460 In 1999, I became one of the first Scottish solicitors to provide advice to pupils and parents, and training to 
‘Not for Profit’ bodies and local government on Education Law. I left practice in 2004 to teach at Edinburgh 
Napier University. My LLM (By Research) thesis (University of Strathclyde, 2008) was a comparison of the 
respective status, capacity and remedies available to (i) vulnerable employees (i.e. disempowered adults) in 
corporate environments and (ii) the young in the field of education. 
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develop knowledge sharing practice.461  Publications 4, 5 and 6 (‘The Child’s Right to 
Education’, ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’ and ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’) 
accordingly are the product of an ongoing research interest spanning almost 15 years.   
 
Publication 6 (‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’) is also about the possible 
impact of the Law of Delict upon the child’s interactions at school and in wider society: 
little has been written about this from a legal perspective in Scotland, or elsewhere.  
This is particularly true in respect of the child’s apparent partial or, perhaps even 
complete, “immunity from liability”462 (i.e. from the legal and financial consequences 
arising in civil law upon wrongdoing).  It is often suggested that the young deserve 
more temperate consideration of their negligence, or contributory negligence, than 
adults.463 However, the notion that any person, regardless of age, should be excused the 
consequences of his actions is at odds with the Law of Delict, which is “primarily 
concerned with the circumstances under which a person who suffers damage may 
recover compensation”.464  Thus, difficulties of legal theory, substance and practice 
linger: while most jurisdictions agree that “a person’s childhood is a relevant 
circumstance in negligence determinations”465 there is widespread disparity about the 
manner in which account is taken of childhood.    
 
The focus of ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’ is the legal difficulties outlined 
above that surround childhood and youth and arise in the Law of Delict, most 
particularly within the field of negligence.  These difficulties are also addressed (insofar 
as they relate to the educational environs) in The Child’s Right to Education’ and ‘Trips, 
Slips and Bangs’.  A critical analysis of the premise and aims of Publications 4, 5 and 6 
is given below.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 See, e.g., previous training events listed on my Edinburgh Napier University page: ‘Children with Special 
Needs’, Scottish Education Law Conference, Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw Bt QC, September 2004; ‘School 
Exclusions: Social exclusions’, Education Law Training, W.S. Society, July 2003; ‘An overview of Scots 
Education Law’, Law Conference, Law Society of Scotland, June 2002: http://www.napier.ac.uk/business-
school/OurStaff/BusinessSchoolStaff/Pages/LesleyAnneBarnesMacfarlane.aspx. 
462 Quotation taken from the Abstract of Publication 6. 
463  This is true of many decisions prior to, and most after, ratification by the UK of the UNCRC: Campbell v. 
Ord & Maddison, (1873), 1 R. 149, Creed v McGeoch Sons Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 1005; Galbraith’s Curator ad 
litem v Stewart (no 2) 1998 SLT 1305. See also, e.g., the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, s 2(3), which states 
occupiers should be ‘prepared for children to be less careful than adults’. 
464 McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199, per Menzies J (dissenting) at para 16. 
465 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Tentative Drafts), Aug 2008, Chapter 3: The 
Negligence Doctrine and Negligence Liability, at p 1. Final version published in march 2011, reviewed at: 
http://wakeforestlawreview.com/a-restatement-third-of-torts-liability-for-intentional-harm-to-persons-
reflections-on-professor-bublicks-thoughts.  
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2.3. Publications 4, 5 and 6 – Contextualising the Premise and Aim(s)  
 
The overarching premise and aim of all three publications considered in the present 
chapter was to contribute to contemporary understanding of the present, uncertain state 
of Scots law concerning children and aspects of their day-to-day interactions beyond the 
family unit.  
 
Publication 4, ‘The Child’s Right to Education,’ was a chapter forming part of a 
textbook, published in 2009, about the overall progress made in Scots Law towards 
“achieving complete respect for children’s rights in Scotland”.466  The premise of the 
textbook was that the time had come to take an “opportunity to consolidate and advance 
the process of analysing” developments in Scots Law since the previous (2nd) edition of 
the textbook had been published in 2001.467   
 
In Publication 4 it was observed that in an effort to “give full effect” to the UNCRC in 
Scotland, the recently “rebranded”468 Scottish Government had committed itself to 
ensuring that “all children receive the help and support they need in order to learn 
effectively”.469  Other developments had taken place in Scottish law and policy since 
2001, 470  and these had not yet been the subject of any comprehensive legal 
consideration from a children’s rights perspective.  The specific aim of ‘The Child’s 
Right to Education’ was, therefore, to provide a reflective: 
 
“overview of the extent to which rights provided in the UN Convention are 
visible in [Education Law] statute, policy and practice.”471 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 All quotes in this paragraph taken from the Preface (at p vii-viii) to the Third Edition of Children’s Rights in 
Scotland. 
467 Information about the 2nd edition of the textbook can be seen at: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Childrens-
Rights-Scotland-Elaine-Sutherland/dp/0414013492.  The UK Government had also recently submitted its 
“Consolidated 3rd and 4th Periodic Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child”, available at: 
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/u/uk%20government%20periodic%20report%20to%20the%20un
crc%20-%20july%202007.pdf.  
468 The Scottish Executive rebranded itself the “Scottish Government” in September 2007, the same year as the 
SNP assumed power: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6974798.stm.  
469 Quote taken from the Report on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
Scotland, at para 449 (Scottish Government Publication, Aug 2007), also cited at p 209 in Publication 4. 
470 These changes include, e.g, the School Education (Amendment)(Scotland) Act 2002 (discussed at p 214 in 
Publication 1); a complete overhaul of the “additional support needs” system in Scotland following the coming 
into force of the Education (Additional Support for Learning)(Scotland) Act 2004, and other subsequent 
legislation in this area of Education Law (see pp 215 – 218, 220 – 223 of Publication 1); the Scottish Schools 
(Parental Involvement) Act 2006, discussed at p 229 of Publication 4. 
471 Publication 4, at p 230. 
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The rights and remedies available to, or on behalf of, the young are also a feature of 
contemporary legal interest when they generate personal injury claims.  The young are 
often slow to appreciate “often the most obvious danger”,472 and so are particularly 
prone to meet with accidents as they interact with those around them.  Publication 5, 
‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’, focused on an issue of growing concern for educators:473  
 
“[a] burgeoning compensation culture in which educational funds [were] 
being diverted to settle claims.”474  
 
Educator liability for pupil injury was not a matter upon which significant reported case 
law within the UK exists – and this remains the case today.475  This suggests that 
Education Authorities might simply be “[accepting] liability for injuries in the 
classroom, sports field or playground” and paying out to avoid litigation.476  The 
premise of Publication 5 was that there was a need to address the nature the educator’s 
duty of care in respect of pupils, particularly those injured on the “periphery”477 of the 
educational environs.  The aim of ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’ was to explore comparative 
judicial rationale and provide some guidance about the likely extent of educator 
liability. 
 
There is an expectation in the Western world that law and policy-makers are “solicitous 
in protecting the interests of children” as they interact with those around them.478  The 
premise of Publication 6, ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’, was that only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Hardie v Sneddon, 1917 SC 1, at p 6, per Lord Salvesen. 
473 The term “educator’ refers to (i) “education authorities” responsible for state school education in terms of s 
135 of the Education (Scotland Act 1980, and (ii) independent schools registered on the Independent Schools 
Register in Scotland, in terms of s 98 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980. 
474 Publication 5, Abstract, at p 189.  For example, The Telegraph reported, on 6 Oct 2008, that “Almost £2 
million [had been] paid in playground accident claims”:  
475 There is a general increase in the online presence of Compensation Claims Agencies offering to obtain large 
amounts in the event of accidents, or incidents, within the educational environs giving rise to injury.  See 
Edinburgh case study involving a school child given by “You Claim” at: http://www.youclaim.co.uk/scottish-
injury/edinburgh-school-personal-injury-case-study.htm.  
476 See, e.g., “Ten pupils a week winning injury payouts from school accidents”, 26 Sept 2010, in which it is 
claimed that in 2009-10 UK councils paid out “£2.25 million” when they “accepted liability for injuries in the 
classroom, sports field or playground”, Smith H, The Metro, available at: http://mtero.co.uk/201/09/26/ten-
pupils-a-week-winning-payouts-from-school-accident.  It is hard to ascertain a clear picture of pupil claims and 
costs involved (Education Authorities do not, necessarily, publish this information).  However, insofar as 
education staff are concerned, Unions often maintain records of claims made and settled on behalf of their 
members.  According to recent statistics cited, “Teachers’ Injury Compensation Exceeded £25 million in 2011: 
http://bestinjuryclaims.co.uk/injury-claims-news/teachers-injury-compensation.  
477 Ibid. 
478 Quote taken from the judgment of Sir Thomas Bingham in Re S (A Minor)(Independent Representation) 
[1993] Fam 263, at 279, cited in Publication 6 at p 198. Also, all United Nations member states, except for the 
United States and Somalia, have ratified the UNCRC, which is intended to ensure that member states are 
committed to putting in place “special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection” for children 
(quotes from the preamble to the UNCRC, 1989). 
	   107	  
“tentative and superficial observations” had been made about the law concerning “child 
victims of Delictual wrong”, particularly where contributory negligence has been an 
issue.479  It certainly seemed to be the case that a child found by a court to be 
“contributory negligent” in respect of injury sustained (i.e. responsible in part for the 
injuries he or she sustained) would most likely have financial compensation reduced by 
courts.480  However, in 2009/10, no clear pattern had emerged concerning this – and 
none has emerged to date. 
 
As with the young in the context of family life, it was thought that capacity481 would (or 
should) have some bearing upon considerations of childhood liability in the Law of 
Delict.  The aim of Publication 6 was, accordingly, to explore judicial approaches from 
a range of jurisdictions in respect of childhood injury in an effort to make observations 
about a likely Scottish approach. 
 
In section 4, the approach adopted, using traditional legal research methods, in respect 
of each publication will be critically appraised.  
 
 
2.4.  Observations on Approach Adopted in Publications 
 
(i) General Approach of Publication 4  
 
The focus of ‘The Child’s Right to Education’ was the broad gamut of rights that the 
Scottish child may, in theory if not in practice, lay claim to within the field of education.  
 
The earlier sections in Publication 4 were taken up with providing a critical overview 
of: (i) the overarching Rights to Education found in Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Publication 6, Abstract at p 195. 
480 The provisions of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 enabled courts to apportion 
damages when both parties (i.e. the ‘victim’ and the ‘wrongdoer’) are found to be at fault. Section 1 of the 
1945 Act provides that “Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the 
fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the 
fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to 
such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for 
the damage”.  
481 The young in the context of family life were discussed with reference to Publications 1, 2 and 3 in Chapter 
1.  It is worth noting, however, that s 1(3) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 specifically 
excludes delict from the ambit of the Act.  The effect of this is that, in theory at least, a child may be liable in 
Scots law at any age in the Law of Delict. 
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European Convention on Human Rights and Articles 28 and 29482 of the UNCRC 
respectively; and (ii) “the child’s educational rights in [domestic] statute”.483  There it 
was noted, in particular, that there had been a definite shift, within Education Law and 
practice, away from recognition of parents’ rights and claims towards those afforded to 
children.  In the section entitled “The evolving focus of educational rights”, it was 
observed that more “welfare-orientated rights” were being “bestowed upon children” in 
Scottish legislation drafted after ratification of the UNCRC by the UK.  That parents 
gradually seemed to be yielding their rights to their children was noted to be: 
 
“a significant change in international and domestic focus.  The child, rather 
than his or her parents, is perceived as the holder of educational rights and the 
beneficiary of the resultant state duties”.484 
 
Although, at the time of writing up ‘The Child’s Right to Education’ there was “no 
reported education case in Scotland” in which the orders sought by a “legally-
represented child [had] contradicted those sought by her parents”485 the underlying 
theme of the chapter was that, within education, the child’s rights could not, and should 
not, be ignored.  The extent to which this was the position (and it is the position today) 
is considered in section 5 below when the research outcomes of the publication are 
discussed. 
 
In the remainder of Publication 4, in accordance with the rest of the textbook, key 
areas486 within Education Law (and the field of education itself) were discussed under 
separate headings and section conclusions drawn throughout about provision for 
children’s rights and participation.487 The clearly ‘signposted’ approach proved useful 
because the textbook is intended for a multi-disciplinary readership.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 These are the Articles of the UNCRC relating to school education.  While other articles, such as Article 23 
(concerning the Right of the disabled child to participate fully in his or her community, including access to 
“education and vocational services”), are concerned with education and related matters, school education is not 
the sole focus of these Articles. UNCRC available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm.  
483 Sections 11.1 to 11.14 of Publication 4. Quote taken from p 212 of Publication 4. Notable statutes passed in 
recent years (post 1989 UNCRC ratification) included: Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000; Special 
Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001; Education (Disability Strategies and Pupils’ Educational 
Records)(Scotland) Act 2002; Education (Additional Support for Learning)(Scotland) Act 2004; Scottish 
Schools (Parental Involvement) Act 2006. 
484 Publication 4, at p 210. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Publication 4, section 11.15 – 11.26. 
487 In some areas, e.g, Provision of Transport, it was concluded that, “while there is little case law, [the] 
statutory provisions accord with the educational rights specified in the UNCRC” (p 229).  In other areas, it was 
concluded that Scots Education Law may not measure up to its internationally imposed deadlines, as was the 
case in respect of provision for Additional Support Needs, where it was concluded that “A principal concern is 
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(ii) General Approach of Publications 5 and 6 
 
Regardless of whether the field of Education Law itself made (or makes) real and 
accessible the stated rights proffered to the young in statute, Education Law stands in 
marked contrast to the Law of Delict, which is the focus of Publications 5 and 6.   
 
Publication 5, ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’, retained as its focus the educational environs, its 
primary discussion concerning pupil injury claims, i.e., proceedings raised against 
educators where a child had sustained injury: 
 
“following an alleged lapse by teaching staff in the supervision of pupils 
within the classroom, playground, extra-curricular setting, or exposure of 
pupils to dangerous educational experiences or materials.”488 
 
The injury claims considered pertained to the educator’s broad duty of care to take 
reasonable steps, through the conduct of appointed staff,489 to safeguard the health and 
welfare, or best interests, of pupil charges.  Of particular interest were cases in which 
pupil injury occurred “on what is perceived to be the periphery of the educational 
milieu”.490  In these cases, irrespective of jurisdiction considered, it seemed that “a 
complex judicial exercise” ensued to “determine the precise boundaries of the teacher’s 
duty of care”.491 
 
In terms of organising content, the approach used in ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’ was to 
break down the key research areas into three sections each of which addressed areas of 
particular legal difficulty.  The sections were: Part A: “The Nature of the Teacher’s 
Duty”, Part B: “The Standard of (Appropriate Teacher) Care”, and Part C: Conclusions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[the law’s] apparent failure to facilitate the disabled child’s participation… it remains to be seen whether it 
will, in other respects, meet the educational needs of children and young people who have a disability” (p 223). 
488 Publication 5, at p 191. 
489 As is observed in Publication 5, at p 190: “In Scotland, as with many other jurisdictions, the educator’s duty 
of care is recognised as encompassing management and supervision of pupils.  An educator can be liable either 
directly, for failure to provide a safe educational environment or vicariously, for the fault of employees in the 
course of their employment.”  A range of significant cases decided in our own, and other jurisdictions, were 
discussed in Publication 5, including: Scott v Lothian Regional Council 1998 Rep LR 15 (educator liability for 
bullying); Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153 (pupil injured in class); Hunter v Perth and 
Kinross Council 2001 SCLR 865 (pupil injury at the end of the school day); Chittock v Woodbridge School 
[2002] EWCA Civ 7 (pupil injured on skiing trip abroad with school); Commonwealth v Introvigne (1892) 150 
CLR (school bullying/failure to supervise); Benitz v New York City Board of Educators 543 NYS 2d 29 (NY 
1989) (pupil injured in school-led extra-curricular activity); Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the 
Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman (1996) Aust Torts Rep 81-399 (pupil injured at school bus stop). 
490 Ibid. Such cases have involved, for example, injuries sustained by pupils in the playground after school 
hours, or during an unsupervised lunch break, or even on the way to or from school (whether on foot or using 
in school, or public, transportation).  Such cases are discussed in Publication 5. 
491 Publication 5, page 191. 
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In Part A, various factors observed to impact upon the duty of care were examined.  
Further sub-headings followed, allowing the “peripheral factors affecting the scope of 
the teacher’s duty of care” to be addressed separately with reference to relevant judicial 
discourse around the world, including the location and time of injury.492  In Part B, it 
was observed, in particular, that two standards of care existed: (i) In loco parentis (the 
parent-substitute standard), and (ii) that of the ordinarily competent professional (the 
professional standard).  The ideology of each standard was discussed, as were the 
factors that seemed to affect judicial preference.493 In Part C of Publication 5, overall 
conclusions were drawn which I think were, on the whole, satisfying. 
 
Children spend much of their time at school.  They do, however, also interact more 
widely with the world around them from time-to-time.  While the young have rights, 
they also have (limited) responsibility in law for their conduct.  In Publication 6, 
‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’, consideration was given to the consequences 
in the Law of Delict that might (or might not) be consequent upon accidents arising as a 
result of the limited ability of the young to: 
 
“(1)… understand cause and effect relationships in the physical world; (2) 
believe that actions produce outcomes in the physical world; and (3)… to 
exercise self-regulation”494 
 
Due to the general dearth of case law available to answer contemporary questions in the 
field, injuries following upon the negligence, and contributory negligence of children 
were evaluated with reference to wide-ranging authorities.  Accordingly, in an effort to 
achieve comprehensive and well-researched publication outcomes, case law: (i) dating 
from the early Nineteenth century to 2009, (ii) involving other “lack of capacity” 
individuals in society,495 and (ii) originating from the UK and a number of other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Publication 5, 191 – 197. 
493 Publication 5, p 197 – 206. 
494 Perrochet L & Colella U, What a difference a day makes: Age presumptions, child psychology, and the 
standard of care required of children, 24 Pac LJ 1323 (1993) at 1339. For a concurring UK University 
textbook overview see How Children Think and Learn, Wood D, 2nd ed, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, chapters 
1, 4, 6 & 7.  Quote taken from the article by Perrochet and Colell, as cited at p 204 of Publication 6.  For a 
more recent (and fairly comprehensive) overview of aspects of child development, see Lindon J, (2005), 
Understanding Child Development: Linking Theory and Practice, Hodder Education. 
495 Youth (and certainly extreme youth), of itself, has long been viewed as a kind of legal disability: Gardiner v 
Grace 1858 1 F&F 359; Hudson’s Bay Co v Wyrzykowski [1938] SCR 278; Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd, 
[1949] AC 386; McKinnell v White, 1971 SLT 61; Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304. Other limited 
capacity groups include, for example, Furtado v Bird (1914) 146 Pac 58 (deaf adult); McLaughlin v Griffin 
1955 135 NW 1107 (blind adult); Paris v Stepney BC [1951] AC 367 (adult blind in one eye); Haley v London 
Electricity Board [1965] 778 (blind adult); Daly v Liverpool Corp [1939] 2 All ER 142 & McKibbin v Glasgow 
Corp 1920 SC 590 (cases involving elderly pursuers). 
	   111	  
jurisdictions, including South Africa, Australia, America and Canada496 was analysed.  
The publication was, again, highly structured, using sections and subsections addressing 
key issues, such as capacity, the standard of care, apportionment of compensatory awards 
and possible parental liability.  The structure was directed towards enabling easy 
transferability of knowledge on areas of legal difficulty common to different jurisdictions. 
 
I think, overall, the approach I adopted in ‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’ was 
structurally sound and generally well-supported by traditional legal research methods.  
However, I wonder whether some of the topics considered in the article were so broad 
that more publications could have been produced at the time (about, e.g., the difficulties 
of theory involved in taking childhood into account in the first place in the Law of Delict, 
or the other limited capacity groups briefly discussed497).  There is, of course, nothing to 
prevent my revisiting the areas that were not addressed in depth in Publication 6. 
 
 
2.5.  Reflections on Publication Research Outcomes  
 
‘The Child’s Right to Education’, ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’ and ‘Contributory Negligence 
and the Child’, all published in 2009/2010, produced a range of research outcomes.  
Significant research outcomes are revisited here with reference to current law. 
 
(i) Education Law: all talk and no action? 
 
Publication 4 was written shortly after important legislation providing for pupils with 
“additional support needs” came into force.498  Although there has been a slow, but 
steady, stream of reported judgments involving the (then) recently created Additional 
Support Needs Tribunal for Scotland, 499 there have been no landmark cases significantly 
impacting upon children’s rights in the field of education since 2009.  Section 2(1) of the 
Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000 provides an overarching education 
authority duty as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 Some such judgments considered included, e.g: Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd,[1949] AC 386; Van der 
Vyver (1983) 100 S.A.L.J. 575; Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983(1) SA 381(A); McHale v 
Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; Humphrey v Burlington N R.R. 559 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1997) & Christensen v 
Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 
497 This is discussed, in particular, in section C of Publication 6 (p 202 onwards). 
498 Notably, the Education (Additional Support for Learning)(Scotland) Act 2004. 
499 See, e.g, City of Edinburgh Council v Additional Support Needs Tribunal [2012] CSIH 48;City of 
Edinburgh Council v K [2009] CSIH 46; K v Midlothian Council [2012] CSIH 77. 
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“Where school education is provided to a child or young person… it shall be 
the duty of the authority to secure that the education is directed to the 
development of the personality, talents and mental and physical abilities of 
the child or young person to their fullest  potential.” 
 
It was observed in Publication 4 that “the judiciary [had] so far been reluctant to engage 
with the term “fullest potential”500 in proceedings brought before them.  This remains the 
case today.501  We do know that the duty to provide education to develop a child’s 
“fullest potential” is tempered by legitimate considerations, such as valid economic 
constraints,502 but no clear picture has yet emerged in Scotland as to the nature and scope 
of this duty.   
 
Little further statutory provision has been made in respect of school education since 
2009: the Education (Additional Support for Learning)(Scotland) Act 2009 made some 
amendments to the law in respect of placing requests, additional support needs and the 
Additional Support Needs Tribunal. 503  Also, there has recently been a National Review 
of Educational Provisions for Young People in need of Additional Support,504 and much 
of the case law decided in recent years has related to this area within Scots Education 
Law.505  This is hardly surprising since there are a high number of pupils in Scotland at 
present falling within the statutory definition of having “additional support needs”.506 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Quote taken from Publication 4, at p 212. 
501 See: City of Edinburgh Council v Additional Support Needs Tribunal, ibid; City of Edinburgh Council v N 
[2011] CSIH 13; City of Edinburgh Council v K [2009] CSIH 46.  
502 The limitations of educational rights are more easily observed in respect of provisions concerning the 
parent’s rights.  For example, Article 2, Protocol 1 was ratified with a UK reservation, being that the Right to 
Education was accepted “only [insofar] as compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training , 
and the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure”. 
503 The 2009 Act, essentially, increased parental rights in respect of making placing requests (still the parent’s 
or young person’s prerogative) and provides that all “looked after” children and young people have additional 
support needs unless the education authority determines that they do not require additional support in order to 
benefit from school education.  Legislation available in pdf form at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2009/7/pdfs/asp_20090007_en.pdf.  The National Advocacy Service Under 
the Education (Additional Support for Learning Act) (Scotland) 2009 also bolsters the responsibility of 
Scottish Ministers to provide a single national advocacy service in respect of educational disputes between 
families and educators. 
504 HM Inspectorate of Education (HMIE) was asked to lead the review by the Minister for Children and Early 
Years.  Other organisations, such as Enquire participated. The report ‘Review of the Additional Support for 
Learning Act: Adding Benefits for Learners’ was published in November 2010, and information about their 
report is available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Education/Schools/welfare/ASL.  
505 See, e.g, City of Edinburgh Council v Additional Support Needs Tribunal [2012] CSIH 48; K v Midlothian 
Council [2012] CSIH 77. 
506Section 1(1) of the Education (Additional Support for Learning)(Scotland) Act 2004 provides that “A child 
or young person has additional support needs for the purposes of this Act where, for whatever reason, the child 
or young person is, or is likely to be, unable without the provision of additional support to benefit from school 
education provided or to be provided for the child or young person.” There are more than 35,000 pupils in 
Scotland who are either based in a special school or have additional support needs in primary or secondary 
schools: statistics cited by the Education Law Unit at: http://www.edlaw.org.uk/?page_id=34. Other cases 
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Other areas of Education Law have remained static in law507 since 2009, and this is 
disappointing, particularly given the Scottish Government’s apparent Commitment to 
ensuring that the “aims and objectives of the” Education Articles of the UNCRC were 
“given full effect in Scotland”.508  For example, certain research outcomes were reached 
in Publication 4 concerning the inability of those below the age of 16 years to make 
placing requests (i.e. a request that a child attend a particular school) on their own behalf.  
It was observed in ‘The Child’s Right to Education’ that this was unsatisfactory from a 
children’s rights perspective and inconsistent with other, more children’s rights-
orientated, amendments made elsewhere in the field of Education law over the last decade 
or so.509  It is odd that, while the child now has the right to challenge her exclusion from 
school, she does not have the right to any part of the decision made about which school 
she attends in the first place.510  The lack of general capacity afforded in law to children 
to participate in a decision concerning which school they attend is also, importantly, and 
ongoing inconsistency with other statutory provisions in Scots law concerning the 
young.511 
 
It remains the case that only a parent or a “young person” (i.e. a person of school-leaving 
age) may make a placing request.512  A legally competent child is not empowered to do 
this by Education Law statute, and any subsequent attempt to judicially review a decision 
of an education authority concerning a placing request is still deemed, by Scottish courts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
arising from pupil injury have also been decided since Publication 4. See e.g, Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 
30-477 (school bullying: former pupil).  It should be noted that there has been a recent, national review of 
provision of services for disabled children in Scotland conducted by the Scottish Government, text of review 
available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/02/25151901/1. 
507 This is not true in respect of policy, however, and a current study by ‘Having a say at school’ (HASAS), 
which is the largest Scottish study of pupils councils undertaken, seeks to encourage greater participation of 
children and young people in the educational environment: see http://www.havingasayatschool.org.uk.   
508 Quote taken from Publication 4, at p 209. 
509 For example, the child’s right to challenge his or her exclusion from school, found in s 41 of the Standards 
in Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000. 
510 It is to be hoped that education authorities would fulfil their duty, in terms of s 2(2) of the Standards in 
Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000 to take the views  of the child “insofar as reasonably practicable” when 
making “decisions that significantly affect that child or young person”. The recent ‘Having a Say at School’ 
initiative, supra, shows that there is certainly a will, if no legal requirement, to encourage the active 
participation of children and young people at school in respect of decisions affecting them. 
511 This is observed in Publication 4, at p 217 - 218.  In particular, schooling could be defined as a “major 
decision” in terms of s 6(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. 
512 Education (Scotland) Act 1980, as amended, ss 28A and 28F.  The terms “parent” and “young person” are 
defined in s 135 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980: “parent” includes guardian and any person who is liable 
to maintain or has [parental responsibilities (within the meaning of s 1(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995) 
in relation to, or has care of] a child or young person” and “young person” means a person over school age who 
has not attained the age of eighteen years.” 
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to be a matter concerning parents’, rather than children’s, rights.513  This is the case 
notwithstanding that a child would, ordinarily, have capacity to bring a petition for 
judicial review.514  In S v Scottish Legal Aid Board the Court of Session ruled that it was: 
 
“the parent of a child who has the title to pursue proceedings relating to a 
placing request,” notwithstanding the terms of s 2(4) of the “Age of Legal 
Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991… it is clear from the provisions of the 
[Education (Scotland) Act 1980] that the underlying purpose is to give a 
parent a right to make a placing request in respect of a child because it is the 
parent's wishes that lie at the heart of the provisions so far as children are 
concerned.”515   
 
The court’s rationale in S v Scottish Legal Aid Board meant that the Scottish Legal Aid 
Board’s refusal to accept an application for legal aid made in the name of the child for 
legal aid (rather than the parent) for a sheriff court appeal against an education authority’s 
refusal of their placing request was upheld.516  This judgment continues to represent the 
judicial approach to such applications made in Scots Education law. Further, more recent 
statutory amendments mean that, even in Education law proceedings where the court is 
satisfied that a legal aid certificate can legitimately be issued in the child’s name, parental 
resources are likely “to be treated as part of the child's own resources.”517 Contested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 See, e.g, Sim v Argyll and Bute Council [2006] CSOH 144; Crossan v South Lanarkshire Council 2006 Fam 
LR 28; S v Scottish Legal Aid Board [2007] CSOH 116.  
514 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(4A), provides that “A person under the age of sixteen years 
shall have legal capacity to instruct a solicitor, in connection with any civil matter, where that person has a 
general understanding of what it means to do so; and without prejudice to the generality of this subsection a 
person twelve years of age or more shall be presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to have such 
understanding.”(Italics added) 
515 [2007] CSOH 116, Temporary Judge C J MacAulay, QC in the Outer House, at paras 38-39. 
516 This, residual, tension (or conflict) between children’s and parents’ rights has often been resolved, whether 
through practice, policy or law, in favour of the parents.  See, e.g., R (on application of Begum) v Denbigh 
High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15, a case in which the young person concerned lost in her bid to wear 
certain religious clothing of her choice to a school that forbade such clothing, but she had no right to chose her 
school (this is true North and South of the border) and would have required on her parents to exercise that 
choice on her behalf.  This case is discussed in Tisdall EKM et al, (2008), ‘Reflecting on Children’s and 
Young People’s Participation in the UK, 16(3); 343-354. More recent child education cases perhaps provide 
greater scope for optimism, see: R (on application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors 
[2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin); G v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College Governors [2011] EWHC 1452 
(Admin). 
517 Amendments in force since 31 Jan 2011, made to the Advice and Assistance (Scotland) Regulations 
1996/2447, and the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2000/494 by the Advice and Assistance 
(Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2010/462, Reg. 5(c) and the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Amendment 
Regulations 2010/461, Reg. 3(b) respectively.  Parental/carer income will be taken into account where a 
legal obligation to aliment the child exists. These provisions do not apply to criminal matters or in any case 
where, in the “particular circumstances”, it would be “unjust or inequitable” to treat parental resources as 
part of the child’s own resources (this might, include, e.g. a scenario in which a child and parent are 
opponents in litigation).  
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litigation in Scotland in the Court of Session is costly – and the risks of being found liable 
for the expenses of an opponent in the event of failure can be prohibitive.518   
 
The research outcomes of ‘The Child’s Right to Education’ have not been overtaken in 
contemporary law and, as observed in my closing comments in the publication: 
 
“Ratification of the [UNCRC] has brought about a continual process of, 
somewhat fragmented, reform throughout domestic Education Law… It 
remains to be seen in the coming years, whether these inconsistencies will be 
fully addressed in Scotland”.519 
 
In October 2008, the UN Committee made 124 recommendations to the UK.520  A 
number of these recommendations (such as investing more money to ensure a child-
inclusive educational experience, and doing more to prevent school bullying 521 ) 
concerned education.  In particular, the UK was asked to: 
 
“Strengthen children’s participation in everything that affects them at school 
and in their education.”522 
 
Notwithstanding other (non-legal) positive developments in Scots education policy and 
practice,523 it is hard to see how primary Education Law statute or the rationale in S v 
Scottish Legal Aid Board, discussed above in this section, accord with this 
recommendation.  Certainly, the UK is due to provide its next Progress Report on 
implementation of the UNCRC into UK law in 2014.524  It is to be hoped that further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 Fees, expenses and costs running into tens of thousands of pounds is not unusual in Scottish civil litigation.  
There have long been concerns expressed about the costs of litigating in Scottish civil courts. The Taylor 
“Review of Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation In Scotland” is currently ongoing. Sheriff Principal 
Taylor began the review in May 2011 and it is anticipated that a final report will be issued in the summer of 
2013. The final report will be sent to the Scottish Ministers for consideration of further action, on completion. 
http://scotland.gov.uk/About/Review/taylor-review.  
519 Publication 4, p 230 – 231. 
520 UN Committee 49th Session Report: Consideration of reports submitted by state parties under Article 44 of 
the Convention, concluding observations available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/CRC.C.GBR.CO.4.pdf 
521 Ibid. Recommendations 84 and 89 respectively, explanatory text available at: 
http://www.crae.org.uk/assets/files/Translation%20Concluding%20Observations%202008.pdf.  
522 Ibid. Recommendation 90. 
523 See, e.g., the Scottish National Framework ‘Education for Citizenship in Scotland’, and the work currently 
being undertaken by Children in Scotland, the University of Edinburgh’s Centre for Research on Families and 
Relationships (info available at: www.havingasayatschool.org.uk). 
524 The next period report is due by 14 January 2014. Timetable available at: 
http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/healthandwellbeing/b0074766/uncrc/reporting-process.  
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steps525 will be taken in respect of the remaining educational areas in which children’s 
rights are not yet fully respected. 
 
(ii) Are teachers quasi-parenting our children – or not? 
   
Most cases in the UK involving claims made by, or on behalf of, children in Delict tend 
to involve incidents occurring in the educational environment.526  Personal injury lawyers 
are increasingly viewing such litigation as part of their ongoing caseload527 and the media 
are quick to make high profile the more curious claims in educational environments.528  
In state school cases, proceedings are typically raised against the education authority (‘the 
Defender’) responsible for maintaining the school.  Education authorities are also 
vicariously liable for the conduct of teachers they employ.  The primary line of argument 
advanced by the Pursuer (i.e. either the parent or child bringing the case) is often that the 
school has failed properly to supervise its pupil charges.  When these cases are successful 
a financial award is made against the educator. 
 
One of the main research outcomes of Publication 5 (‘Trips, Slips and Bangs’) concerned 
the nature and extent of the teacher’s duty of care, which was observed to be: 
 
“significantly affected by where and when injuries take place and the level of 
the teacher’s perceived control over pupils… [meaning that] the application 
of the concept of a teacher’s duty of care where pupil injury occurs on the 
educational periphery… is problematic”529    
 
There existed “limited judicial rationale” in Scotland at in 2009, and this remains the case 
today.  A further key research outcome concerned the, rather unsatisfying, co-existence of 
two “standards of care” applicable530 to the teaching profession: (i) the “parent-substitute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Here it is worth observing that, as part of the Scottish Government’s broad commitment to giving the 
UNCRC full effect in Scots law the Children and Young People (Scotland) bill (passed on 19 Feb 2014). 
526 Ten pupils a week winning injury payouts from school accidents” Sunday 26th Sep 2012, Metro 
(London): http://mtero.co.uk/201/09/26/ten-pupils-a-week-winning-payouts-from-school-accident; See also 
“Accidents at school: the most common types of claim for children”, Accident Claims Solicitors (reference to 
statistics): http://www.accident-claim-expert.co.uk/en/child-claims/accident-at-school.html.   See guidance of 
the Health and Safety Executive on educational matters: http://www.hse.gov.uk/services/education/faqs.htm.  
527 See, e.g., the well-known National firm, Thomsons, who have a department that specialises in such claims: 
http://www.thompsons.law.co.uk/other-accidents/accidents-injuries-school-compensation-claim.htm.   
528 See, e.g: The Telegraph, “Janitor sues school over Vaseline prank”, 2 Nov 2012 available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/9650430/Janitor-sues-school-over-Vaseline-prank.html; Daily Record, 
“Pupil sues her Barra school over not being properly prepared for Higher English exam”, 28 Nov 2010, 
available at: http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/pupil-sues-her-barra-school-over-1077059.  
529 Publication 5, at p 206 – 207. 
530 Publication 5, at p 207.  See also Eve N, ‘Safety Implications for Partnerships – in loco parentis’, (1994) 
Bulletin of Physical Education 6 and observations of Lord MacLean in Scott v Lothian Regional Council 1998 
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standard”, in loco parentis, and (ii) the “ordinarily competent professional standard”.531  
Both were noted to be “historically and currently established among, and within, the 
jurisdictions considered”.532  Courts continue to make their decisions on a case-by-case 
basis: judicial preference for one, or the other, standard often emerges without a clear 
rationale being provided throughout the course of the judgment.  
 
However, in an English case decided last year, Woodland v Swimming Teacher’s 
Association,533 there is judicial commentary from the Court of Appeal suggesting that in 
loco parentis might be too low a standard of care to impose upon teaching staff in some 
circumstances.  Laws LJ, who gave the court’s opinion said (referring to Murphy J):  
 
“’the notion that a school teacher is in   loco   parentis does not fully state the legal 
responsibility of a [teacher], which in many respects goes beyond that of a parent’… 
A school should not be equated to a home.  Often hazards exist in a home which it 
would be unreasonable to allow in a school.”534 
 
It seems, therefore, that (certainly insofar as in loco parentis is concerned) the law 
concerning which standard of care should be imposed upon the teaching profession is – if 
anything – even more opaque today than it was in 2009.535  The question abides: are 
teachers quasi-parenting our children – or not?  What is needed is a lengthy judgment 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rep LR 15, at 11, when referring to the teacher’s duty to act as a “teacher of ordinary skill… acting with 
ordinary care”. 
531 Publication 5, at p 207. The ‘vying’ standards of care were discussed throughout the publication in more 
depth, notably in section B, from p 197 – 204. 
532 Cases from a number of jurisdictions (and throughout the 20th century) were considered, including South 
Africa (Transvaal v Provincial Administration v Coley 1925 AD 24), Australia (Trustees of the Roman 
Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman (1996) Aust Torts Rep 81-399), America  (Benitz v 
New York City Board of Educators 543 NYS 2d 29 (NY 1989) and the UK (Beaumont v Surrey County 
Council (1968) 66 LGR 580). 
533 Woodland v Swimming Teacher’s Association [2012] EWCA Civ 239 (Court of Appeal judgment). 
534 Ibid, at papa 40. 
535 See, e.g, Brown v North Lanarkshire Council, [2010] CSOH 156, when an education authority was found 
liable in respect of pupil injury sustained following a paint brush “penetrating a child’s eye and brain” in 
classroom activity. Lady Dorian, in the Outer House, discussed the appropriate standard of care, referring to 
“in loco parentis” and quoting a general duty of care for teaching staff observed in DM Walker’s authoritative 
text, Delict (2nd edn), p.1062: “A school teacher owes a duty to take reasonable care for the safety and health 
of the children under his charge, and must exercise care and forethought, having regard to their age, 
inexperience, carelessness and high spirits and the nature and degree of danger, not to subject them to 
avoidable risks of harm.”    
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 (iii) Children and Delict: it’s not about the child’s best interests 
  
‘Contributory Negligence and the Child’ was concerned with civil claims made by (or on 
behalf of) children within the field of Delict. For the most part, the research outcomes 
clarified the state of legal uncertainty, in all jurisdictions considered, of the child’s status: 
is she to be found in law as capable (and thus, to some extent, legally accountable) of 
contributing to her own injuries?  If so, at what age does such capacity emerge? 
 
An attempt was made, in Publication 6, to categorise judicial approaches to stages of 
childhood development when determining degrees of childhood contributory negligence 
in respect of injuries sustained.536  Broadly speaking, it was concluded that below that age 
of about 4 years old a child was not generally likely to be considered capable of 
contributory negligence.  Between 4 and 6 years of age, it was possible (although not the 
norm) that a finding of contributory negligence could be made.  From about 6 years old 
upwards, it became progressively more likely, as a child moved towards adulthood, that 
he or she would be found capable of negligence or contributory negligence.537   
 
However, the most significant and (so far) enduring conclusion of Publication 6 was that: 
 
“… there are few guaranteed ‘safeguards and… legal protections to be found 
within the Law of Delict where child victims are concerned… only very 
limited patterns of consistent judicial rationale emerge… it should be a matter 
for contemporary concern that the Law of Delict has continued so long 
without clarity…”538 
 
This remains the case today.  Few judgments have been reported to since 2009 (either in 
Scotland or England) involving personal injury claims made about the young, and none 
that advance the law concerning the child’s “capacity to neglect”.539  In essence, the 
Scottish legal approach concerning the contributory negligence of children is predicated 
on the assumption that the Law of Delict does not exist to serve the best interests of the 
child, and so the child’s “best interests” are not a feature of judicial rationale. This 
contrasts with other areas of the law, such as Child and Family Law (discussed in Chapter 
1 of this thesis).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 Publication 6, sections C and D. 
537 Publication 6, p 205 – 206. 
538 Quote taken from Publication 6, at p 213 – 214, and quote within the quote taken from the preamble to the 
UNCRC. 
539 The leading case on childhood capacity in Scots Law remains Galbraith’s Curator ad Litem v Stewart 1998 
SLT 1305. 
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(iv) Children and Delict: might it be about best interests after all? 
 
Although there have been no significant developments since 2009 concerning child 
capacity, or child best interests, in respect of negligence (an unintentional wrong), there 
has been a recent, noteworthy decision concerning the intentionally committed Delicts of 
children.  In late 2011, the South African Constitutional Court issued a landmark 
judgment in the case of Le Roux v Dey.540  The court found a child and two young 
people541 liable in defamation for causing the publication, online, of fabricated images of 
their deputy-principal and principal teacher in sexually compromising positions.   
 
The Le Roux judgment is particularly interesting, since it is one of the first of its kind: a 
case in which the young have been found to possess clear capacity to be delictually liable 
and, perhaps more significantly, financially liable for their Delicts. This was the case 
notwithstanding that the court considered the application of the South African Children’s 
Act 2005 to the Delictual proceedings.542  Section 9 of that Act provides that: 
 
“In all matters concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child the 
standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount importance, must be 
applied.”543 
 
The wrongdoers, aged between 15 and 17 years, were all “children” in terms of the 
Act.544 The judgment raises an interesting question, discussed below: what approach 
might a Scottish court be expected to adopt in a similar scenario?   
 
Cases involving children in the Law of Delict (particularly cases in which the child is the 
wrongdoer) are rare.545  As the research outcomes of Publication 6 indicate, the Scottish 
legal approach concerning the unintentional wrongs of children is predicated on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 [2011] ZACC 4.  
541 Three pupils were involved in the wrongdoing. The judgment states that “Mr Le Roux was about 15½ years 
old while Messrs Gildenhuys and Janse van Rensburg were about 17 years old” at the time they committed the 
Delict [para 12]. 
 
542 Exactly “How should the “best interests” standard come into play in a matter such as this?” was a matter 
that was debated by the court: see, in particular, dissenting judgments of Skweyiya J (quote from para [211]) 
and Yacoob J. 
543 2005 Act of South Africa available as pdf at: http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67892 , 
as amended by the Children’s Amendment Act 2007 and Child Justice Act 2008. 
544 See s 1 of the South African Children’s Act 2005, which provides that all persons below the age of 18 years 
are “children”. 
545 One of the few examples of a UK court determining a child wrongdoer claim is Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 
W.L.R. 1304, although it should be noted that allegations of negligence were countered with those of 
contributory negligence in the case which concerned a ruler fight between two 13 year old school girls that led 
to a serious eye injury. 
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assumption that the child’s ‘best interests’ are not a feature of judicial rationale. It 
therefore seems very unlikely that the best interests of children would feature in judicial 
rationale concerning a case of intentional child Delict in Scotland. 
 
In a Le Roux scenario, a Scottish Pursuer would, in technical legal terms, require to 
demonstrate that there was (i) an appreciation (or capacity) on the part of the child to 
comprehend the nature of the wrong done (as with unintentional delicts considered in 
Publication 6).  Additionally, in respect of an intentional wrong, it would probably have 
to be demonstrated that (ii) the child had ostensibly acted maliciously or with a reckless 
disregard for the understood consequences.  Were these two conditions met, it seems that 
a Scottish court could well hold a child liable for an intentional Delict. 
 
Of course, it does not necessarily follow, just because a Scottish court could hold a child 
or young person delictually liable for an intentional Delict that it would.  Finding children 
or young people financially responsible for their conduct is a thorny, and in reality 
impracticable, matter.  Since few children have the financial resources to pay any court 
award made against them, would this not simply be back-door parental liability?  We 
have no modern precedent in Scotland546 on that particular matter.  However, on account 
of such public policy, rather than legal, considerations our Scottish judiciary would I 
think be unlikely to make a finding against children in the Law of Delict. 547 
 
Somewhat ironically, therefore, it seems that without considering the child’s ‘best 
interests’ at all, a Scottish court would be more likely in cases like Le Roux to issue a 
judgment that better serves a child’s best interests.  That is, of course, if we assume that it 
serves a child’s best interests to be free of facing the prospect of paying his teacher 
almost £2,000548 in damages for a practical joke gone wrong. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 There are some old cases, predating the 1945 Act, that relate to parental liability for failure to supervise very 
young children. These cases include Reilly v Greenfield Coal and Brick Co Ltd, 1909 SC 1328 (involving a 
child 3 years of age who was killed on a train line: the parents were found to have been contributory negligent 
on account of their failure to supervise); in Christie’s Tutor v Kirkwood (OH) 1991 SLT 805, some more 
modern consideration was given to this issue. See p 213 – 214 of Publication 6. 
547 Other steps, such as school disciplinary measures or a brush with criminal law might form a preferred 
disposal of the case. Also, perhaps a referral into the Scottish Children’s Hearing System might be a 
consideration (current law: Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 52(2) grounds). 
548 In Le Roux v Dey the South African Supreme Court reduced the award made against the pupils from 
R45,000 to R25,000 (equating to a reduction in the “composite award” from c £3,200 to £1,800: see para 4 of 
the judgment). 
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2.6. Concluding Comments 
 
In this chapter, I have critiqued published work having as its focus the first strand of my 
overarching research theme: a critical evaluation of the rights, status and capacity of the 
young in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law.   
 
Conceptual Framework: Rights, Status and Capacity - Contribution of Publications 4, 5 
and 6 
 
Publications 4, 5 and 6 were placed within the broader academic literature in Section II of 
the Thesis Introduction. Insofar as both the fields of Education Law and Delict are 
concerned, the young possess underdeveloped rights, status and capacity.  In Education 
Law, the status of the child is in the midst of change: much of this change has taken place 
within the last 15 years.  Ratification by the UK of the UNCRC has played a part in 
accelerating reform in the field of Education Law – although the reform is as yet 
incomplete and the child’s education rights are still in the process of emerging.  Where 
the Law of Delict is concerned, our ratification of the UNCRC has done little to improve 
the legal status or capacity of the child: both remain in a rather static state of 
underdevelopment.  
 
Publications 4, 5 and 6 publications are all contributions based on traditional legal 
research methods. As a contribution to the literature, these Publications are principally 
directed towards providing critical analysis for a legal community that creates, interprets 
and applies the law. By systematically addressing Publications 4, 5 and 6, I describe their 
contribution to an evaluation of the rights, status and capacity of the child in Scots Law, 
as follows: 
  
Publication 4: is concerned with the extent to which the child’s UNCRC rights are 
implemented within the field of Scots Education Law. The notion of the child as a valid 
rights-bearer has been developed in the wider socio-legal literature: it is in the possession 
of rights, as recognised and enforced, that legal status is realised.  However, in Education 
law, it is observed that the child’s status and rights are still superseded by the parents’ 
rights in some respects – even although there is a growing tendency in Scots Education 
Law to view the child, rather than the parent, as more than a passive subject.  Similarly, 
questions of capacity are explored in this publication, in particular, the capacity the child 
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does (or, in some cases, does not) possess in Scots Education Law to access remedies on 
his or her own behalf. The broad contribution of Publication 4 on the theme of rights, 
status and capacity is therefore to provide a traditional doctrinal analysis of how the 
relevant UNCRC rights of the child are framed in contemporary domestic ‘black letter’ 
law. 
 
Publications 5 and 6: each of these publications is concerned with the status and capacity 
of the child within the Law of Delict.  Publication 5 focuses on the child in the 
educational environs; Publication 6 focuses on the child within the wider community.  
Childhood capacity is discussed in these publications with reference to Delict, a field of 
law in which the rights vouchsafed the child in terms of the UNCRC have yet to make 
any real impact.  The lack of clarity and outdated nature of the field of Delict is 
highlighted as a matter for judicial and policy concern. While publication 5 can most 
accurately be described as a doctrinal legal analysis, Publication 6 is, in some respects, 
traditional legal research that is reform-based.  Both publications represent contributions 
to what is a general dearth of traditional Scottish (and UK) legal literature concerning 
children in the field of Delict.  Accordingly, the broad contribution of Publications 5 and 
6 is in providing an exposition of what is considered to be the current state of Scottish 
law and to recommend a need for reform in order that the law may better provide for the 
rights, status and capacity of the child. 
 
My intention is that this general research strand concerning the young will grow to 
include consideration of disabled young people and adults both in private, family life and 
as they progress from a school education to higher or further education and, thereafter, 
into the workplace. 
 
Next, in Chapters 3 and 4, the focus of this thesis shifts the second strand of my 
overarching research theme: a critical evaluation of the rights, status and capacity of 
disempowered adults in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law.  To date, my 
research outputs have concerned transsexuals, although broad LGBT issues, including a 
deeper consideration of gender (and transgender) within the fields of education and 
employment, are potential areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER 3: Publication 7 
 
 
3.1. General Introduction to Publication 7 
 
In this chapter, a critical appraisal is given of: 
 
• Publication 7: ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law: the Legal Response to 
Transsexuality’, Edinburgh Law Review, 2007, 11(2), 162 – 186 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’).  
 
As observed in Publication 7, a diversity of views and agendas has emerged over decades 
of public discourse about transsexuality and this has produced a “perplexing choice of 
terminology”. 549  ‘Transsexual’, rather than ‘transgendered person’, is the term used in 
this chapter.  At first glance, the more traditional term ‘transsexual’ emphasises the 
biological sex of an individual (i.e. male or female) while the more contemporary term 
‘transgender emphasises an individual’s sense of personal identity (i.e. with either the 
masculine or feminine).  However, the terms are broadly interchangeable and are 
understood to refer to the same group550 of people: individuals conventionally understood 
as possessing the physical characteristics of one sex while psychologically belonging to 
the other.  The term ‘transsexual’ is widely used and understood in cross-disciplinary 
discussions; it is concise and, significantly, remains the term most frequently adopted in 
case law throughout the jurisdictions considered.551  
 
‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ was a comprehensive article published in a peer-
reviewed journal552 examining the rights, status and capacity of transsexuals – who were, 
and remain, disempowered individuals in Scots (and wider-UK) law.  The article was 
written between 2005 and 2006 and was accepted for publication in March 2006.  Since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Publication 7, p 166. 
550 For an overview of key terms in the field, see Publication 7, Section C “Perceptions and Terminology” at p 
164. 
551 This is discussed at pp165-166 of Publciation7. See also, e.g., recent media coverage: ‘Transsexual, 16, 
forces school to let him sit exam dressed as a girl: Head threatened with Equality Act’, Daily Mail, 22 July 
2012; ‘Transsexual differences caught on brain scan’, J Hamzelou, New Scientist (online), 26 January 2011; 
e.g. ); A recent judgment in point is R (on the application of C) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2011] 
EWCA Civ 247, in which the term “transsexual” is used throughout the judgment. 
552  The Edinburgh Law Review aims to set “the law of Scotland in an international and comparative context” 
by providing comprehensive “analysis of developments in legislation and of court decisions”. Quotes taken 
from the EUP Publishing webpages: http://www.euppublishing.com/journal/elr  
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the relevant law was in the midst of a period of reform, the text of the publication 
required to be revisited and several parts of it updated between March 2006 and 2007.  
Addressing feedback from an anonymous referee was part of the process of finalising the 
article and the final revisions to the edited text were made in early 2007.  The Edinburgh 
Law Review is published in three volumes per annum: Publication 7 belongs to the May 
2007 volume of the journal.   
 
‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ considered how (and why) case law from different 
jurisdictions, ongoing medical progress and evolving social perceptions had influenced 
the legal recognition of the individual rights, status and capacity of transsexuals in the 
UK.  A Transsexuality Timeline contextualising developments is provided in the thesis 
Appendix. 
 
Publication 7 also considered the influence on Scottish law of the UK-wide Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’), and outlined various anomalies in the legal 
treatment of transsexuals found in both Scottish and English law at the time.  The terms 
of the 2004 Act, which provided for the first time in history for the formal recognition of 
transsexuals in an “acquired” (i.e. desired) status, were discussed. The publication 
debated whether Scottish transsexuals might seek legal recognition of their acquired 
gender without following the procedure of the 2004 Act.  In particular, several pertinent 
questions were posed on behalf of those disempowered groups falling outwith the scope 
of the 2004 Act and who lived in a legal “no [wo]man’s land”.  Such categorisation had 
significant implications for transsexuals in their personal and professional capacities, and 
also for the public and private organisations with whom they interacted.    
 
In section 2 below, ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ research rationale and 
independence outlined.  In section 3, the research premise and aim will be examined.  
The general approach adopted using traditional legal research methods, and research 
outcomes reached, are critically analysed in sections 4 and 5.  In section 6, concluding 
observations about the contribution of the publication to literature concerning rights, 
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3.2. Rationale and Independence of Publication 7 
 
Transsexuality 553 was chosen in 2005 as the focus of Publication 7 for a number of 
reasons.  The first, and chief, reason concerned the, almost uniform, lack of assured status 
possessed by transsexuals in domestic and international society throughout this and last 
century.  Steps taken in the UK in the early years of the millennium towards the formal 
legal recognition of the transsexual in her desired status were sweeping and riddled with 
social, medical and legal complexity.554  The transsexual therefore falls precisely within 
the overarching remit of my independent research:555 she was (and, arguably, remains) a 
specific, and distinct, category of disempowered individual in respect of whom rights, 
status and capacity fall within an underdeveloped and emerging area of law.    
 
Secondly, there was no body of consistent case law, or analytical commentary of case 
law, in Scotland, or in other jurisdictions, concerning transsexuality. This meant that 
comprehensive applied research could form an original and worthwhile contribution.  The 
dearth of consistent judicial rationale made it difficult to predict what decisions were 
likely to be reached in cases about transsexuals across the range of jurisdictions 
considered. 556   No substantial legal research concerning the Scottish response to 
transsexuality had been published at the time of researching Publication 7. Further, no 
significant legal publications were found concerning transsexuality in any Western 
jurisdiction searched, with the exception of one article published in an American peer-
reviewed legal journal in 1971.557  The latter publication, which had as its focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 The Department for Constitutional Affairs, Government Policy concerning Transsexual People (available at 
www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/policy.htm) “estimates vary, but it is thought one man in every 12,000 
feels he is a woman. The proportion of women who feel they are men is smaller.” 
554 Significantly, after decades of failure in bringing cases on behalf of the transsexual community, recent 
judgments (domestic and the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’)) had ruled that UK law was 
failing in its respect for the private life of the transsexual: Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No 1) [1971] P 
83; Cossey v UK [1991] 2 F.L.R. 492; Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467; Goodwin v 
UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
555 Research Strand 2: “Critical Analysis of Legal Status and Capacity of Disempowered Adults”, it also forms 
part of my focus in respect of Research Strand 1: Critical Analysis of the Legal Status and Capacity of the 
Young: see, e.g., Publication 8, “Transsexuality and Kidulthood…” discussed in Chapter 4. 
556 The diversity in judicial attitudes towards legal recognition of the transsexual’s desired status can be seen by 
considering the variety of approaches adopted in cases decided in the following jurisdictions: New Zealand (Re 
T [1975] 2 NZLR 449); Canada (M v M(A) (1985) 42 RFL (2d) 55); South Africa (W v W 1976 (2) SA 308); 
Ohio (Re Ladrach 513 NE 2d 828 (1987)); England (C & D (1979) 6 Family Law Reports 636); New Jersey 
(MT v JT 355 A 2d 204 (1976)). 
557 D K Smith, (1971), ‘Transsexualism, sex reassignment surgery and the law’, 56 Cornell L Rev 963-1009. 
Various brief case comments had been published (e.g., ‘Right to private and family life: Sheffield v UK’ (case 
comment) E.L. Rev. HR144) and the Corbett judgment has been written on several times since 1970, and 
overviews had been written on the broad terms  of the Gender Recognition Bill and subsequent Act (see, e.g.,  
‘Gender Reassignment’ , Med. Leg. J. 2004, 72(4), 151-152 ). However, no comprehensive coverage of 
transsexuality from a legal perspective was found. 
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transsexuals and the law, was an interesting and useful point of reference but was 
considerably out of date.   
 
A third factor which led to the selection of transsexuality as a research focus concerned 
interconnected developments in UK law at the time.  In late 2005, the main provisions of 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force, 
with both pieces of legislation creating rights and remedies in domestic law for cross-
sections of the LGBT558 community.  The birth of civil partnerships throughout the UK 
had been the subject of considerable discussion, debate and publication by Scottish 
lawyers and other professionals.559  However, the impact of a statutory system regulating 
and recognising the transsexual’s status appeared to be rather neglected in comparison. 
This seemed to me unsatisfactory, and so a comprehensive study of legal responses to 
transsexuality, having as its primary focus Scots law, presented itself as a worthwhile 
research objective.  
 
 
3.3. Publication 7 – Contextualising the Premise and Aim(s)  
 
‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ was concerned with the “relatively recent emergence 
of transsexuality into the public forum”560 and the ensuing (and diverse) legal response in 
Scotland and other Western jurisdictions. The premise of the publication was that, over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 A term in common usage since the 1990s: many publications have provided overviews of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender  (‘LGBT’) terminology, perceptions and social attitudes: see, e.g., S S M Edwards, 
Sex and Gender in the Legal Process, Blackstone Press (1996), and M Blasius; S Phelan, We are everywhere: a 
historical sourcebook in gay and lesbian politics, Routledge (1997).  
559 For example, Kenneth McK Norrie, a leading Scottish Private / Family Law academic, has published 
extensively, and with some regularity, on this subject, advocating equality of status and in favour of gay rights 
in family and private life for several decades, see e.g.: ‘Parental pride: adoption and the gay man’, S.L.T. 1996, 
33, 321-325; ‘Early v Early is dead’, S.L.P.Q. 2000, 5(2), 169-170; ‘What the Civil Partnership Act 2004 does 
not do’, S.L.T. 2005, 6, 35-40. Norrie has written considerably less about the rights of the transsexual. 
Prominent transsexuals, such as the English campaigner Stephen Whittle OBE, have published on topical 
issues concerning rights, status and capacity but this has been with the intention of driving reform and 
promoting rights, rather than providing a critical academic analysis of the legal response. 
560See Transsexuality Timeline in thesis Appendix.  Little, it seems, was known socially of transsexuality 
before the Twentieth century.  Secret accounts of transsexuals living in previous centuries are available. See R 
Perkins, “Famous Trannies in Early Modern Times”, available at www.gendercentre.org.au/8article11.htm and 
S Whittle, (2003), ‘Standpoint’, 12 Journal of Gender Studies 137.  Magnus Hirschfeld, the German doctor and 
sexologist, was one of the first professionals to study the condition.  In his earlier publications (around 1900), 
he used the term “Geschlechtsübergänge” (“gender passage”). That term was later converted to “psychopathia 
transsexualis” (meaning a pathologic-morbid desire to become a member of the opposite sex) which was then 
adopted into common usage in around the 1940s: see D Cauldwell, (1949), ‘Psychopathia transexualis’, 16 
Sexology 274. By the 1950s it was not uncommon that the transsexual “phenomenon” featured in articles in 
prominent Western medical journals, see, e.g., H Benjamin, (1954), ‘Transsexualism and transvestism as 
psychosomatic and somatopsychic syndromes’, 8 American Journal of Psychotherapy 219. However, debate as 
to the origin, nature and appropriate medical, social and legal treatment of the condition persisted: see pp 171-
173; p 175; pp 184 – 186 of Publication 7. 
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the foregoing 80 years, understanding and making provision for the transsexual had 
become a journey that was simultaneously (i) medical, (ii) social and (iii) legal.   
 
The overarching aim of the publication was to provide the first comprehensive, and 
critically reflective, examination of the past, present, and possible future Scottish legal 
response to transsexuality.  Since it became apparent in the early stages of researching the 
topic that a close and (at times) “uneasy partnership” existed between evolving medical 
opinion, social perceptions and the legal response, three interconnected research 
questions were formed. These were to: 
 
(i) Ascertain and rationalise the degree to which medical perceptions have impacted, 
and might continue to impact, upon on the legal response to transsexuality; 
 
(ii) Examine the perceived effects of general social (or cultural) developments on legal 
rationale with reference to relevant decisions; 
 
(iii) Consider the impact of the law itself: i.e. developments towards, and issues 
surrounding, recognition of the transsexual’s status in terms of the recent Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’).  
 
 
3.4. Observations on Approach Adopted in Publication 7 
  
‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ necessitated considering in some depth the three, 
distinctive, research questions outlined above. 
   
The publication was written with, primarily, a legal readership in mind.  Lawyers do not 
readily use medical terminology.  Accordingly, any detailed consideration of the legal 
response to transsexuality demanded that a reasonably comprehensive, and neutral, 
introduction to the subject matter be provided.  The reader also required to be familiarised 
at the outset with important terms and a critical overview of historic, current and evolving 
norms, views and attitudes concerning transsexuality. This proved particularly 
challenging, since there exists a wide and bewildering choice of terminology – itself 
“indicative of… wider debate surrounding the nature of transsexuality.”561  Even those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Publication 7, p 166. 
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who are transsexual can find defining themselves an “extremely difficult task”, as one 
prominent transsexual campaigner observed: 
 
“Any definition [of transsexuality] has to accommodate more than lifestyle. 
Cultural and temporal changes regarding our knowledge of gender also alter 
our view of who should be known and who would identify as such. It would 
be easier to list those not encompassed rather than vice versa, but it would be 
a very long list.”562 
 
Consequently, the early sections of Publication 7 (Sections A, B and C) were entirely 
taken up with outlining and critiquing subject-matter introductions, terminology and 
perceptions.  Throughout the process of constructing these sections, the building blocks 
of my own knowledge of the subject-matter were being cemented.  None of the terms 
explained in Publication 7 has evolved to assume a different meaning, and so the first 
three sections in the publication remain viable.  However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the term “transsexed”, identified in Publication 7, as a potentially useful term 
for the transsexuality lexicon, has been assumed in common usage to date. 563  
  
Medical Progress was the first substantive area addressed in ‘Gender Identity and 
Scottish Law’ (Section D) because, before the Twentieth Century medical community 
endorsed transsexuality as a viable condition,564 the transsexual was socially invisible.  
Further, when legally acknowledged at all, she was perceived in the criminal law as a 
deviant and in the civil law as a contemptible riddle. 565  It was observed that, only when 
medicine recognised a need for “research, compassionate treatment and rectification… 
the law followed suit”.566  The enduring influence of medical opinion upon judicial 
rationale (from true sex “pastiche” to the contemporary possibilities generated by “brain 
structure”567) was believed to be of import and so was examined in some depth.  
 
Distinctions between adopting a legal approach to transsexuality governed by a medical 
sex determination exercise or, alternatively, an approach based on the more “nebulous” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 M McMullan and S Whittle, Transvestism, Transsexualism and the Law: A Handbook (Manchester, 1994) 
16. 
563 Publication 7 at p 165 – 166.  The lack of popularity of the term “transsexed” might be because it has been 
increasingly linked to the concept of intersex, rather than transsexuality/transgender: see, e.g., “Genderqueer”: 
http://genderqueer.tumblr.com/post/1066509897/on-suffixes-and-considering-the-term-transsexed.  
564 Initially, transsexuality was believed to be a “disorder of the mind” (i.e. a mental illness to be rectified 
through mental health treatment alone), see Publication 7, p 167. 
565 Publication 7, pp 163; 167. 
566 Publication 7, p 166. 
567 Publication 7, pp 167 – 173; See also Section ‘F’ at pp184 – 186. 
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concept of each individual’s personal gender identity (i.e. an inner sense of being male or 
female) were drawn.568  
 
In Section ‘E’ of Publication 7, certain social developments, in particular the “growing 
awareness of gender”, were critically evaluated.  It might be argued, of course, that it is 
impossible to unravel in many scenarios the extent to which the law facilitates cultural 
change or, alternatively, cultural change facilitates legal reform.  However, the judiciary 
worldwide seemed to recognise that the recent emergence of the transsexual into the 
public forum (and the resultant problem of whether or not to accommodate a newly 
acquired sexual/gender status) was a matter deserving of consideration: 
 
“Social developments are scarcely capable of proof but judges must be 
sensitive to these developments and must reflect them in their opinions… if 
the law is to meet the needs of society.”569 
 
My research indicated that the growing legal trend that legal decision-making reference 
the language and rationale of gender, rather than medicine, could be perceived (at least in 
part) as a product of an increasingly permissive, pragmatic and humane contemporary 
Western society.  In that sense, it seemed that social factors had begun to contribute to a 
movement away from medical determinations 570 about sex and gender in case law.  
 
In Section ‘F’ of ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ the terms of the (then) recently in 
force Gender Recognition Act 2004.  The 2004 Act made it possible for transsexuals to 
be recognised in an “acquired” (i.e. desired) status in law, and the legilsation sets down a 
statutory process through which the acquisition of a transsexual’s new status can be 
regulated. Possible lacuna in the 2004 Act (e.g. individuals excluded from the provisions 
of the Act) and anomalies (e.g. sexual offences involving transsexuals with artificially 
constructed genitalia) were critically examined.571   Finally, in Section ‘G’, the possibility 
of an alternative means by which transsexuals might be afforded a new legal status in 
their desired gender was mooted.  
 
Throughout Sections ‘D’ to ‘G’ of the publication, existing difficulties and issues likely 
to generate uncertainty in terms of the legal response to transsexuality were also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Publication 7 pp 171 -176. 
569 Publication 7, p 173, quoting from Bellinger v Bellinger 2002 Fam 150, at para 157 per Thorpe LJ. 
570 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83 (PDAD). See discussions of the “Corbett 
pastiche” at p 167 onwards of Publication 7. 
571 Publication 7, p 178 – 184. 
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identified and conclusions reached as to a predicted legal approach. This can be seen, for 
example, in respect of the uncertain position of the young transsexual, in which it was 
concluded that Scottish case law to date:  
 
“… suggests that Scottish courts are more likely to see it as patently illogical 
that young people should be granted a general power to decide on medical 
treatment only to have this power removed when uncomfortable situations 
arise.”572  
 
In terms of overall research approach, it is difficult to see that ‘Gender Identity and 
Scottish Law’ could have drawn on any other fields or broad areas of knowledge in an 
attempt to answer the research questions posed.  Had I made an attempt to do that, it is 
likely that Publication 7 would either have (a) been unable to retain Scots law as its 
primary focus because a more strongly comparative publication would have evolved, or 
(b) required consideration of wider LGBT issues, such homosexuality or, alternatively, 
various forms of intersex/hermaphroditism.  The outcome of a legal research approach 
embracing (a) above would have removed the publication from the remit of the 
Edinburgh Law Review, which has as its primary focus Scots law.  The outcome of a 
legal research approach involving research of wider LGBT or intersex issues at (b) above 
would, almost certainly, have resulted in a number of publications, some of which would 
have addressed areas already written on in depth by other commentators.573  
 
The imposition (early on in the research journey) of a, fairly rigid, publication structure 
was certainly of assistance to me in wielding a great volume of diverse research material 
spanning a variety of disciplines, and in retaining research focus.  It was hoped that 
adopting this approach towards the burgeoning legal structure governing recognition and 
regulation of transsexuality would form an original contribution of both academic merit 
and practical use.  The publication was certainly topical, and some of the anomalies 
observed and commented upon were later addressed by legal policy bodies in Scotland.574  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Publication 7, p 178. 
573 See K McK Norrie publications on gay rights, supra; the condition of intersex is considered as complex: see 
A Fausto-Sterling, (1993), ‘The five sexes: why male and female are not enough’, The Sciences, March/April 
1993, available at www.nyas.org/publications/sciences/pdf/ts_03_93.pdf.  
574 See, e.g., Publication 7, pp 182 – 184, in which the problematic and unclear question of “what constitute 
genitalia in law” is addressed in respect of gender specific offences, such as rape.  This problem was later 
addressed by the Scottish Law Commission: see section 5(iii) below.   
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3.5. Reflections on Publication 7 Research Outcomes: 
 
In this section, key research outcomes of ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ are outlined, 
contextualised and critically reflected upon with reference to ongoing developments and 
contributions concerning the Scottish legal response to transsexuality: 
 
(i) The influence of Medical Progress on the Law 
 
In the concluding remarks in Section D of Publication 7 it was observed that, while 
mainstream medicine had reached the stage of recognising a formal medical diagnosis of 
“gender dysphoria”, ongoing medical research continued to generate diversity of opinion 
about the nature of the condition and the appropriate means of treatment.575  However, it 
was considered that contemporary courts were less likely to be drawn into medical 
controversy concerning the classification and categorisation of transsexuality in what 
continued to be an evolving field of medicine. This was undoubtedly because:  
 
“… medical sex-determination has [demonstrably] generated outcomes for 
transsexuals which are ‘profoundly unsatisfactory’ in law.” 576 
 
Little has changed since 2007 in respect of ongoing medical debate, although it seems 
that early research (between 1994 and 2006) concerning brain structure variations found 
in transsexuals has gathered momentum and attracted increasing support within (and 
beyond) the medical community.577  
 
However, it is interesting to observe that, despite the currently favoured and rather 
nebulous terminology of “gender” dominating contemporary discourse, any diagnosis of 
“gender dysphoria” still requires to be made by doctors.  And, such a diagnosis is made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Publication 7, pp 171 – 173. 
576 This observation was made at p 173 in Publication 7, and is supported by reference to case law (including, 
in particular, the infamous and long-reigning Corbett judgment in which the court referenced a series of tests, 
including chromosomal and gonadotrophic testing, that could be used to determine “true sex” in questionable 
cases. The notion of someone’s psychological sex, or gender identity, was not a significant factor in this 
process). 
577 See page 2 of the Transsexuality Timeline in the Appendix to this thesis.  Newly surfacing medical research 
explored while researching for Publication 7 in 2006 concerning “brain structure” or verifiable biological 
matter as being either a, or the, component factor in establishing gender identity has continued to expand and 
develop. Expansions in knowledge have, it seems, become increasingly publicised from the early 2000s to 
date: see, e.g., J.N. et al, (1995), ‘A sex difference in the human brain and its relation to transsexuality’, 
Nature, 378, 68-70; Y Stafford and M Webb, (2004), ‘Imaging the Transgendered Brain’, chapter in 
Mindhacks, O’Reilly Media; ‘Transsexual gene link identified’, BBC News online (referencing the work of 
Professor Vincent Harley et al at Prince Henry’s Institute of Medical Research in Australia), 26 October 2008; 
J Hamzelou, (2011), ‘Transsexual differences caught on brain scan’, New Scientist (online), 26 January 2011. 
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with reference to clinically recognised factors.578  Further, the 2004 Act does not define 
what constitutes “gender dysphoria”: it only provides that gender dysphoria is “the 
disorder variously referred to as gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder and 
transsexualism”.579  Thus, the medical community retains a sizable degree of control over 
how society, and subsequently, lawyers and courts, perceive “gender” within the context 
of cases concerning transsexuals.  
 
On reflection, more might have been in Publication 7 of this rather interesting paradox. 
Certainly, an observation was made in the publication that the medical community retains 
the discretion (and power) to define what factors comprise gender dysphoria and, 
consequently, to define what a “transsexual” is.580  Perhaps, though, the significance of 
that observation was not stressed strongly enough, nor was it developed or critically 
examined in any depth.    
  
Further reflections, or predictions, might now be made. For example, the terminology 
used in contemporary statute (in particular, the 2004 Act) concerning transsexuals is 
grounded upon the language of “gender”.  This means that either a specialist medical 
doctor or a registered psychologist “practising in the field of gender dysphoria”581 must 
produce evidence of the condition in the form of a report.  Thereafter, on the basis of this 
evidence, a Gender Recognition Panel may issue a “Gender Recognition Certificate” 
allowing the individual concerned to be afforded a formal status in law (and in society) 
that is based on their “acquired gender”.582  In section 9(1) of the 2004 Act a rather blunt 
attempt is made broadly to equate gender with sex: 
 
“Where a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, the person's 
gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that, if the acquired 
gender is the male gender, the person's sex becomes that of a man and, if it is 
the female gender, the person's sex becomes that of a woman).” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 The terms of the 2004 Act require that a “report” must be provided to the Gender Recognition Panel 
containing “details of the diagnosis of the applicant’s gender dysphoria” (s 3(2)). 
579 2004 Act, s 25 (“Interpretation”). 
580 This is observed at p 180 of Publication 7. 
581 2004 Act, s 3(2). N.B. s 3(2)(b) was amended by Sch 5 of the Health Care and Associated Professions 
(Miscellaneous Amendments and Practitioner (Psychologists) Order 2009/1182, simply providing a change of 
terminology in the field from “chartered” to “registered” psychologist. A “registered psychologist” means, in 
terms of s 25 of Order 2009/1182, “a person registered in the part of the register maintained under the Health 
Professions Order 2001 which relates to practitioner psychologists”.  
582 2004 Act, ss 1 – 5A. 
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However, the growing trend in medical research 583  towards identification and 
classification of “brain sex”584 appears now to be linking the medical understanding and 
diagnosis of transsexuality to biology and genetics rather than gender identity.  According 
to research published in 2011, it is becoming more widely believed that something as 
simple as a brain scan585 might be able to detect and diagnose transsexuality.  This may 
mean that physical tests become the dominant means of clinical diagnosis, in preference 
to exploring gender dysphoria, an area of medicine/psychology that, arguably, is difficult 
to penetrate even for those working in the field.586  Might, in time, defining and 
diagnosing transsexuality with reference to “gender” itself become redundant? 
 
(ii) The effect of Social Developments on the Law 
 
It was observed in Publication 7 that there appeared to be two evident dimensions to an 
individual's gender. The first of these, which might be termed ‘gender identity’, was 
recognised by Handler J A D in the New Jersey case of MT v JT when he said a person's 
sex, or sexuality “embraces an individual's gender” which in turn includes “self image, 
the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity or character”.587 A second 
dimension to gender is the perception of self by others. The growing awareness, and 
perceived significance, of gender could thus be viewed as more of a social than a medical 
development. 
 
Of course, transsexuals represent a small percentage of the public: while “estimates 
vary… it is thought one man in every 12,000 feels he is a woman.  The proportion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 See observations, supra, with particular reference to recent publications listed: e.g., ‘Transsexual gene link 
identified’, BBC News online (referencing V Harley et al at Prince Henry’s Institute of Medical Research in 
Australia), 26 October 2008; J Hamzelou, (2011), ‘Transsexual differences caught on brain scan’, New 
Scientist (online), 26 January 2011. 
584 As opposed to the early “true sex” medical approach endorsed by the court in the infamous Corbett 
judgment, see Publication 7 at p 165 – 196. 
585 See note 577 above. 
586 For example, some authorities classify gender dysphoria as a “mental illness” while others do not, instead 
terming it a “condition” (the NHS, for example) for which “medical treatment is appropriate in some cases." 
See, e.g., NHS Patient Support pamphlet: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_097168.pdf.  The 
current criterion, as stated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM, 4th text 
revision, 2012 ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Code 302.85) published by the American Psychiatric Association are: (i) 
Long-standing and strong identification with another gender; (ii) Long-standing disquiet about the sex assigned 
or a sense of incongruity in the gender-assigned role of that sex; (iii) The diagnosis is not made if the 
individual also has physical intersex characteristics; (iv) Significant clinical discomfort or impairment at work, 
social situations, or other important life areas. It is worth noting that these criterion are not universally 
accepted, e.g., the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10: version 2010: 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en) lists only three diagnostic criterion.  
587 Case reported at 355 A 2d 204 (1976), quote at 209. 
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women who feel they are men is smaller.”588  Records available from the last few years in 
Scotland, however, now evidence a slow, but steady, growth in the numbers of 
transsexuals seeking formal recognition of their status in law since 2005.589    
 
Insofar as Social developments are concerned, a key outcome of Publication 7 was that 
modern society had increasingly accepted the importance of respecting the transsexual’s 
sense of personal identity.590 Certainly, in the years immediately preceding the decisions 
in Bellinger and Goodwin591 and the subsequent Gender Recognition Act 2004, courts 
worldwide had begun more frequently to base their decisions upon endorsing the 
“individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness”.592  The rationale behind this 
accords with the self-determination (and Human Rights) movement and was encapsulated 
in Publication 7 by reference to the following judicial observation: 
 
“Transsexuals exist in our society. Many will not undergo surgery. Even 
fewer will ever want to marry. Allowing those few who qualify to marry will 
not impact greatly on society, but will provide relief and recognition for the 
few individuals affected.”593 
 
There remains, in contemporary law and society, a humane logic to this (very candid) 
approach.  In practice it means that, notwithstanding the complex issues concerning 
evolving medical classification discussed at section 5.(iii) above, a legal remedy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 The Department for Constitutional Affairs, Government Policy concerning Transsexual People (available at 
www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/policy.htm). 
589 The Registrar Gender for Scotland maintains a Gender Recognition Register in which the birth of all 
individuals who legally change gender/sex by means of the issue of a Gender Recognition Certificate granted 
in terms of the 2004 Act is recorded. The Registrar General must ensure that a traceable connection is 
maintained between “birth sex” and “acquired status”. There were no comparative statistics available in 
Scotland at the time of writing Publication 7. However, in 2010, there were 18 entries in the Gender 
Recognition Register; in 2011, there were 24 entries in the Gender Recognition Register: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equalitys/DataGrid/Transgender.   
590 Publication 7, at heading “(3) Gender Identity… not Genitals” at p 175. 
591 Goodwin v UK((2002) 35 EHRR 18) and the House of Lords decision in Bellinger v Bellinger ([2003] 
UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467) were the catalysts for the Gender Recognition Act 2004. In Goodwin, the ECHR 
found that the UK had breached the human rights of the transsexual concerned in failing to recognise her 
formally in her “acquired status” and in Bellinger the House of Lords granted a declarator of incompatibility in 
terms of s 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, since there was no provision made in domestic law (namely in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 11(c)) for recognition. 
592 MT v JT 355 A 2d 204 (1976) at 204, 211 per Handler J A D. This was even noted in earlier case law: see, 
e.g., the observations of Judge Martens in respect of the “ever-growing awareness of the essential importance 
of everyone's identity” in Cossey v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 622 at 660 (despite the fact that this was a case in 
which the transsexual concerned failed, at the ECHR, in her quest for recognition of her acquired status via the 
issue of a fresh birth certificate reflecting her acquired status). See also, e.g., the general approach adopted by 
Ellis J in Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603. 
593 Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603 at 630, per Ellis J. 
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proffered could (in theory at least) be entirely “independent of, often controversial, 
medical sex-determination.” 594  
 
The broad trend of what might be termed ‘cultural compassion’ identified in Publication 
7 has continued, and developed, with general regard for the acquired status of 
transsexuals growing in law since 2007. 595  Transsexuals are becoming increasingly 
visible in public life and their existence, and the significance of their recent legal 
recognition,596 is now evident in policy-making considerations.  In particular, recognition 
by the state has led to further discussion about rights by the executive.   
 
On 8th of December, 2011, the UK Government launched the “first ever transgender 
action plan to advance gender equality”.597 The plan has been praised by transsexuality 
action groups and high profile transsexuals.598 Amongst its objectives, the plan commits 
the Government to reform Health services to ensure greater consistency in 
commissioning gender identity services, and to increase from 15 to 30 years the tariff in 
respect of any murders “motivated by hostility towards a transgender person”.599 Also, 
having identified areas in which public attitudes concerning transsexuals must 
improve,600 the Scottish Government intends to follow the lead of the UK Government.  
To that end, the Scottish Government has said that it is currently “considering future 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 See, e.g., J C Puffer, (1996), ‘Gender verification: a concept whose time has come and passed?’ 30 British 
Journal of Sports Medicine 278. 
595 In culture, various prominent issues have arisen concerning, e.g., athletes (CNN Special: ‘Transsexual 
Athletes treated unfairly’, 20 Oct 2010; ‘Transgendered Athlete vies for spot on Olympic Team’, Yahoo Shine, 
21 Jun 2012) and teenagers (‘I was born this way: Teenage Transsexual reveals how Lady Gaga inspired him 
to have full sex change’, Daily Mail, 31 Jan 2012; ‘BBC 3: Transsexual Teen – Beauty Queen’, aired 28 Nov, 
2012; ‘Transsexual, 16, forces school to let him sit exam dressed as a girl: Head threatened with Equality Act’, 
Daily Mail, 22 July 2012), also reported in the Telegraph from a more conservative perspective, but 
referencing to term “gender”: ‘School forced to allow transgender pupil (16) to sit exam in a skirt’, Telegraph, 
23 July 2012.  For the most part, the media has been kind in its representation of transsexuals. For a legal 
example, in applying the terms of the 2004 Act, courts exercise particular care in granting anonymity orders, 
breach of which may attract criminal sanctions (see e.g,, recent Court of Appeal judgment: R (on the 
application of C) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 247). 
596 The Transsexuality Timeline, in the Appendix to this thesis, provides an overview of relevant developments. 
See, e.g., article by Juliet Jack in the New Statesman, ‘The turning of the Tide: the media’s monstering of 
transgendered people is finally being challenged’, 13 Feb 2012, available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2012/02/transgender-media-transsexual.  
597 Plan and publicity statement available at: http://homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/transgender-action-
plan.  
598 See, e.g., statement of the Gender Identity Research and Education Society (GIRES): “We applaud the 
Government’s transgender equality action plan…” and the comments of Press for Change, who participated in 
the policy-making steps and advised the Government on the plan:  http://www.pfc.org.uk/transactionplan.html.     
599 Strategy statement overarching the plan, available at: http://homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/news/transgender-action-plan.  
600 The results of the 2010 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey were concerning from an equality perspective: 
almost half (49%) of those polled said that they would be unhappy with a family member forming a 
relationship with someone who had had a sex change operation, and almost a third (31%) said that they 
believed someone who had had a sex change operation would be an unsuitable primary school teacher: 
information available on Scottish Government website Equality pages (accessed Dec, 2012). 
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work in the area”, in particular in respect of aggravated crimes committed against 
transsexuals.601  Accordingly, formal legal recognition of the transsexual in the status of 
his or her newly acquired gender is generating the growth (and creation) of other, more 
specific, rights pertaining to personal safety and wider “equality” rights.602 
 
It was also predicted in Publication 7 that, once the transsexual's basic human right to be 
recognised in an acquired gender had been acknowledged, other issues concerning 
diagnosis, treatment and self-determination were likely to become prominent.603  In 
Goodwin v UK, 604 a post-operative male-to-female transsexual was successful in her 
claim that the UK had breached Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in failing, for both legal and practical purposes, to recognise her acquired gender. 
It was observed in Publication 7 that the decision in Goodwin was an indication of two 
likely future legal developments in Scotland and elsewhere. It is worth revisiting these 
predictions from the perspective of contemporary law.   
 
The first, and most obvious, legal development was formal recognition through statute: 
Goodwin was a catalyst for the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (the ongoing operation of 
the 2004 Act is discussed under heading 5. (iii) below).  Secondly, the Goodwin decision 
created the potential for litigation in the UK, and elsewhere concerning: (a) the self-
determination of young transsexuals, and (b) disputes over funding (in particular state 
funding) for “sex change”605 surgery. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 The Scottish Government is currently developing for release data concerning criminal proceedings 
(information available on Scottish Government website Equality pages (accessed Dec, 2012) in which, during 
2010-11, “3 persons were convicted in Scottish courts of a charge with an associated transgender aggravation”.  
602 Section 7 of the Equality Act 2010 specifically provides that “gender reassignment” is a “protected 
characteristic” in terms of the Act’s provisions directed towards “prohibit[ing] victimisation in certain 
circumstances;… eliminate[ing] discrimination and other prohibited conduct; to enable duties to be imposed in 
relation to the exercise of public procurement functions;… increase[ing] equality of opportunity…”: taken 
from the preamble to the 2010 Act. 
603 Publication 7, pp 175 – 178. 
604 Ibid, citation: (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
605 “Gender reassignment surgery” is often colloquially referred to as a “sex change” operation. It consists of a 
series of operations by which the male or female genitalia are removed and opposing genitalia are artificially 
constructed: The Looking Glass Society, Transsexualism: A Medical Overview, 3rd edn (1998) ch 10. It is 
believed that the first recorded attempt at a modern sex change operation took place in the 1930s, in Berlin, on 
a patient called Lili Elbe. One of the first publically announced “sex change” operations announced took place 
in November 1952, and was performed by a Danish doctor, Christian Hamburger, who had begun working in 
the field by experimenting with gender therapy through testing hormones on animals. The patient concerned is 
recorded as having written to her parents after the operation in the following terms: ‘”Nature made a mistake 
which I have had corrected, and now I am your daughter”, Christine Jorgensen: 60 years of sex change ops’, 
Hadjimatheou, BBC World Service, 30 Nov 2012. 
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(a)  Young Transsexuals: the Schoolboy in a Dress? 606 
 
Publication 7 made reference to the, then very recent, landmark Australian case, Re 
Alex,607 in which a 13 year old female-to-male transsexual had sought authorisation, 
which was eventually granted, to begin hormonal treatment in preparation for eventual 
gender reassignment surgery. The judgment raised interesting questions, including: would 
Re Alex be followed in Scotland or elsewhere?  Is gender reassignment such a 
momentous decision that even a legally competent child may never consent?  And, 
should the principles of consent be applied differently to reversible (e.g. hormone) and 
irreversible (e.g. certain surgery) gender reassignment treatments?   
 
There is, as yet, no definitive, or wholly consistent, answer to the questions raised by Re 
Alex but there have been several cases since 2007 either reported at law 608 or in the 
worldwide media.609  It is worth observing that two issues seem now to be surfacing in 
cases involving gender dysphoric children and young people.  First, the desire to suppress 
puberty means that proceedings are likely to be raised by or on behalf of children around 
12 years old and younger.610  In cases involving particularly young children judicial 
discomfort is palpable.611 Secondly, questions about parent/carer conduct and child 
protection issues are likely to be raised in such cases.612 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 See note 595 below and 613 above. 
607 Re Alex [2004] Family Court of Australia 297 (2004) 180 Federal Law Reports 89, judgment available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/family_ct/2004/297.html. 
608 It is interesting to note that almost all of the cases reported concerning children since the decision of Re Alex 
have been decided in Australia by the Family court: Re Brodie (Special Medical Procedure) [2008] FamCA 
334 (15 May 2008, 12 year old male-to-female transsexual – hormonal treatment to suppress puberty 
authorised); Re: Jamie (Special medical procedure) [2011] FamCA 248 (6 April 2011, 10 years, 10 months old 
male-to-female transsexual – child too young to make significant decisions about puberty and beyond). 
609 See note 613 above for coverage by worldwide media of issues concerning transsexuality and the young. In 
apparent contrast to Re Alex, a German court ruled, in early 2012, that an 11 year old male-to-female 
transsexual (also referred to as “Alex”) could be institutionalised.  The child concerned had apparently changed 
her own name to that of a girl before entering primary school: http://www.thelocal.de/society/20120210-
40647.html#.UMJ7zI7w6SI.  
610 In Re Brodie, supra, the child was 12 years old; in Re Jamie, supra, the child was between 10 and 11 years 
old. These cases are discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. 
611 Honourable Justice Dessau, at para 124 in his judgment in Re Jamie that “… there is the unusual 
circumstance of a very young child, at 10, the youngest to be treated by the experts in this case. That means 
that decisions as to phase two of the treatment plan would not come into play for another five or six years, 
obviously a long way off and an extremely large proportion of this child’s life. I cannot overlook that…” 
612 Ibid, re the German “Alex” case cited, a formal case report has not been found.  Although some groups 
within the transsexual community worldwide have taken up the child’s case, serious allegations have been 
made about parental conduct and inducements, and the issue may in fact be a more complex one of child 
protection: ‘Transsexual Child could be sent to Mental Ward’, The Local (Germany Edition), 12 Feb 2012, 
article available at: http://www.thelocal.de/society/20120210-40647.html#.UMJ7zI7w6SI and further 
commentary of the case available online. See, e.g., ‘Transgender girl faces being institutionalised by father 
who rejects her gender expression’, 31 Jan 2012: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/transgender-
german-girl-f_n_1245407.html.  
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Issues concerning self-determination and transsexual young people will be explored in 
more depth in the consideration of Publication 8 (in Chapter 4 below).  However, media 
coverage of young transsexuals has significantly increased in the course of the last five or 
so years.613  Greater awareness also exists about the nature of the condition within the 
contemporary paediatric and educational community.614  Some debate surrounding how 
best to address transsexuality surfacing throughout childhood or teenage years exists.615   
 
Regardless of whether it may be thought to be a socially uncomfortable area, 
transsexuality has, it seems, become a Children’s Rights issue.616  Accordingly, I still 
believe that we can continue to expect to see increasing (and increasingly high profile) 
case law worldwide concerning the rights of transsexual children and young people.  
 
(b)  Funding Disputes: Who Pays for the “Sex Change”? 
 
Litigation over funding for gender reassignment surgery has not been as prevalent as I 
had anticipated when writing up Publication 7617  Seven significant cases have been 
reported since 2006 in which UK courts (and in one instance,618 the ECHR) have had as 
their focus aspects of the transsexual’s rights, status and capacity.619 Of these judgments, 
two concerned male-to-female transsexuals convicted of offences and who sought to 
challenge their secure detentions in male-only facilities.620  Four cases related to National 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 See, e.g., ‘How to deal with a transsexual daughter (by a mother who knows)’, The Independent, 19 Nov 
2012;’I was born this way: Teenage Transsexual reveals how Lady Gaga inspired him to have full sex change’, 
Daily Mail, 31 Jan 2012; ‘BBC 3: Transsexual Teen – Beauty Queen’, aired 28 Nov, 2012; ‘School forced to 
allow transgender pupil (16) to sit exam in a skirt’, Telegraph, 23 July 2012: ‘Diary of a Teen Transsexual’, 
Channel 4: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/ria-diary-of-a-teen-transsexual. 
614 See, e.g., Houk CO and Lee PA, (2006), ‘The Diagnosis and Care of Transsexual Children and Adolescents: 
a Pediatric Endocrinologists’ Perspective’, J Pediatr Endocrinol Metab, 19(2), 103; Brill SA and Pepper S, 
(2008), ‘The Transgender Child: A Handbook for Families and Professionals’, Cleis Press; Pleak RR, (2011), 
‘Gender Variant Children and Transgender Adolescents: An Issue of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics 
of North America’, Elsevier; Drescher J and Byne W, (2012), Treating Transgender Children and Adolescents, 
Routledge. 
615 See, e.g., ‘Children born transsexual have the right to delay puberty’, M Fox, 31 Aug 2011: http://ts-si.org/.  
616 See, e.g., NBC News short, dated 9 July 2012, about transgendered childhood in America (involving a child 
born male who adopted a female persona from the age of 6): 
http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/08/12625007-transgender-children-in-america-encounter-
new-crossroads-with-medicine?lite; For a discussion as to the Children’s Rights aspects of transgendered 
childhood and youth, see Chapter 4 below, in which Publication 8. and the recent judgments in Re Brodie and 
Re Jamie considered further.  
617 Publication 7, at pp 176 – 177. 
618 Grant v United Kingdom (32570/03) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 1. 
619 Some of these reported judgments are listed at note 592 below. 
620 R (on the application of DB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 659 (Admin): 
detention in an all male high security psychiatric hospital (no breach of Articles 3 or 8 found); R (on the 
application of B) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 2220 (Admin): held that the detention of a 
male-to-female transsexual holding a Gender Recognition Certificate in a “male prison estate” was a violation 
of Article 8. 
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Insurance and Pension rights claimed by male-to-female transsexuals in respect of 
determining the appropriate “pensionable age”.621 
 
Insofar as funding of surgery is concerned, while the media has been wildly speculative 
about costs, 622  the costs recently specified by specialist clinics and the NHS are 
considerably more modest.623   Since 1999,624 the general approach in the UK has been 
that any blanket policy adopted by an NHS health care provider to refuse to fund gender 
reassignment treatment will be deemed unlawful.625  However, Health authorities still 
retain discretion to prioritise treatments for viable medical reasons (e.g. evidence of 
clinical effectiveness626).   
 
In practice, Health authorities are permitted to exercise considerable discretion in public 
expenditure: respecting individual human rights is, of course, an important factor in the 
decision-making exercise.  It is not, however, the only factor to be considered. 
Particularly in our current economic climate, requests for any kind of treatments that are 
more aesthetic than corrective are likely to be refused on the NHS.627  Insofar as 
transsexuals are concerned, there has only been one significant decision in the UK since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 Richards v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 2 CMLR 49; Grant v United Kingdom 
(32570/03) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 1; Timbrell v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] EWCA Civ 701; 
M v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] UKFTT 356 (TC). The overall picture from these judgments 
is generally favourable to the transxual: where a Gender Recognition Certificate (or an interim certificate) had 
been issued, this is the date from which the newly acquired status must be implemented by national law (in 
terms of Directive 79/7; Pensions Act 1995, Sch 4) and in cases where an individual lived in his or her acquired 
status prior to the coming into force of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the date of surgery can be the 
relevant date from which the acquired gender-specific pension entitlements etc accrue.  
622 See, e.g., Telegraph, ‘Number of NHS sex change operations triples’,  21 Apr 2012: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/7613567/Number-of-NHS-sex-change-operations-triples.html. 
According to the Daily Mail, ‘Sex change ops on the NHS have trebled… since the procedure became a ‘right’, 
“…costing the taxpayer up to £10 million”, 28 Jun 2009, although it is hard to see how these figures have been 
arrived at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1196024/Sex-change-ops-NHS-trebled--procedure-
right.html.  
623 The surgery is estimated to cost between around £8,000 - £12,000 on the NHS: see, e.g., ‘The Cost of 
Gender Reassignment’, NHS Northwest publication: http://help.northwest.nhs.uk/storage/library/gid-paper-
final.pdf. Costs are understood to be higher when the surgery is privately performed: 
http://www.transhealth.co.uk/; http://www.wlmht.nhs.uk/gi/gender-identity-clinic/frequently-asked-questions/.  
624 Following upon the English ruling in R v North West Lancashire HA Ex parte A, D and G, [1999] 1WLR 
977 that an indiscriminate approach adopted by any Health authority that it will not fund gender reassignment 
treatment is unlawful. 
625 North West Lancashire HA Ex parte A, D and G, supra.  The same indiscriminate approach will be unlawful 
in respect other surgeries that might be the subject of debate, such as bariatric surgery for the morbidly obese: 
R (on the application of Condliff) v North Staffordshire Primary Care Trust [2011] EWHC 872 (Admin). 
626 This was the rationale given for failing to fund gender reassignment surgery by Berkshire West Primary 
Care Trust decision in the 2011 AC case ([2011] EWCA Civ 247). 
627 Some Health authorities offer guidance as to which treatments that will not be funded by the public purse in 
their area. See, e.g., NHS Sheffield ‘Treatments not routinely available from your Local NHS – Individual 
Funding Requests’: http://www.sheffield.nhs.uk/services/ifr.php.  
	   140	  
2006: the case of R (on the application of AC) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust.628 
The litigation arose because Berkshire West Primary Care Trust had adopted the policy 
that gender reassignment surgery was a “low priority treatment”.  The Trust had also 
decided that: 
 
“Cosmetic surgery and other non-core procedures such as breast surgery, 
larynx reshaping, rhinoplasty, hair removal, jaw reduction and waist 
liposuction should not be considered as a core part of [Gender Recognition 
Surgery].”629 
 
The Claimant (‘AC’) was a male-to-female transsexual who wanted breast augmentation 
surgery. The Trust had already funded hormone therapy to develop AC’s breast tissue 
but, in accordance with its policy, it refused to fund breast augmentation surgery.  AC 
challenged the Trust’s policy: she argued that the policy was discriminatory.  She was 
unsuccessful at first instance.  Further, in dismissing AC’s appeal, the Court of Appeal 
found that:  
 
“Discrimination was a problematic word because all choice involved 
discrimination… The material legal criteria were that gender and clinical 
needs were both relevant characteristics… the ethical and clinical judgment 
of the trust… did not transgress the law.”630 
 
Of course, not all people, or professionals, agree on what treatments are essential and 
what treatments might, instead, be optional (or more aesthetic) in nature.  In AC v 
Berkshire West Primary Care Trust, there were medical professionals who supported the 
Claimant’s position and, conversely, medical professionals who supported the Trust.  
Since the Court of Appeal’s ruling in the case last year, there exists potential for more 
subtle disputes concerning, not merely gender reassignment surgery, but a diverse, 
growing631 (and often costly) range of possible treatments for transsexuals. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 [2011] EWCA Civ 247, Court of Appeal judgment (reported at first instance at [2010] EWHC 1162 
(Admin)). 
629 Transcript of judgment at first instance, p 4, reported at [2010] EWHC 1162 (Admin). 
630 Court of Appeal, official transcript, at para 52, per Lord Justice Hooper. 
631 See, e.g., the recent “Primary Care Protocol for Transgender Patient Care”, developed by the ‘Centre of 
Excellence for Transgender Health’ at the University of California and published online in April 2011 
(available at: http://www.transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?page=protocol-00-00) which outlines treatment, support 
and advice for transsexuals in respect of matters as diverse as physical appearance, musculoskeletal health, 
fertility treatments, further surgery, gender-specific therapy and sex segregation etc. 
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(iii) The Impact of the Gender Recognition Act 2004: Subsequent Law 
 
The dearth of case law around the time of Publication 7 meant that any exploration of the 
legal issues facing the Scottish legal system was, inevitably, “an international and 
comparative exercise”. However, the principal focus of the publication was the Scottish, 
and wider UK, legal response to transssexuality, culminating in a critique of our current 
legal recognition of the transsexual and regulation of her status: the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’).  Relevant cases decided since the date of the 2004 Act have 
briefly been canvassed at section 5(ii) above. 632  The focus of the present section is upon 
the 2004 Act itself and subsequent policy, statute, debate and general progression.  
 
In January 2007, when the final revisions were made to Publication 7, the key sections of 
the 2004 Act had been in force for only 21 months.633  There were two reported 
judgments on the terms of the 2004 Act, both of which had been decided on fairly narrow 
factual issues.634  Most of the case law considered in the publication pre-dated the 2004 
Act, and so was concerned with recognition of the transsexual’s status and capacity in 
law – a matter that was, ultimately, resolved by the 2004 Act itself. Certain observations 
were made about the terms of the 2004 Act.  Anomalies, and potential lacunae, believed 
to be significant were also highlighted.635   
 
The anomalies/lacunae considered in Publication 7 which will be revisited with reference 
to contemporary law relate to: (a) gender specific offences, (b) marriage and (c) 
individuals left without a remedy in terms of the 2004 Act (notably transsexual children 
and young people). 
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 The most prominent cases have been reported since the date of Publication 7  are: J v C (Void Marriage: 
Status of Children) [2006] EWCA Civ 551; Grant v United Kingdom (32570/03) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 1; R (on 
the application of B) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 2220 (Admin); Timbrell v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2010] EWCA Civ 701; M v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] 
UKFTT 356 (TC); R (on the application of C) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 247 
(reported at first instance and on appeal). 
633 Key sections, for the purpose of my research, were (and are) ss 1 – 4, 9, 20: these sections came into force 
in April 2005. 
634 (i) R (on the application of DB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 659 (Admin): 
about the detention of a former prisoner who was a male to female transsexual in an all male high security 
psychiatric hospital (Queen’s Bench ruled that there was no breach of Articles 3 or 8); (ii) Richards v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions (C-423/04) [2006] All E.R. (EC) 895: about refusal to grant a pension to a male 
to female transsexual at the same age as a woman (ECHR ruled that this was discriminatory). 
635 Publication 7, pp 180 – 186. 
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(a)  Gender Specific Offences: 
 
In ‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’, it was concluded that, in Scotland at least, the 
legal system faced a new assortment of dangerous legal perplexities in respect of gender 
specific offences.636  In particular, the 2004 Act permits the granting of a Gender 
Recognition Certificate in cases where gender reassignment surgery has not taken 
place.637  It was, and is, accordingly possible that a trans-woman (i.e. a male-to-female 
transsexual) in possession of a Gender Recognition Certificate may still have a penis. 
 
In an attempt to permit the state to penetrate the possible layers of obscurity in respect of 
relevant criminal offences, section 20(1) of the 2004 Act provides: 
 
“Where (apart from this subsection) a relevant gender-specific offence could 
be committed or attempted only if the gender of a person to whom a full 
gender recognition certificate has been issued were not the acquired gender, 
the fact that the person's gender has become the acquired gender does not 
prevent the offence being committed or attempted.” 
 
This section ensures that liability will continue to exist in respect of “relevant gender-
specific offences”, regardless of whether the victim or perpetrator has been issued at any 
stage with a Gender Recognition Certificate.  “Gender specific offences” are defined as 
offences involving sexual activity and which may be committed only by or upon a person 
of a particular gender. 638  
 
Rape, for example is a gender specific offence throughout the UK.  At the time of writing 
Publication 7, rape in Scots law was an offence that could only be committed by a man 
upon a woman, and the act of rape required vaginal penetration.639  The terms of section 
20 of the 2004 Act meant that as long a person was, or ever had been, male in law, he or 
she could have been capable of committing the offence of rape upon any other person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636 Publication 7, at p 184. 
637 The 2004 Act requires only, in terms of s 3 (“Evidence”) that the applicant “has undergone or is undergoing 
treatment for the purpose of modifying sexual characteristics… if treatment for that purpose has been 
prescribed or planned”. 
638 Section 20(2) of the Act provides that “An offence is a “relevant gender-specific offence” if (a) either or 
both of the conditions in subsection (3) are satisfied, and (b) the commission of the offence involves the 
accused engaging in sexual activity.  Subsection (3) provides that “The conditions are (a) that the offence may 
be committed only by a person of a particular gender, and (b) that the offence may be committed only on, or in 
relation to, a person of a particular gender, and the references to a particular gender include a gender identified 
by reference to the gender of the other person involved.” 
639 This was in marked contrast to the law in force in England at the time which defined “rape” as an offence 
that “can be committed by a man on either a man or a woman, and the act of rape consists of penile penetration 
of the mouth, anus or vagina” (Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss 1, 2). 
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who was, or had been at the time of the offence, female in law.  In practice, the police 
(and our courts) could ignore the issuing of a Gender Recognition Certificate in such 
circumstances. 
 
The 2004 Act was silent, as was the rest of Scots criminal law in 2006, on the question of 
whether the artificially-constructed created genitalia of a either a perpetrator or a victim 
would be found to constitute a “penis” or a “vagina” in law. 640   This was an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
 
The whole issue of what constituted “rape”, and indeed “genitalia”, in Scots law was 
shortly afterwards canvassed by the Scottish Law Commission in its report on Rape and 
Other Sexual Offences. 641   Subsequent legislation specifically included “surgically 
constructed”642 genitalia within the statutory definition of penis and the vagina.  Further, 
the definition of “rape” was amended in statute to include a male victim (and penetration 
of the anus or mouth 643), and so, since 2009, the gender, or sex, of the victim has become 
a matter likely to attract considerably less debate.   
 
It is interesting to note that these, significant, loopholes discussed in ‘Gender Identity and 
Scottish Law’ have now been addressed in Scots Criminal statute.644 
 
(b)  Marriage: 
 
One key research outcome of Publication 7 concerned the potential vulnerability of the 
“post-operative” transsexual spouse in terms of perceived sexual capacity.  In the 
(in)famous Corbett judgment in 1971, Ormrod J had referred to the apparent inability of 
the transsexual Respondent to consummate marriage because of her artificially created 
genitalia.  He commented that he did not believe:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Had, for example, a criminal court required “ordinary and complete intercourse” (see Publication 7 at p 182) 
then in the case of a rape involving artificially-constructed genitalia, the implementation of section 20 was 
problematic. The ‘Looking Glass Society’ noted that the results of surgery could “vary from very poor (looking 
most unlike natural female genitals, and having little sensation) to excellent (indistinguishable from natural 
female genitals without internal examination, and having full sexual sensation).” Transsexualism: A Medical 
Overview,3rd edn, para 10.1. 
641 Report 209, published Dec 2007, including a draft bill. 
642 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 1(4).  
643 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 1(1).  “Rape” has also been defined to include penetration of “the 
vagina, anus or mouth” in that section. Section 1 of the 2009 Act came into force on 14 July 2009. 
644 Statutory (and other significant) developments can be plotted on the Transsexuality Timeline in the thesis 
Appendix. 
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“sexual intercourse, using a completely artificial [vaginal] cavity … [could 
possibly amount to] ‘ordinary and complete intercourse”’.645  
 
The 2004 Act did not specifically address the issue of surgically constructed genitalia in 
civil law.  However, if previous case law was any indicator, the transsexual remained 
vulnerable to being held incapable in law of consummating his or her marriage.646  It was, 
therefore, possible that a transsexual might be found by a Scottish court to be “incurably 
impotent”, a finding upon which a court may determine that a marriage is void.   
 
“Incurable impotency” was, in 2006 (and remains today, notwithstanding the 
recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission647), a ground on which a marriage is 
voidable. The opportunity was not taken at the time the Family Law (Scotland) bill was 
passing through the Scottish Parliament to abolish voidable marriages and so the status is 
left untouched by the provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.648  
 
(c)  Individuals without a remedy in the 2004 Act: the young 
 
A suggestion was made in the closing pages of Publication 7 that transsexuals who were 
either unable or unwilling to follow the procedures found in the 2004 Act might seek 
recognition on different terms.649  Insofar as originality is concerned, I am not aware of 
any proposal to this effect having been made before, or since, the publication of ‘Gender 
Identity and Scots Law.’650 The proposal built upon a previous publication (Publication 
8), which had as its sole focus the rights of transsexual children and young people.  
Contemporary legal issues concerning transsexuality and the young will be discussed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 at 85 per Ormrod J, at 107. 
646 Publication 7, at p 183 – 184.  In Scots law marriage has always been regarded as a union between a man 
and a woman: see, e.g., Stair, Inst 1.4.1-1.4.6. 
647 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (Scot Law Com No 135, 1992) 75 at paras 8.21 – 8.30 
and recommendations 49 and 50. Scottish courts have traditionally taken the view that complete penetration is 
required (“vera copula perfecta”) and partial penetration by the husband of the wife is not enough: J v J 1978 
SLT 128. Interestingly, ability to consummate is not required of civil partners. 
648 An action for declaratory of nullity of marriage may be raised either in the Court of Session or the Sheriff 
Court: Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, s 5(1), as amended by s 4 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. 
649 Publication 7, at p 180; 184 – 186. The proposals related to those who did not, for whatever reason, meet the 
statutory requirements found in ss 1 – 3 of the 2004 Act for the grant of a Gender Recognition Certificate. This 
might, e.g., include a person who has no medical evidence supporting his/her having lived for 2 years in his/her 
“acquired gender”. 
650 This was, in fact, what the Scottish court did in the case of Forbes-Sempill, 29 Dec 1967, Court of Session 
Outer House, court process available National Archives of Scotland, CS258/1991/P892 (a case in which twelve 
medical experts gave evidence), but not in X, Petitioner,1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 61.  The rationale was that Forbes-
Sempill, who was clearly a transsexual, might have instead been a hermaphrodite. Although the case has rarely 
been written on from a legal perspective, it has been widely commented on socially: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Ewan_Forbes,_11th_Baronet.  
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greater depth in Chapter 4, although the relevant observations made in Publication 7 will 
be summarised in brief in this section. 
 
The 2004 Act, in particular, requires that any applicant seeking a Gender Recognition 
Certificate is “aged at least 18” and has “lived in the acquired gender for throughout the 
period of two years ending with the date on which the application is made”.651  This 
means that medically competent transsexual children and young adults under eighteen 
living in Britain would be unable to use the provisions of the 2004 Act and so face the 
prospect of beginning a new school, and later a university or career, in their birth sex 
rather than their “acquired gender”.  Difficulties arising from this anomaly might be 
circumvented by Scottish courts considering an alternative application to change legal 
status.  An application might be made, if supported by contemporary medical evidence 
(e.g. a brain scan showing a transsexual brain, or a chromosome test652), in terms of the 
Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 to rectify “birth sex” the applicant’s 
birth certificate.653  
 
No test cases have been reported in Scotland, or elsewhere in the UK, involving a 
transsexual seeking to alter, or correct, “birth sex” status since the publication of ‘Gender 
Identity and Scottish Law’.  In other jurisdictions,654 courts have in recent years allowed 
certain steps to be taken by children and young people to delay puberty so as to postpone 
taking certain decisions until they are older.  
 
It remains uncertain, given that transsexual children and young people are absent from 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 2004 Act, ss 1, 2. 
652 There is a growing body research concerning this e.g., J.N. Zhou et al, (1995), ‘A sex difference in the 
human brain and its relation to transsexuality’, Nature, 378, 68-70; J Hamzelou, (2011), ‘Transsexual 
differences caught on brain scan’, New Scientist (online), 26 January 2011; Y Stafford and M Webb, (2004), 
‘Imaging the Transgendered Brain’, chapter in Mindhacks, O’Reilly Media: ‘Transsexual gene link identified’, 
BBC News online (referencing the work of Professor Vincent Harley et al at Prince Henry’s Institute of 
Medical Research in Australia), 26 October 2008. 
653 Publication 7, p 184 – 186. Section 42 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 provides 
that, where a correction is made, an entry will be made in the Register of Corrections Etc in terms of s 44. The 
Act provides that an appeal to the sheriff is final (s 42(5)) but the sheriff's decision would be open to judicial 
review. See also s 48 of the 1965 Act, concerning “Decrees of court altering status”. 
654 See broader discussion about the rights of transsexual children and young people in Chapter 4 below. 
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(d)  Sportspersons 
 
Insofar as the ongoing application and impact of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is 
concerned, one matter left untouched in Publication 7 was that of the transsexual 
sportsman or sportswoman.  At the time of publication, section 19(1) of the 2004 Act 
made provisions for sporting activities as follows: 
 
“A body responsible for regulating the participation of persons as competitors 
in an event or events involving a gender-affected sport may, if subsection (2) 
is satisfied, prohibit or restrict the participation as competitors in the event or 
events of persons whose gender has become the acquired gender under this 
Act” 
 
Section 19 was one of the more controversial sections of the Gender Recognition bill, and 
its inclusion in the 2004 Act, as passed, was the subject of academic discourse and social 
debate.655  One commentator observed around the time the 2004 Act came into force that 
section 19: 
 
“… [left] the decisions to individual sporting bodies, but the right to require 
participants to disclose information relating to this Act does not exist; rather 
it appears that there can only be a voluntary disclosure by the athlete. If this is 
the case, then it is clearly an inadequate [statutory provision] which will do 
nothing to maintain a level playing field in sport.”656 
 
It is interesting to note that section 19 was repealed by the Equality Act 2010.657  While 
the Equality Act 2010 included transsexuals generally within its terms,658 “sport” is a 
field forming an express exception659 to the protective provisions of the 2010 Act.  This 
means that separate sporting competitions can continue to be organised for men and 
women “where physical strength, stamina or physique are major factors in determining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 See, e.g., P Charlish P, (2005), ‘Gender Recognition Act 2004: transsexuals in sport – a level playing field’, 
ISLR, 2 (May), 38-42; the terms of s 19 were heatedly debated during the passage of the Bill, see, e.g., M. 
Bowness, The Sun, December 18, 2003: ‘A BIZARRE sex-change law could give Tim Henman his best chance 
of winning Wimbledon for Britain.’ However, for a more grounded response to the Bill, see the comments of 
Lord Carlisle of Berriew, in Hansard, HL, col.1302 (December 18, 2003):“I read some grossly exaggerated 
publicity this week about supposed cheating by transsexuals, who apparently in droves were going to change 
their gender so that they could win Wimbledon and score the winning goal in the Cup Final. For a start, it is 
quite difficult to do either, and changing one's gender does not generally achieve it for one.” 
656 P Charlish P, (2005), ‘Gender Recognition Act 2004: transsexuals in sport – a level playing field’, supra, at 
p 42. 
657 Repealed by Equality Act 2010, Sch 27. 
658 Key sections of the 2010 Act came into force on 1 October 2010.  Section 7(1) of the 2010 Act provides that 
“A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is 
undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by 
changing physiological or other attributes of sex.” 
659 Equality Act 2010, ss 195(1) – 195(8). 
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success or failure, and in which one sex is generally at a disadvantage in comparison with 
the other.”660  Since section 19 has been repealed, it is also now lawful to “restrict 
participation of transsexual people in such competitions if this is necessary to uphold fair 
or safe competition, but not otherwise.”661   
 
It is perhaps worth observing, in closing, that fears of super-powered transsexual athletes 
sweeping the competitive sporting world have so far proved unfounded.662  The recent 
Equality Act 2010 attempts set a precedent for resolving the, often sensitive,663 issues that 
can arise within UK the sporting community664 with reference to sporting regulators 
rather than the courts in the first instance.  This accords with the broad adopted in other 
jurisdictions and at the international competition level.665 
 
3.6.  Concluding Comments  
 
‘Gender Identity and the Law’, discussed in the present chapter, was concerned with the 
second research strand of my overarching research theme: rights, status and capacity of 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 Annotations to the Equality Act 2010, s 195.  It should also be noted that special provision has very recently 
been made in respect of childhood games and activities to restrict the broad power that exists to, effectively, 
discriminate on the grounds of gender assignation: Equality Act 2010 (Age Restrictions) Order 2012, Art 9. 
661 Ibid. 
662 See, e.g., story of American transsexual track and field athlete who did not qualify for the 2012 Olympics: 
‘Transgender athlete fails to qualify’, New York Times, 21 Jun 2012: 
http://london2012.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/transgender-athlete-fails-to-qualify/. It appears that India has 
attempted to circumvent the issue entirely by hosting “Transgender Games”: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-19554390.  
663 This is particularly the case where female athletes come from cultures in which aspersions on their 
femininity may be damaging. See, e.g., ‘Is she really a HE? Women’s 800 runner shrugs off gender storm to 
win gold’, Daily Mail, 19 Aug 2009, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1207653/Womens-
800m-gold-medal-favourite-Caster-Semenya-takes-gender-test-hours-World-Championship-race.html.  
664 For example, the FA has its own Equality Guidance which includes ‘LGBT Football’: 
http://www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance, and a policy specifically providing that “An individual’s 
sexual orientation or gender identity should never be a barrier to participating in, and enjoying, our national 
sport.” This includes a pledge to “combat all forms of homophobic, biophobic and transphobic language and 
behavior”.  
665There are many international bodies with a regulatory / overseeing capacity in sport and who now have 
policies (and testing regimes) in place to address issues involving transsexual (or query transsexual) sportsmen 
and women, see, e.g., the ‘IAAF’ (‘International Association of Athletics Federation’), policy on 
“Hyperandrogenism and Sex Reassignment”, available at: http://www.iaaf.org/about-
iaaf/documents/medical#hyperandrogenism-and-sex-reassignment. This does not mean that issues of 
considerable difficulty do not arise: see, e.g., “Expert view: gender testing imperfect for female athletes”, 
CNN, 8 Aug 2012, available at: http://www.cnn.co.uk/2012/08/08/health/athletes-gender-testing/index.html.  
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Conceptual Framework: Rights, Status and Capacity - Contribution of Publication 7 
 
Publication 7 was placed within a wider body of literature concerning the accommodation 
of new groups and ‘voices’ in Scottish law and society in Section II of the thesis 
Introduction.  Adult transsexuals were noted to belong to a disempowered group for 
whom a range of issues concerning rights, status and capacity had either recently emerged 
or were still to emerge.  These issues concern, e.g., the realisation of human rights in 
respect of private and family life – notably, the recognition of status in an ‘acquired 
gender’, capacity to marry in the gender of choice. Publication 7 is a piece of doctrinal 
research intended to form a contribution, from a traditional legal perspective, to the 
broader interdisciplinary discourse.    
 
In order to contextualise my analysis of the legal approach in Scotland (and the UK), I 
critically evaluated a range of materials and perspectives that were non-legal in nature. 
These included, e.g., reference to social/medical research and historical publications 
contextualising developments in the medicine and in the law. The inclusion of this wider, 
interdisciplinary discourse allowed me to broaden my own considerations of the rights, 
status and capacity of the transsexual. As a contribution to the literature, Publication 7 
evaluates the evolving rights, status and capacity of the transsexual in Scots Law with 
reference to other benchmarks, such as medical developments and cultural perceptions. 
While Publication 7 is principally directed towards providing a comparative legal 
analysis, it is intended that the publication also form a contribution that is accessible to a 
wider readership.  
 
Next, in Chapter 4, a publication addressing a point of intersection between my two 
research strands, the young and disempowered adults, will be considered. 
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          CHAPTER 4: Publication 8  
 
    
      
4.1. General Introduction to Publication 8  
   
The focus of this chapter is:  
 
• Publication 8: ‘Transsexuality and “Kidulthood”: treatment and recognition’, 
Scots Law Times, 2006, 25, 169 – 172  (hereinafter referred to as ‘Transsexuality 
and “kidulthood”’).   
 
The purpose of Publication 8 was to consider the capacity of children and young people 
in Scotland to consent to medical treatment in respect of transsexuality,666 and to discuss 
whether Scots law might formally recognise the status of an “acquired gender”667 in the 
young.  The article was written in late 2005 and submitted in early 2006 to the Scots Law 
Times for publication.668   
 
Publication 8 arose as a by-product of my research for the more substantial publication 
‘Gender Identity and Scottish Law’ (discussed in Chapter 3).  Transsexuality and 
“kidulthood” is, accordingly, a reflection of my own thoughts and developing knowledge 
at a particular, and unfinished, stage in a wider research process.  It was also my first 
publication as an academic and, as such, provides ample scope for criticism.   
 
An interesting feature, however, of Publication 8 is that it represents an interesting point 
of intersection between the two main research strands in my published work: rights, 
status and capacity of (i) the young, and (ii) disempowered adults.  In Publication 8, the 
young669 are considered within the context of the rights and recognition afforded in Scots 
law to disempowered adult transsexuals.  While some legal difficulties are shared by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 For an explanation of choice of terminology used in this thesis, see Chapter 3 introduction. 
667 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s 1(2). 
668  The Scots Law Times, described as the Law Publisher W Green’s “flagship title”, is one of Scotland’s most 
popular weekly practitioner Law journals. It contains “case reports, articles, book reviews, Acts of Adjournal 
and Sederunt, news and case commentaries. Quotes in this and the previous sentence taken from the W 
Green/Sweet & Maxwell webpages: http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/wgreen/scots-law-times.htm.  
669  “Gender identity disorders” in children are, it seems, considered by many professionals as “clinically 
distinct” from disorders of the same name surfacing in adolescence or in adulthood and for which different 
sorts of specialist approach and treatment are required: see, e.g., specialist NHS ‘Gender Identity Development 
Service for Children’: http://www.tavistockandportman.nhs.uk/node/534.   
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young and adult transsexuals there are also, quite distinct, issues that set them apart.  
‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ has, accordingly, been included with other, more 
considered, published work in support of the present thesis.  
 
In section 2 below, Publication 8 will be contextualised.  Research rationale and 
independence will also be outlined.  The research premise and aim will be examined in 
section 3.  Thereafter, in sections 4 and 5, the broad research approach adopted, and 
research outcomes of Publication 8 will be critically evaluated.  In section 6 concluding 
chapter observations are made about the contribution of the publication to literature 
concerning rights, status and capacity.  
    
 
4.2. Rationale and Independence of Publication 8 
 
‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ principally addressed the uncertain legal position, in 
the wake of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, 670  “of Scottish children and young people 
who have a gender identity disorder.” 671   Specifically, the publication considered 
“kidulthood”, i.e. the “elusory years” of a young person’s development from around the 
age of 16 to 18 years old.  During this period of time, young people are, rather 
incongruently, defined in Scots law as adults for some purposes but remain in law 
children for others.672  It seemed that there existed particular difficulties in academic law 
in respect of classifying (i) medical steps sought by, or on behalf of, transsexual children 
and young people and (ii) formal recognition of their “acquired gender”.673 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2004 Act’.   
671 Formal definitions of “gender dysphoria” are varied, as are the criterion for diagnosis (regardless of whether 
the patient is a child or an adult).  Most contemporary definitions cite (i) long-standing and strong 
identification with another gender, and (ii) enduring personal disquiet about the sex assigned or a sense of 
incongruity in the gender-assigned role of that sex as essential criteria.  A ‘gender identity disorder’ is defined, 
with reference to other similar terms, in a rather circular manner in s 25 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, 
which provides that ““gender dysphoria” means the disorder variously referred to as gender dysphoria, gender 
identity disorder and transsexualism”.  International clinical definitions classify gender dysphoria as a “mental 
disorder” in both the current ICD (10)(“International Classification of Diseases”: 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/) and the current DSM-IV-TR (4th edition).  A new edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), DSM-5, was approved by the Board of Trustees 
of the American Psychiatric Association on December 1, 2012: http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx.  It is, 
however, worth observing that some authorities, e.g., the NHS, do not define gender dysphoria as a “mental 
disorder” at all, instead describing it as "a condition for which medical treatment is appropriate in some cases”: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_097168.pdf.  
672 Quote from the second paragraph of Publication 8 “Kidulthood” was a phrase taken from a movie made 
about young people falling within the 15 – 19 year old stage of life (see: 
http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/kidulthood/).  See thesis Introduction. 
673  Section 1(2) of the 2004 Act provides that “the acquired gender” is “the gender in which the person is 
living…” 
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Important, but largely untested Scottish statutory provisions674 concerning children and 
young people were considered in the light of an Australian case (‘Re Alex’675) in which an 
application had been made on behalf of a transsexual child to the Family Court for 
permission to begin medical treatment towards gender reassignment.  This case, decided 
in 2004, was the first of its kind to be reported at length.  Also, the impact (or, perhaps 
‘lack of impact’ might be a more appropriate description) of the recently in force 2004 
Act upon the status of the young was also discussed. 
 
Publication 8 was written with a practitioner, rather than an academic or inter-
disciplinary, readership in mind.  In particular, the publication was intended to assist 
Scottish child lawyers who might be asked to provide legal advice to transsexual children 
or young people.  In section 3, below, the premise and aim(s) of Publication 8 are 
discussed in more depth. 
 
 
4.3. Publication 8 – Contextualising the Premise and Aim(s)  
 
The broad premise of ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ was that the young could be 
divided into two broad groups in Scots law for whom personal capacity 676 was either 
unclear or uncertain.   
 
The first group might be termed the “autonomous generation” 677 (i.e. young people 
between the ages of 16 to 18 years).  Individuals belonging to this group possess 
uncertain legal capacity: they may, for example, marry and enter into civil partnerships 
but they are unable to seek formal recognition in law of the “acquired gender” in which 
they may have been living for some years.  It was thought that issues affecting this group 
of transsexual young people largely concerned status and access to remedies.  
Consideration was therefore given to the operation of the recently in force 2004 Act 
insofar as its provisions pertained to this group of “the young”. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674 Section 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, discussed in the chapter main text below. 
675 Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria [2004] Fam CA 297, a judgment of the 
Family Court in Australia. 
676 For the purpose of the 1991 Act, and the discussion in this chapter, “capacity” assumes its meaning in the 
ordinary English language sense.  Thus, the capacity to act in law, for the purpose of the 1991 Act, simply 
means possessing the legally recognised ability to make autonomous decisions. This is reinforced by the terms 
of s 1(1)(a) of the 1991 Act in which the expression “legal capacity to enter into any transaction” is used. 
677 This is discussed in Publication 8 at p 172. 
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The second group of the young comprises individuals below the age of 16 years: the 
group most commonly referred to as “children”678 in Scots law.  The general capacity of 
this group to make decisions and interact with society is determined by the provisions of 
the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991.679  The 1991 Act does not supersede 
statutory age limits laid down for specific purposes, and it does not affect child capacity 
in certain, excluded fields of law (e.g. Criminal law and Delict680).  However, for most 
purposes, the 1991 Act created a broad “binary scheme” providing that, subject to 
particular exceptions outlined in section 2 of that Act, those over 16 years of age have full 
“legal capacity” while those under 16 years of age have none.681   
 
In order to reflect the growing maturity of children and young people throughout 
childhood, a number of specific exceptions to the general rule that a person under 16 
years of age has no legal capacity were created by the 1991 Act.  These statutory 
exceptions provide for the legal autonomy of the individuals below 16 years of age in 
certain scenarios including, for example, the capacity of a “competent” child to instruct a 
solicitor in civil proceedings or to consent to adoption and even, if so inclined, to draft 
her own will.682  The difficulty with the application of the 1991 Act is that some of the 
statutory exceptions are vaguely expressed and, for the most part, the exceptions are 
untested in practice.683  Thus, the personal capacity of “the young” who are under the age 
of 16 years is unclear.  This is particularly true insofar as medical decisions about surgery 
or treatment are concerned.   
 
Section 2(4) of the 1991 Act makes provision for the potential capacity of those below 16 
years of age to consent to “surgical, medical or dental procedure[s] or treatment[s]”.684  In 
doing so, the 1991 Act provides a medical exception to the general rule that below the 
age of 16 years a person has no legal capacity.  Publication 8 accordingly focused on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 See Thesis Introduction, Section (IV), for examples of the varied definitions of “child” in Scots law. 
679 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1991 Act’. 
680 Section 1(3) of the 1991 Act provides, among other things, that “nothing in this Act shall… (c) affect the 
delictual or criminal responsibility of any person” or “(d) affect any enactment which lays down an age limit 
expressed in years for any particular purpose…” 
681 Quote taken from Publication 8 at p 170. Reference to the 1991 Act are references to s 1(1)(a) and (b). 
682 These exceptions are found in s2 (in particular, ss 2(2); 2(3) & 2(4A)) of the 1991 Act.  The exception 
relating to the capacity of a child or young person below the age of 16 years to instruct a solicitor 
independently is discussed in depth in Chapter 1. 
683 See discussions in Chapters 1 and 2 concerning the general application of the 1991 Act. 
684 Section 2(4) of the 1991 Act requires that the child satisfy a “qualified medical practitioner attending him” 
that he is capable of “understanding the nature and possible consequences of the procedure or treatment”.  This 
is discussed further, below, in the main text. 
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section 2(4) of the 1991 Act, discussing the perceived capacity of those under the age of 
16 years to request, and consent to, hormonal and surgical treatments for transsexuality.  
 
On reflection, I do not think that a particularly clear distinction was drawn, in 
‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’, between the two groups of “young” transsexuals 
outlined above or, in particular, between the subtly different (but significant) legal 
difficulties with which each group contended.  Thus, both the publication premise and 
aims lacked precision.  Those older “young” people, between the age of 16 and 18, 
possess(ed) full capacity in law to make medical decisions, including decisions about 
hormonal treatment towards gender reassignment and surgical gender reassignment 
procedures.  However, any such medical decisions effecting a social and medical change 
in personal sex/gender685 could not (and still cannot) be legally endorsed using the gender 
recognition provisions of the 2004 Act.   
 
The younger group of transsexuals, i.e. those below the age of 16 years, were (and 
remain) similarly unable to have an “acquired gender” formalised using the provisions of 
the 2004 Act.  In addition, however, they were (and are) likely, in terms of the 1991 Act, 
to have questions asked about their general capacity to make decisions about medical 
treatments or procedures.  It is possible that a doctor might, in terms of s 2(4) of the 1991 
Act, find a person under the age of 16 incapable of “understanding the nature and 
possible consequences of the procedure or treatment” sought in respect of 
transsexualism.686 
 
Since the overall publication aim(s) of Publication 8 were not unequivocally stated, the 
research outcomes lacked the clarity found in other publications supporting this thesis.  
This was an inevitable outcome of the publication, notwithstanding that a reasonable 
critical analysis of the relevant law was provided throughout.  Issues surrounding 
specification of research aims, approach and outcomes will be discussed further in the 





  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Distinctions between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are discussed Publication 7and in Chapter 3. 
686 The 1991 Act, s 2(4). 
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4.4. Observations on Approach Adopted in Publication 8 
 
In Publication 8, I approached transsexuality and the young, first, by outlining areas of 
perceived difficulty in Scots law; secondly, by posing research questions and, finally, by 
seeking (through review and analysis of available law) to generate valid conclusions.  
Observations about overall approach are made below:  
 
(i) Approach and Structure of Publication 8 
 
A general introduction was provided in the initial sentences to the subject matter and the 
relevant terminology was briefly explained.  Thereafter, in the section entitled “Statutory 
provisions for transsexuals: a gap?” a concise overview was given of the provisions of the 
2004 Act and of the anticipated worldwide ripples following a decision about medical 
treatment involving a 13 year old female to male transsexual in a reported Australian 
case.687  
 
It was observed that the Australian case, Re Alex, raised “two interesting issues for Scots 
lawyers” at the time: first, “whether any Scottish young person might be deemed capable 
of consenting to treatment for transsexuality” and secondly, “whether Scots law will 
recognise a transsexual young person's acquired gender.” 688  Next, in the section entitled 
“Surgical procedures, medical treatments and transsexuality” in Publication 8 section 2(4) 
of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act1991 was reproduced: 
 
“A person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to consent on 
his own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment 
where, in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is 
capable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the 
procedure or treatment.” 
 
The above section was critically examined having regard in particular to decision of the 
Australian Family Court in Re Alex, i.e: what should be understood, in Scotland, by: (i) 
“consent… to any surgical, medical… treatment” (ii) “in the opinion of a qualified 
medical practitioner…”; (iii) “capable of understanding the nature and possible 
consequences”.  This approach was adopted because there were no significant decisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria [2004] Fam CA 297. 
688 Publication 8 at p 169. 
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in Scotland,689 and few elsewhere in the UK,690 concerning young people making medical 
decisions of a significant, and possibly permanent, nature affecting their sex/gender.  
Other judgments691 concerning the capacity of children and young people to give consent 
in a medical context were briefly canvassed in an effort to posit what possible approach 
towards the medical autonomy of transsexuals below the age of 16 years might be 
expected in Scotland. 
 
Thereafter, in the section entitled “Recognition of ‘acquired gender’ and young people”, 
potential difficulties arising from the threshold requirement of sections 1 and 2(1)(b) of 
the 2004 Act were considered.  These sections provide that an applicant must be over 18 
years of age and must have lived for the preceding two years in an acquired gender.  This, 
of course, prevents applications both by medically competent young people under 16 
years of age and by young adults under the age of 18.   
 
Some of the research questions that might (and perhaps should) have been asked in 
Publication 8 are discussed below: 
 
(ii)  Questions that Might Have Been Posed in Publication 8: 
 
In particular, I think that three practical questions (likely to be of interest to solicitors 
instructed by children and young people) were left unasked in Publication 8.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 The decision in Houston, Applicant (1996 SCLR 943) was observed in passing as one of the few reported 
authorities in Scotland concerning child capacity in a medical context.  Houston, which was a Sheriff court 
judgment (and so is not binding), was concerned with a mentally ill teenager deemed capable in law of 
“understanding the nature and consequences of the proposed treatment”.  The decision, though, suggested that 
the s 2(4) capacity test was (and is) not a particularly arduous one.   
690 It is, of course, difficult in any consideration of child capacity in the medical sphere avoid discussing the 
English House of Lords judgment, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority ([1986] AC 
112), and the famous retreat from that judgment into a more paternalistic approach in England in respect of 
uncomfortable medical decisions and the young.  See Publication 8 at p 170 – 171.  It is interesting to note, in 
passing, that in England, the trend to usurp decision-making autonomy of, even older, children and young 
people perceived to be ill-informed or lacking a balanced understanding of life has continued.  Paternalistic 
judgments:  Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758, in which medical 
treatment refused by a girl of 16, suffering from anorexia nervosa, was authorised by the Court of Appeal 
against her will; Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick competence) [1998] 2 FLR 810 in which a critically injured 
14 year old Jehovah’s Witness refused to consent to a blood transfusion, and the court overrode that decision. 
There are three points worth making here: (i) general issues surrounding child consent to medical treatment is a 
subject-matter that has been written on in depth in other jurisdictions and such broad, academic, medico-legal 
discussions fell outwith the scope of Publication 8; (ii) English courts do seem more willing to endorse the 
perceived autonomy of the young in matters concerning evolving sexual self-determination than in other areas 
(see, e.g, R (on the application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] 2WLR1130]: Gillick followed), 
and (iii) we simply do not know what approach a Scottish court would take: see discussion in text above.  
Gillick is only a persuasive authority and the terms of s 2(4) have as yet not been the focus of any significant 
judicial consideration. Further reading on Gillick, see: Douglas, G, The Retreat from Gillick, 55 Mod L Rev 
569 (1992). 
691 Publication 8 at p 170 – 172. 
	   156	  
(a) Which Methods of Dispute Resolution? 
 
Publication 8 did not canvas the (non-legal) methods through which a dispute about the 
capacity of a young transsexual to make medical decisions could, in reality, be resolved.  
These methods might include, for example, referral to a different medical practitioner for 
a second opinion,692 or even arranging formal mediation with the Health authority 
concerned.693  In exercising such options, a young transsexual would be likely to avoid 
considerable stress and other possible consequences, such as the risk of unwanted 
publicity,694 consequent upon raising legal proceedings. 
 
(b) Who Raises Proceedings – and How? 
 
Publication 8 did not address pressing (and rather puzzling) practical questions 
concerning the appropriate means by which a formal application might be made to a 
Scottish court (whether the Sheriff Court or the Court of Session) to resolve questions 
about a young transsexual’s capacity to consent to medical treatment or surgery.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 In practice, this was, and remains, a straightforward process: http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/910.aspx. 
Further, the recent Patient Rights (Scotland) Act 2011 largely, came into force on 1 April 2012. The 
overarching aim of the 2011 Act is to provide patients with the right that the health care they receive should be 
directed towards their needs and optimum personal benefit. The 2011 Act seeks to encourage patients to take a 
greater role in decisions being made about their health and wellbeing. It would seem, then, that there is more 
scope to obtain the medical treatment desired by the patient concerned: s 1 of the 2011 Act binds Scottish 
Ministers to publish a document to be known as the Charter of Patient Rights and Responsibilities and s 3 
outlines patient rights. 
693 Since 2011, various NHS Trusts in Scotland have begun pilot programmes in collaboration with the Scottish 
Mediation Network towards greater services to resolve patient-care provider disputes and disagreements, see, 
e.g: http://www.scottishmediation.org.uk/about/types-of-mediation/healthnhs-mediation.  
694 It is likely that a child pursuer or applicant would qualify for legal aid in Scotland, since legal aid is largely 
means tested.  In Re Alex, the Family Court in Australia granted an order “closing the proceedings from the 
public and prohibiting any identifying disclosure of Alex” (judgment, p 1).  This procedure was adopted in the 
subsequent Australian judgments considered later in this chapter.  UK courts (and tribunals) have the broad 
power to make an order protecting the anonymity of a party in litigation (this is often used where that party is a 
child).  Such steps have also been taken before in proceedings concerning adult transsexuals in litigation about 
a range of matters, see e.g: Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed (Restricted Reporting Order) [1998] 
I.R.L.R. 56, a case involving a complaint of sexual harassment brought by a transsexual against her employers 
and confidentially of the identity of the Complainant was a matter considered by the court; AC v Berkshire 
West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162 (Admin), transsexual seeking particular NHS treatment, 
discussed in Chapter 3 above.  However, there is always a risk that the identity of litigating parties will be 
revealed: judgments of academic interest and value are frequently reported in Law Reports (identity should be 
protected if there is a publicity ban: see, e.g., Court of Session Practice Note 2 of 2007 on the Parliament House 
website) and also in the media.  Were the (online) media to be dogged in its pursuit, it would not be hard in as 
small a jurisdiction as Scotland, for the identity of a young transsexual applicant to be uncovered. Once 
confidentiality is breached, it is impossible to regain it, or possibly even to seek redress, particularly in an 
internet era in which the information source may not always reveal his or her identity.  For an interesting 
discussion about (unlawful) tweeting and the operation of Article 8 Rights in Scottish courts, see: 
http://scotslawthoughts.wordpress.com/2012/11/05/open-justice-what-is-the-problem-with-tweeting-from-a-
scottish-court/.  
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First, and perhaps most importantly, who raises proceedings?  A different litigant process 
would most likely be adopted in Scottish proceedings than the process followed in the 
Australian Family Court by the applicants in Re Alex.  There, the applicants were Alex’s 
“legal guardians” and, as such, they bore the principal responsibility for persuading the 
court that the hormonal treatment sought for transsexuality was “in Alex’s best interests”. 
695  A child in Scotland can instruct a solicitor to represent her from the age of around 12 
years old,696 so there would be no need for a guardian to raise proceedings on her behalf.  
Further, a Scottish young transsexual’s argument as to capacity to consent would be 
based on her ability to “understand the nature and possible consequences”697 of the 
medical treatment proposed.  Thus, it would doubtless be detrimental to her case if she 
were so lacking in maturity that she required a parent698 or guardian to make a court 
application on her behalf.   
 
Secondly, while substantive rather than procedural law was (and remains) the focus of 
my research, it may have been helpful to outline briefly in Publication 8 the form by 
which proceedings concerning child medical capacity might be raised in Scotland.  Since 
the provisions of s 2(4A) of the 1991 Act are largely untested there appears to be no clear 
answer to this question. 
 
In practice, there might be a number of stages in any journey towards eventual litigation: 
(a) where a medical practitioner attending a person below 16 years of age did not find 
that person capable of consenting to treatment or surgery for transsexuality, then the 
patient could seek legal advice;699 (b) the medical practitioner would normally be an 
employee of a Health authority and so any legal correspondence would be handled by the 
Health authority’s legal department; (c) were a Health authority subsequently to endorse 
the opinion of the medical practitioner concerned proceedings could then be raised by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 Re Alex, citation above, at para 5.  The facts of the case will be outlined in section 5 below. 
696 Section 2(4A) of the 1991 Act provides: “A person under the age of sixteen years shall have legal capacity 
to instruct a solicitor, in connection with any civil matter, where that person has a general understanding of 
what it means to do so; and without prejudice to the generality of this subsection a person twelve years of age 
or more shall be presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to have such understanding.” 
697 1991 Act, s 2(4). 
698 The power of a parent to bring proceedings on behalf of his or her child is found in ss 1(1)(d) and s 2(1)(d) 
of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  Section 1(3) of that Act provides that this includes “title to sue, or 
defend, in any proceedings…”  Strictly speaking, this power extends until a child is 16 years old (s 2(7)), and 
this means in practice that the parents of a child competent to instruct a solicitor could still agree with that child 
that they raise proceedings on his behalf qua parent. 
699 The power to do this is found in s 2(4A) of the 1991 Act (as long as the child is deemed competent to 
instruct by the solicitor he or she consults). 
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patient700 against the Health authority, which would as a public body (or private trust) 
have title and interest to defend the action.701 
   
The most obvious form of procedure for the child litigant would appear to be raising a 
petition in the Court of Session for Judicial Review702 of the Health authority’s decision.  
As the name suggests, this procedure would request that the Court exercise its power of 
“judicial review” over the decision-making process of the public body concerned.  Thus, 
the Court could consider, for example, whether the decision the Health authority reached 
in terms of a transsexual child’s capacity was reasonable in all of the circumstances.  A 
competent child or young person could also seek incidental orders, including an interdict 
or an order suspending the implementation of any decision already taken by the Health 
authority to refuse treatment. 
 
Since there are, as yet, no reported cases in Scotland concerning child capacity in terms 
of section 2(4) of the 1991 Act it is hard to predict whether any other form of proceedings 
might be raised: an action seeking specific implementation of the right to exercise 
capacity703 perhaps?   But, is there any sort of “right” to be found capable of consenting 
to medical treatment, or are there any other relevant rights that could give rise to an 
actionable point, and procedure, on this matter in Scots law?  Simply put: we await what 
is sure to be a landmark ruling in terms of both substantive and procedural law.   
 
(c) “Best Interests” or “Capacity”? 
 
Publication 8 perhaps did not stress strongly enough that the “best interests” test applied 
by the Australian Family Court in Re Alex is not, ostensibly, the test set down in Scots 
law for determining whether or not a child who might have capacity to consent actually 
receives medical treatment.  The legal decision in Re Alex turned entirely on the Alex’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 It should be noted that the rights of the patient to have an input in decisions made about her care and 
treatment appear to have significantly increased since April 2012 when the Patient Rights (Scotland) Act 2011 
came into force. 
701 The National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 sets out the constitution, statutory functions and operation 
of the NHS in Scotland.  
702 For an overview of the nature and scope of judicial review proceedings generally, see the Judicial Review 
Handbook, 6th ed, Fordham M, Hart Publishing 2012 (focus largely on English law). For a, slightly more dated, 
but purely Scottish text on the subject, see Judicial Review in Scotland, Mullen T,  Sweet & Maxwell, 1996. 
703 It may be that the broad rights set out in the United Nations Convention on the Child (‘the UNCRC’) could 
provide some assistance here.  Articles 23 and 24 cover, amongst other rights, rights in medicine and health 
care for children and young people (i.e. those under the age of 18 years in terms of the UNCRC). The UK has 
ratified the Convention, but it does not have direct impact in current Scots law.  It is envisaged that the 
Convention will form part of the substance of Scots law in early course.  See, e.g, Consultation on the (recently 
passed) Children and Young People bill: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/07/7181/12.  
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welfare, or as the Family Court of Australia termed it, her “best interests”.  In his written 
decision, Nicholson CJ, the presiding judge in Re Alex, neatly side-stepped the issue of 
child capacity throughout most of his judgment and observed: 
 
“The key issue before me is whether I should authorise medical treatment 
involving the administration of hormonal therapies that will begin what is 
colloquially described as a “sex change” process. In order to reach this 
decision I must be firmly satisfied upon clear and convincing evidence that 
the proposed treatment is in Alex’s best interests.” 704 
 
In other words, both a doctor and, subsequently, a court had to take the view that the 
treatment proposed was the best outcome possible for Alex in the circumstances.  Alex’s 
capacity to decide herself was a secondary issue because the final decision about the 13 
year old transsexual’s treatment in the Australian proceedings did not, ultimately, rest 
with her.705  In the end, permission was given was given for Alex to receive hormone 
treatment to suppress the onset of puberty.706  The 2004 decision of the Family Court in 
Australia in Re Alex represented a strongly paternalistic approach towards medical 
decisions made concerning the young.  It is, however, an approach that has been not been 
wholly endorsed in later judgments of the Family Court in Australia about transsexual 
children.707  
 
The key issue, in Scotland, in respect of all patients is normally708 one of consent.  Insofar 
as the young are concerned, parents may consent on behalf of children who lack capacity 
to consent themselves709 or, alternatively, since 1991, children may consent on their own 
behalf where they possess such capacity in terms of section 2(4) of the 1991 Act.   
 
As was observed in Publication 8, in proposing the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) bill 
that later became the 1991 Act, the Scottish Law Commission expressly rejected a best 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 Supra. Nicholson CJ, paras 1 and 4 of the judgment. 
705 This is made clear by the Family Court’s observation at paras 168 - 169 of the judgment: “… the evidence 
does not establish that Alex has the capacity to decide for himself whether to consent to the proposed 
treatment. It is one thing for a child or young person to have a general understanding of what is proposed and 
its effect but it is quite another to conclude that he/she has sufficient maturity to fully understand the grave 
nature and effects of the proposed treatment… I therefore take the view that the capacity of Alex to give his 
own consent would be an academic question unless I were to refuse authorisation.” 
706 Para 242 of the Re Alex judgment, per Nicholson CJ. 
707 See, e.g, Re Brodie (Special Medical Procedure) [2008] Fam CA 334; Re: Jamie (Special medical 
procedure) [2011] Fam CA 248, both discussed in text of chapter below. 
708 Medical staff treating patients who do not consent to that treatment commit an assault, unless there are 
circumstances (such as an emergency) to justify such medical/surgical steps. 
709 Such power is given to parents in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1-2: section 2(1)(b) of that Act 
provides that any person with parental responsibilities and rights has the right “to control, direct or guide, in a 
manner appropriate to the stage of development of the child, the child’s upbringing”.   
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medical interests test for the young as being “too restrictive” confirming instead that “if it 
has been accepted” a young person is capable of consenting in law then his consent 
should not be undermined simply because the treatment might not be for his own good.  
While the Scottish Law Commission said that it expected that “a greater level of 
understanding might be required” in respect of procedures not considered to be in the best 
interests of the child, the Commission concluded that the “young patient should be treated 
no differently from anyone else capable of consenting”.710  Thus, the terms of the Scottish 
1991 Act focus solely on establishing capacity as opposed to the Australian “best 
interests” approach adopted in 2004 in Re Alex.   
 
A child “capacity-only” approach would create an odd dual reality in practice in Scotland 
where parents and children are concerned.  The parents of a child incapable of consenting 
herself to medical treatment would be subject to a “best interests” test by a Scottish court 
in the event that there was a dispute over medical treatment.  This is because parents bear 
the legal responsibility of safeguarding their own child’s welfare throughout childhood.711  
However, once a person below the age of 16 years becomes capable of making medical 
decisions herself it certainly seems that, in terms of current Scottish statute, she need 
satisfy no-one that a decision she makes about medical treatment is in her own best 
interests. 712  Of course, she must find medical practitioners willing and able to treat her.  
 
(iii)  Lessons Learned 
 
It would have been a worthwhile exercise in Publication 8 to give some consideration to 
these three additional issues affecting children and young people that have been outlined 
above.  Exploring the matters highlighted in this section would, however, almost certainly 
have produced two, perhaps more, practitioner articles outlining and critically evaluating 
the rights of Scottish child transsexuals within a medical context.  That would have been 
a greater undertaking.  As observed at the outset of this chapter, Publication 8 was not the 
primary focus of my research into the legal issues surrounding transsexuality.  
Notwithstanding this, the issues explored in the publication were (and remain) topical and 
seldom considered in academic or practitioner journals in Scotland.  However, had I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Pupils and Minors, Report 110, 1987, at para 3.61 
onwards.  Italics added. 
711 This is contained within the broad statutory overview of parental responsibilities and rights found in 
sections 1 and 2 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. 
712 Section 2(4). Of course, the ideal situation would be that both the transgender child and his or her parents 
jointly wish the treatment /surgery to take place. 
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submitted ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ for publication some months later, I might 
then have taken the opportunity to form more significant reflections, ideas and opinions 
and a more rounded output might then have been produced. 
 
Lessons have been learned from this publication.  Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ 
represented an important step in my forming a more comprehensive, and definitive, view 
on the research subject.   
 
 
4.5. Reflections on Publication 8 Research Outcomes  
 
‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ was concerned with two, largely untested, pieces of 
legislation in Scotland: the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, and the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004.   
 
Although the 1991 Act has been in force since 25 September 1991, the legislation has 
only been recorded in national case reports as being the primary focus of two reported 
judgments to date.713  One judgment predated Publication 8 and the other postdated 
Publication 8: neither was concerned with medical treatment.  Insofar as the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 is concerned, it had come into force on 4 April 2005 and not been 
the sole focus of any reported Scottish litigation at the time of writing up Publication 8.  
This remains the case today. The research outcomes of Publication 8 were, accordingly, 
tentative in nature, reflecting the existing uncertainties in Scots law.   
 
It is interesting to note that there have been no major developments, cases, statutory 
amendments or repeals714 either to the 1991 Act or the 2004 Act since ‘Transsexuality 
and ‘kidulthood’” was published.  A general lack of growth and discussion in a particular 
area of law is perhaps not the best argument for originality and significance of a 
publication.  However, it may be worth observing that Publication 8 remains the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Westlaw search on19 December 2012: (i) Bell's Curator Bonis, Noter 1998 SC 365 (s 3 of the 1991 Act 
discussed: the possibility that the compromising actings of a curator bonis of a young incapax, rendered 
paraplegic in a road traffic accident, could be set aside as prejudicial); (ii) X v BBC 2005 SLT 796 (s 3 of the 
Act debated: prejudicial transaction of a teenager who had agreed to be part of a BBC documentary and wished 
to renege on that agreement).  In practice, the underlying principles of the 1991 Act (such as the presumption, 
in terms of s 2(4A) of the Act that a young person over the age of 12 years old is mature enough to instruct his 
own solicitor) operate on an impliedly understood basis in Scots Family law, although they have rarely been 
the sole subject of a legal dispute to date. 
714 Some minor repeals/amendments have been made to both pieces of legislation, and s 19 of the 2004 Act 
(concerning the impact of a gender recognition certificate in sport) has been repealed. This is discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
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Scottish legal article focused on the capacity, status and rights of the transgendered young 
in Scotland. 
 
The research outcomes of Publication 8 concerning child consent to medical treatment or 
surgery for transsexualism, and recognition of young transsexuals are revisited below: 
 
(i)  Consent to treatment (those below the age of 16 years) 
 
The following observation, made in ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ remains, I think, 
an accurate representation of contemporary law:715   
 
“… since Scottish courts possess no inherent welfare, or wardship, 
jurisdiction they are free (or, rather, bound) to determine medical, surgical 
and dental competency of under 16's purely on the basis of what appears to be 
a fairly unchallenging competency test.”716 
 
It was further observed in Publication 8 that it would be “most likely that reversible 
treatment [only] would be proposed for those under 16.”  It was also concluded that 
Scottish “medical experts will almost certainly view prepubescent children as lacking the 
level of understanding required to consent to irreversible gender reassignment 
surgery.”717  Determining whether these research outcomes have lasting significance is 
difficult because no reported cases so far uncovered718 have involved anyone below the 
age of 16 years seeking permanent gender reassignment surgery in the UK.719  Rather, the 
child has sought (or, in Australian practice, his or her representatives have tended to seek) 
reversible hormone treatment to delay or prevent puberty.720  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715 See Transsexuality Timeline in Thesis Appendix. The terms of s 2(4) of the 1991 Act do appear to provide 
complete decision-making autonomy to the competent person under the age of 16, something that the “best 
interests” approach adopted in England and Australia towards child patients does not guarantee. In Australia, 
the terms of the Gender Reassignment Act 2000 require that the Gender Recognition Board are “satisfied that it 
is in the best interests of the child that the [Gender Recognition] certificate be issued.” 
716 Publication 8 at p 172. 
717 Publication 8 at p 172. 
718 Search, late December 2012, with focus on Scotland, England and, indeed, Australia.  
719 There may, of course, be strong medical reasoning for delaying surgery until at least late teenage years from 
a psychological or physical perspective.  For example, the Specialist NHS Gender Identity Development 
Centre, that takes referrals from the whole of the UK, states that “the likelihood of the patient going ahead with 
gender reassignment surgery varies dramatically according to age: "80% of those referred to us pre-puberty 
will not go ahead with sex reassignment surgery and will find another solution such as living as a lesbian or 
gay man. Post-puberty 80% of referrals will go ahead with it." The implication here is that surgery before 
puberty is not appropriate: http://www.tavistockandportman.nhs.uk/node/1613. According to the Daily Mail 
(perhaps not the most reliable source!) the youngest person in the world to have gender reassignment was 16 
years of age and the operation was performed in Thailand: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2140775/Jackie-Green-Youngest-person-sex-change-reaches-Miss-England-semi-finals.html.  
720 It is worth noting that hormone treatment is not always reversible, although the earlier stages of the 
treatment seems to be so. This complexity is something that was noted by Nicholson CJ in para 185 of his 
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There is, in addition, a dearth of Scottish (and UK-wide) case law concerning the general 
decision-making capacity of the young within the field of medicine (both at the time of 
writing Publication 8 and today721).  This has generated little academic and practitioner 
discussion about the ethically uncomfortable scenarios such capacity/powers of the young 
might produce in Scotland.722  Considerable legal debate has taken place about such 
issues in other jurisdictions723 where problematic medical scenarios involving children 
have arisen.724 
 
If Publication 8 were rewritten (or updated) today, it would be prudent, first, to ‘revisit’ 
Australia, which is the jurisdiction in which Re Alex was decided in 2004.  In rather stark 
contrast to the lack of litigation in other jurisdictions searched, the Family Court in 
Australia has ruled on a number of cases involving child transsexuals seeking hormone 
treatment to prevent puberty.  Unlike Scotland, it is already accepted as a matter of law in 
Australia that the authorisation of the Family Court is required in respect of treatments 
administered for transsexual young people or children. 725  The recent Australian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
judgment when he observed ”I was asked not to view the reversible first stage in isolation from the second 
stage of hormonal therapy which would have irreversible consequences and may involve injections or an 
implant”. 
721 There are no further reported judgments concerning Scottish children or young people making 
significant/permanent medical decisions on their own behalf in terms of s 2(4) of the 1991 Act.  In England, the 
case of Hannah Jones, a 13 year old child who initially refused a heart transplant (a decision supported by her 
parent and endorsed by the court) was agreed in the early stages of the procedure and so there is no detailed 




722 Cleland A and Sutherland E.E, Children’s Rights in Scotland, 3rd ed., W Green, 2011, at Chapter 3, is one of 
the few contemporary considerations of the rights of the Scottish child in respect of medicine that exists. 
723 Certainly, such scenarios have been provided for in clinical practice in the UK – but little litigation has 
followed.  The General Medical Council has already drafted guidance for doctors in respect of clinical trails 
involving young people below the age of 18 years: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/6469.asp.  They recommend that doctors “should aim to reach a consensus 
with parents about a child or young person’s participation in research.” 
724 See, e.g: New South Wales: Mathews B, ‘Children and consent to medical treatment’, in White, Benjamin 
P, McDonald, F & Willmott, L (Eds), (2010), Health Law in Australia, Thomson Lawbook Co., Sydney, pp 
113-147; India: Nandimath OV, (2009), ‘Consent and medical treatment: The legal paradigm in India’, Indian 
J Urol, 25:343-7; England: Selinger C. P, (2009), ‘The right to consent: is it absolute?’, BMJ, 2(2) 50-54; 
Douglas, G, (1992), ‘The Retreat from Gillick’, 55 Mod L Rev 569; America: Cobill J, (1995), ‘Outpatient 
Mental Health Care Services – A Minor’s Right’, 13 U Rich L Rev 915 (78-9); Australia: Parlett, K., and 
Weston-Sceuber, K-M, (2005), ‘Consent to Treatment for Transgender and Intersex Children’, 375 Deakin LR 
(Australia), Vol 9(2). 
725 It is settled that this falls within the jurisdiction of the Australian Family Court.  See Re Brodie, at para 42, 
and the Family Court, as such, disposed of the case in the manner of general family proceedings: having 
“regard to Brodie’s best interests as the paramount consideration” (para 32). 
	   164	  
judgments may be considered persuasive authorities in any future Scottish cases, and so 
two significant decisions of the Family Court are discussed below. 726   
 
Re Brodie 727 
 
On 15 May 2008, the judgment of Carter J in Re Brodie was delivered.  The case 
concerned “Brodie”, a child who was a female to male transsexual and was, at the time of 
the judgment, 13 years old.  Brodie’s mother was seeking various orders on his behalf, 
including ongoing hormone treatment to suppress puberty.728  The Family Court had 
previously authorised the earlier stages of hormone treatment when Brodie was 12 years 
old.729  An independent “Children’s Lawyer” was appointed to Brodie by the court.  This 
recognition of child capacity, and provision for child participation, had been lacking in 
the earlier Re Alex730 case of 2004 which had concerned a child of the same age.   
 
Significantly, in finding that “on all the evidence the treatment is in [Brodie’s] best 
interests” the court in Re Brodie also ruled that “Brodie is capable of making an informed 
decision about the procedure”.731  Capacity was determined in Re Brodie with reference a 
fairly straightforward test administered by a medical practitioner attending the child: she 
was found to be of “above average intelligence” for her age, and was considered well 
enough “informed” about the nature and “impact of puberty blocking medication” to 
consent.732  The treatment sought at the time the judgment was delivered in Re Brodie 
was still “completely reversible”. Carter J added that: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726 Re Brodie and Re Jamie (citations and discussions below). Re Rosie (Special medical procedure) [2011] 
FamCA 63 was also decided by the Family Court of Australia, but the “child” in that case was 17 years old 
(individuals are children, for the purpose of such proceedings in Australia).  Since, in terms of s 1(1) of the Age 
of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 any person over the age of 16 years “shall have legal capacity to enter 
into any transaction,” Re Rosie is not considered in this chapter. Another case decided by the Family Court in 
Australia was Re Bernadette [2010] FamCA 94: this judgment of Collier J concerned a male to female 
transsexual in respect of whom a hearing took place in 2007. The judgment, which was handed down by the 
Family Court of Australia on 19 January 2010, was largely taken up with a debate over whether a parent of a 
transsexual child were able to consent to treatment without an order of court. The answer in Australia, certainly 
insofar as reasoned out in Re Bernadette, appears to be ‘no’. 
727 (Special Medical Procedure)[2008] Fam CA 334 
728 The treatment was described at para 213 of the Re Brodie judgment as an implanted pellet, under the skin, 
“to suppress pituitary gonadotrophin secretion, which will in turn suppress ovarian function and oestrogen 
secretion for the duration of the course of treatment. This will have the effect of suppressing [Brodie’s] 
pubertal development as a female…” 
729 This decision took place on 14 Dec 2007, and is mentioned in para 1 of the judgment of Carter J. 
730 In Re Alex, a “child representative” was appointed, but it is not clear from the judgment in what capacity the 
representative was intended to act (Re Alex, judgment at paras 13, 48-9). 
731 Judgment at paras 213 and 223. 
732 Judgment at para 223(g). 
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“[I]t was envisaged that at a later stage a further application would be made 
for permission to commence treatment with testosterone, the male sex 
hormone. Testosterone would cause permanent physical changes.” 733 
 
The court had regard to “the overall treatment plan”, considering that “to do otherwise 
would be ‘an artifice’.”734  While finding Brodie entirely capable of making a decision 
about treatment for transsexuality, the court was, in reality, finding her competent only to 
decide about reversible treatment (i.e. the first stages of treatment towards a permanent 
sex/gender change). 
 
       Re Jamie 735 
 
The second significant Australian judgment, Re: Jamie, was handed down by the Family 
Court of Australia on 6 April 2011.  The case concerned an application made by the 
parents of “Jamie”, a 10 years and 10 month old male to female transsexual.  The parents 
sought, on Jamie’s behalf (and, it should be noted, did so with the “unequivocal” support 
of the medical practitioners concerned736) orders to allow puberty suppressant hormones 
to be administered to Jamie.  As happened in Re Brodie, an independent child lawyer was 
appointed to Jamie.  The Family Court had previously agreed to the first stage of 
(reversible) hormone treatment on 28 March 2011.  The parents of Jamie were seeking, it 
seems in an effort to avoid future stress and expense,737 authorisation in advance to 
proceed to the second stage of hormone treatment which was not anticipated as necessary 
for some years.  The second stage of hormone treatment was irreversible.  The court 
refused to grant the order authorising irreversible treatment, Dessau J, the presiding 
judge, observing: 
  
“The issue is whether the court can comfortably determine this 10-year-old 
child’s best interests, and therefore approve a particular procedure or 
treatment, irreversible in nature, not due for six years… I simply cannot 
determine in 2011, when Jamie is still only 10, what is likely to be in her best 
interests in 2016 or 2017 when she is aged sixteen.” 
 
The Family Court then went on to assure Jamie and her parents that a quick, and 
inexpensive, judicial resolution could be provided at a later stage:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 Re Brodie, at paras 38-40. 
734 Judgment at para 39. 
735 (Special medical procedure) [2011] Fam CA 248. 
736 Re Jamie, Judgment, at para 5. 
737 Judgment, at para 131. 
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“[I]f… Jamie remains determined to start stage two treatment, and her parents 
continue to understand and support her to be free of pressure to make her own 
decisions, and the treating medical practitioners continue in their view that it 
is in her best interests for the treatment to be administered”.738 
 
While the child in Re Brodie was 13 years old, and was found to possess medical 
decision-making autonomy the child in Re Jamie was only 10 years and 10 months old.  
Capacity was discussed in some detail in Re Jamie: it was said by Jamie’s doctors (and 
endorsed by the court) that, although Jamie was bright and mature for her age, and 
understood many of the ramifications of her disorder: 
 
“clearly Jamie does not [at present] have the level of maturity to be 
responsible for [permanent] decisions of such gravity...” 
 
It is interesting to note the emphasis placed by the Australian Family Court in Re Jamie 
on what appears to be a tripartite decision-making process in respect of child 
transsexuals’ irreversible medical treatment: (i) the child wishes the treatment; (ii) the 
parents understand and support the child and (iii) the medical profession take the view 
that the treatment serves the child’s best interests.  It is quite possible, particularly where 
a child’s capacity to consent is dubious, that this, more recent, Australian approach might 
be followed by a Scottish court in a similar situation. 
 
These Australian judgments concerning transsexual children have sparked debate and 
discussion on an international scale.  Opinions are polarised.  Some commentators view 
the “transgendering of children” as an “increasing” and altogether “harmful cultural 
practice” founded upon societal, discriminatory notions of sex and gender.739  Others 
consider the acceptance and recognition of the status in law of young transsexuals to be 
an issue for social compassion that goes to heart of basic individual rights, personal status 
and capacity.740 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738 Judgment, at paras 125 – 131. 
739 Including, e.g., Professor Sheila Jeffreys in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, 
Australia.  Last year, Professor Jeffreys sent her views, in an open letter, to the Chair of the Australian 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/cedaw_crc_contributions/SheilaJeffreys.pdf  Dr Jeffreys 
goes so far as to criticise the international Endocrine Society for its recommendations of hormonal treatments 
for children and young people to suppress puberty, arguing that “the long term effects of this treatment” are 
unknown on the physiology of young people. Clinical guidelines of the Endocrine Society available at: 
http://www.endo-society.org/guidelines/final/upload/Endocrine-Treatment-of-Transsexual-Persons.pdf.  
740 See, e.g, the Guidance for Creating Policies for Transgendered Children in Recreational Sports by the 
Transgender Law and Policy Institute: http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/trans_children_in_sports.pdf. 
The UK media is beginning to pick up on the rights of transgendered children within the LGBT community as 
a whole, see, e.g: Beadle, P, (2009), ‘Who do you think you are?’, The Guardian, 17 Feb 2009, at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/feb/17/transgenderism-children.  
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There has been little debate in Scotland about child medical capacity and the meaning of 
section 2(4) of the 1991 Act in Scottish law and practice.  The Best Interests ‘versus’ 
Rights debate is a long-standing one in the field of Children’s Rights.  The capacity of 
young transsexuals to consent in law to medical treatment and be formally recognised is, 
it seems, an emerging Children’s Rights issue.741    
 
(ii)  Recognition of the “Young Transsexual” 
 
Publication 8 also generated a research outcome in respect of recognition, concluding that 
there was “no recognition process”742 for transsexuals under 18 years of age in Scots (and 
wider) UK law.  Insofar as failure to recognise, formally, the status of the “acquired 
gender” of young transsexuals is concerned, UK law remains static – even in respect of 
those who may have undergone medical transsesxuality procedures.   
 
At present, section 1(1) of the 2004 Act provides throughout the UK, as it did at the time 
of Publication 8, that any person applying for a “Gender Recognition Certificate” must be 
aged at least 18”, while section 2(1) states that any applicant must, among other things,743 
have “lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with the 
date on which the application is made”.   
 
No reported cases further afield concerning statutory recognition and the young have 
been found, although it is interesting to note that other jurisdictions regulate recognition 
differently.  In Australia, for example, an application can be made on behalf of a 
“child”744 below 18 years of age for statutory recognition of an acquired gender.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Other Children’s Rights issues that similarly affect the LGBT community have begun to be addressed in 
mainstream legal journals, and so it seems likely that greater academic discussion about transsexual young 
people will make its way into multi-disciplinary discourse: see Valetine, S. E, (2008), ‘Traditional Advocacy 
for Non-Traditional Youth: Rethinking Best Interest for the Queer Child’, Mich. St. L. Rev., 1053. 
742 Publication 8, at p 172. 
743 It must also be demonstrated to the Gender Recognition Panel that the applicant “has or has had gender 
dysphoria” in terms of s 2(1)(a).  Gender dysphoria is proved, in terms of s 3 of the 2004 Act, by the inclusion 
in the application of “a report by..” at least one doctor or psychologist specialising in the field of gender 
dysphoria and one other medical report.  The report by the specialist must “include details of the diagnosis of 
the applicant’s gender dysphoria”. 
744 The Gender Reassignment Act 2000 of Western Australia, s 15 outlines the process regulating the grant of 
recognition certificates. Section 15(2) provides that “where an application under section 14 relates to a child, 
the Board may issue a recognition certificate if… (a) one or more of the following applies: (i) the reassignment 
procedure was carried out in the State; (ii) the birth of the child is registered in the State; (iii) the child is a 
resident of the State and has been so resident for not less than 12 months; and (b) the Board is satisfied that it is 
in the best interests of the child that the certificate be issued.”  “Child” is defined in s 3 of the 2000 Act as 
someone under the age of 18.  A child cannot make the application herself: her guardian must do that (s 14).   
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However, this might well give rise to a ‘catch 22’ scenario in Australia, since it seems 
that only a person who has undergone a “reassignment procedure”745 may apply for 
recognition.  It is not clear that hormonal treatment alone, to prevent puberty, necessarily 
falls within the statutory definition of “reassignment procedure”.  Australian courts, it 
seems, have yet to authorise full surgery in respect of any person below the age of 16.  
Thus, the reality for most Australian and Scottish young transsexuals insofar as formal 
legal recognition is concerned may be no different. 
 
It might yet be that the increasing numbers of young transsexuals surfacing in the public 
forum, in the UK and elsewhere, will form the main catalyst for legal discussion and 
reform in the UK about status capacity and rights.746   I believe, in the coming years, we 
can expect to see increasing debate747 about the issues considered in Publication 8.  It is, 
accordingly, hoped that, in terms of making a contribution, ‘Transsexuality and 
“kidulthood”’ remains a useful point of reference within the legal framework existing 
today.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 Gender Reassignment Act 2000 of Western Australia, s 16 provides that “A recognition certificate is 
conclusive evidence that the person to whom it refers – (a) has undergone a reassignment procedure; and (b) is 
of the sex stated in the certificate”. In terms of s 3 of the Act, “reassignment procedure means a medical or 
surgical procedure (or a combination of such procedures) to alter the genitals and other gender characteristics 
of a person, identified by a birth certificate as male or female, so that the person will be identified as a person 
of the opposite sex and includes, in relation to a child, any such procedure (or combination of procedures) to 
correct or eliminate ambiguities in the child’s gender characteristics.” 
746 See, e.g: ‘Children born transsexual have the right to delay puberty’, M Fox, 31 Aug 2011: http://ts-si.org/; 
‘Diary of a Teen Transsexual’, Channel 4: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/ria-diary-of-a-teen-
transsexual; ‘How to deal with a transsexual daughter (by a mother who knows)’, The Independent online, 19 
Nov 2012: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/how-to-deal-with-a-
transexual-teenage-daughter-by-a-mother-who-knows-8329471.html ; ‘I was born this way: Teenage 
Transsexual reveals how Lady Gaga inspired him to have full sex change’, Daily Mail online, 31 Jan 2012: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2094296/Cambell-Kenneford-16-reveals-Lady-Gaga-inspired-sex-
change.html ; ‘School forced to allow transgender pupil (16) to sit exam in a skirt’, Telegraph, 23 July 2012: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/9419577/School-forced-to-allow-transgender-pupil-16-
to-sit-exam-in-a-skirt.html ; NBC News short, ‘Transgendered childhood in America’, 9 July 2012: 
http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/08/12625007-transgender-children-in-america-encounter-
new-crossroads-with-medicine?lite; NHS ‘Gender Identity Development Service for Children’: 
http://www.tavistockandportman.nhs.uk/node/534; ‘Transsexual Child could be sent to Mental Ward’, The 
Local (Germany Edition), 12 Feb 2012, article available at: http://www.thelocal.de/society/20120210-
40647.html#.UMJ7zI7w6SI; ‘Transsexual, 16, forces school to let him sit exam dressed as a girl: Head 
threatened with Equality Act’, Daily Mail, 22 July 2012: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2177404/Transsexual-16-forces-school-let-sit-exam-dressed-girl-Head-threatened-Equality-Act.html; 
‘Transgender girl faces being institutionalised by father who rejects her gender expression’, 31 Jan 2012: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/transgender-german-girl-f_n_1245407.html 
747 See Transsexuality Timeline, in thesis Appendix.  Sensitivity to the evolving rights of the transsexual is an 
issue faced by many jurisdictions, not merely the UK, see Human Rights Watch consideration of the current 
rights, status and capacity issues facing transsexuals, including children, in the Netherlands: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/13/netherlands-transgender-law-violates-rights.  
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4.6.  Concluding Comments  
    
Here, in Chapter 4, area of overlap between the two research strands of my overarching 
research theme has been discussed with reference to ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood.”’   
 
Conceptual Framework: Rights, Status and Capacity - Contribution of Publication 8 
 
Publication 8 was contextualised in Section II of the thesis Introduction with reference to 
a wider body of literature concerned with the evolving capacity of the child to make 
medical decisions and to consent to complex medical or surgical treatment. While 
considerable UK and international literature exists about such matters, there is relatively 
little academic work of a legal nature in Scotland that focuses on the child’s medical 
capacity within a ‘Family law’ forum. 
 
Insofar as themes of rights, status and capacity are concerned, Publication 8 addresses the 
child’s evolving status and capacity to act as an agent, or decision-maker, in his or her 
own life. In particular, the young person’s rights in the context of medical decisions about 
transsexuality are discussed.  
 
Publication 7 is a traditional doctrinal legal research contribution.  Some conclusions 
reached in the publication about the child’s rights, status and capacity are tentative. This 
is because of the absence of judicial determination. It is, accordingly, observed that, in 
questions of capacity, Scots law does not appear to impose a requirement that the child 
make a ‘reasonable’ decision about medical treatment. The, largely untested, s 2(4) of the 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 indicate that a Scottish child need only 
possess the capacity to ‘rationalise’ (not justify) his or her decision. Where discourse 
about the child’s rights, status and capacity are concerned, however, Publication 7 is 
limited as a contribution: it focuses on various factors only believed to shape legal 
perceptions of child capacity in Scots law.  
 
Next, in Chapter 5, the significance, originality and impact (i.e. the overall contribution) 
of my published work is considered. 
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   CHAPTER 5: Overall Contribution 
  
5.1. Aim of Thesis      
  
This thesis is produced in support of my application for an award of PhD by Published 
Works in accordance with the Research Degree Regulations of Edinburgh Napier 
University.   The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate, in terms of the University 
Regulations, that I have made a distinctive contribution in my published work.748 
 
My ongoing research forms a systematic and coherent study, using traditional legal 
research methods, within closely related fields of law.  My overarching research theme is 
concerned with critically evaluating the legal capacity, status and rights of certain groups, 
or categories of individual, in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law.  This theme 
encompasses my research to date concerning: (i) the young, and (ii) disempowered 
adults. 
 
5.2. Bringing Together my Contribution: Rights, Status and Capacity of Distinct 
Categories of Individuals in Underdeveloped and Emerging Areas of Law 
 
In this section, I outline how, when brought together, my publications concerning 
children and disadvantaged adults contribute to evaluating the rights, status and capacity 
of each distinct group in underdeveloped and emerging areas of law. 
  
Rights, Status and Capacity: the Young 
 
“More than any other part of the legal system, child and family law could tell 
a visitor from Mars how our society is organised. In its ideal form… [such 
law] is the expression of our most profound beliefs about how we live our 
lives… At the outset, any discussion [in] this area… asks more questions than 
it answers…”749 
 
Any consideration of the rights, status, and capacity of individuals in Scots law asks more 
questions than it answers.  More than 30 years ago, Freeman observed that society should 
give children rights so that their personal status and dignity – within the family unit and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 Edinburgh Napier University Research Degree Regulations, Reg D15.9. 
749 Sutherland, E.E, (2009), Child and Family Law, 2nd ed., Thomson / W Green, at p 1. 
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beyond – was respected.750 In more recent decades, our appreciation of children’s rights, 
and in particular the right to participate in matters concerning them, has grown apace.751  
Giving the child the opportunity to be heard is seen as critically important because, 
without this, the child may be seen as merely “the object of other people’s disputes or 
concerns” rather than a real human being.752  Positive legal steps intended to make the 
child a more visible participant in various legal processes (including Family Law and 
Education Law) have been taken in Scotland – and are continuing – but there is some 
way to go.753  In other fields, such as Delict, little has been done to see the child as 
anything other than an “object”.   
 
Insofar as legal rights and recognition are concerned, children arguably remain a 
disadvantaged group. It is unfortunate that lawyers, generally, “lack education about 
Childhood Studies.”754 This is almost certainly one reason why, across the spectrum of 
legal processes, certain rigidly applied factors observed in Section II of the thesis 
Introduction (i.e. age and maturity) ‘gate-keep’ the child’s legal participation. Within the 
broad, interdisciplinary conversations ongoing about children and childhood, such 
rigidity has long generated (often well-founded755) criticism of the legal profession.   
 
My own Publications concerning the child’s rights, status and capacity have an in-depth 
but relatively narrow focus. My contribution is doctrinal in nature: traditional ‘black 
letter’ research in which core legal data756 is critically evaluated with reference to 
established legal norms. In other words, my publications are concerned with the law, as it 
has been variously constructed in the fields of Scots Family Law, Education Law and 
Delict.  For the most part, they discuss the law as it is, rather than what it arguably ought 
to be. My publications can, more specifically, be brought together and commented on as 
follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 Freeman M, (1983), Rights and Wrongs of Children, Pinter (London), chapter 1.  
751 James A and Prout A (eds.), (1997), Constructing and reconstructing childhood: Contemporary issues 
in the Sociological Study of Childhood, (2nd ed.), London: Falmer Press. 
752 Baroness Hale, (2006), ‘Children’s Participation in Family Law Decision-Making: Lessons from 
Abroad’, Australian Journal of Family Law, 119 at 124. 
753 See, e.g., the current Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill, recently passed, in the Scottish 
Parliament.  
754 Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, chapter in 
Freeman M (ed), Law and Childhood Studies, Open University Press, p 43. Age and maturity are 
considered by Childhood Studies scholars to be unreliable benchmarks for child development: James A and 
James A, (2012), Key Concepts in Childhood Studies, 2nd ed, Sage Publications, p 1-6. 
755 See, e.g., Henaghan M, (2012), ‘Why judges need to know and understand Childhood Studies’, ibid; 
Bruch CS, (2002), ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children – getting it wrong in child 
custody cases’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 14(4), 381. 
756 See ‘Traditional Legal Research Methods’ Section (III) in thesis Introduction. 
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◦ Children in the Family: Private Family Law Proceedings – Publications 1, 2 and 3 
 
For all its ‘friendly sheen’, 757  Scots Family Law has long been perceived as an 
overwhelmingly adult process: 758  it has as its main child-participation focus the 
articulation and recording of views given by the child with requisite “capacity”. 
Comprehending non-verbal expressions of views by children (and placing a value on 
these expressions) is something that lawyers are not trained to do.  This is to be 
contrasted with other professionals who, instead, focus on using the child’s views “as 
windows on their worlds and to give them insights on how the children experienced 
family life.” 759 However, my publications have inevitably focused on the issues have to 
date been observed and recorded within the existing legal framework and process. Thus, 
reported case law and legal academic discourse is typically concerned with children who 
have some degree of capacity to articulate views – in other words, older children.760   
 
Publications 1, 2 and 3, which critically evaluate the rights, status and capacity of 
children in the context of Family proceedings have contributed to the existing body of 
traditional legal scholarship by providing: (i) an evaluation of the participation rights that 
are incorporated in substantive Scottish legislation and which, through the Scottish 
processes, can be enforced; (ii) a considered analysis of judicial determinations 
concerning the capacity of various “problem” children; (iii) an exploration of the 
procedural law (or ‘machinery’) underpinning the means by which children can express a 
view in the Family court process; (iv) a critical evaluation of the court’s case 
management role in Family law cases involving children, with particular regard to the 
status of the alienated/contact resistant child and the question of non-obtempering and 
compliance orders of court; (v) a critique of the practical, ethical and academic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757 Tisdall and Morrison observe that the perception of Scotland as a “success story” is undermined by other 
trends that “sideline” the child: Tisdall, E.K.M. and Morrison, F. (2012), ‘Children’s Participation in Court 
Proceedings ..’, supra. 
758 This is despite the fact that the welfare of the child is stated to be the court’s “paramount consideration” 
(Children (Scotland ) Act 1995, s 11(7)(a)).  See Smart C, Wade A, and Neale B, (1999), ‘Objects of 
Concern? – Children and Divorce’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 11(4): 365-376. See also Raitt F 
(2007), Hearing Children in Family Law Proceedings: Can Judges Make a Difference?, Child and Family 
Law Quarterly, 204-224, c.f. Kirby P, Lanyon C, Cronin K, and Sinclair R (2003), ‘Building a Culture of 
Participation: Involving children and young people in policy, service planning, delivery and evaluation’ 
(research report), London, Department for Education and Skills. 
759 Cashmore J and Parkinson P, ‘What responsibility do courts have to hear children?’, supra, (2009), p21.  
760 This is something that was identified in Marshall K, (1997), Children’s Rights in the Balance: The 
Protection Participation Debate, Stationary Office Books – see chapters 5 and 6 for a discussion about 
wider, and more effective ways of involving children (including younger children) in legal, and other, 
systems and processes. See, e.g., Stewart v Stewart, 2007 SC451, concerning the “views| of a child of 
around 3 years old (discussed in Publications 1 and 2). 
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difficulties judicially observed in children’s view versus children’s best interests/parental 
rights scenarios. 
 
◦ Children in the Wider Community: Education Law; Delict – Publications 4, 5 and 6 
 
Where children’s interaction with the wider community is concerned, Publication 4 is 
focused on Education Law, and Publications 5 and 6 are focused on the Law of Delict. As 
with my Family Law publications, my contribution to the research in Education Law and 
Delict is traditional legal doctrinal research. Education Law is observed, in particular, to 
be an area of law in which the certain of the child’s rights have recently emerged in 
domestic statute. Delict is an underdeveloped field in Scots law, certainly insofar as the 
child and his or her rights are concerned. Accordingly, I critically analyse the child’s 
legal status as a rights-bearer in terms of how the UNCRC is expressed and implemented 
in Scottish statute (Publication 4), and explore the status and capacity of the child within 
the Law of Delict (Publications 5 and 6). 
 
Specifically, Publications 4, 5 and 6 form a contribution to literature on the themes of 
rights, status and capacity by doing the following: (i) providing a critique of the child’s 
educational rights (in particular the ‘right to education’) as constructed in substantive 
Scottish primary legislation; (ii) outlining and evaluating the procedural law governing 
applications made to Scottish courts by, or on behalf of, children, depending on their 
status in domestic statute, in respect of educational rights; (iii) a critique of the extent to 
which Scots Educational Law implements key UNCRC rights; (iv) an exploration of the 
duties owed by the state towards children in a school environs; (v) an analysis of the 
appropriate standard of care owed to the child while in or around school; (vi) providing a 
systematic analysis of capacity for contributory negligence in the young; (vii) critically 
evaluating the resistance within the Law of Delict to consider childhood as a homogenous 
status, instead of categorising them with other disability groups. 
 
◦ Children and Complex Medical Treatment: Transsexuality – Publication 8 
 
In Publication 8, the capacity of the child to consent to complex medical treatments, such 
as surgery for gender-reassignment, is discussed with reference to case law and statute.  
The transsexual child is considered to be a distinct category of individual within an 
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underdeveloped area of law: legal recognition of acquired status is considered within the 
context of a discussion about medical treatment for transsexuality.  
 
More specifically, Publication 8 forms a contribution to literature about rights, status and 
capacity in which: (i) the child’s developing status and capacity to act as an autonomous 
decision-maker is analysed; (ii) a systematic exposition is provided of the legal capacity 
of children to consent to medical treatments and procedures, as framed in s 2(4) of the 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991; (iii) a range of possible interpretations and 
applications of the statutory provisions are posited; (iv) the statutory anomalies that 
undermine the transsexual child or young person in achieving legal recognition and rights 
in his or her acquired gender are considered. In Chapter 4, above, Publication 8 is 
observed as having limited value as a contribution because of the tentative nature of the 
conclusions reached about children’s capacity and status in Scots law.  
 
The second strand of my research theme is considered below. 
 
Rights, Status and Capacity: Disadvantaged Adults 
 
In Publication 7, I observed that certain transsexuals remain, notwithstanding the coming 
into force of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, trapped in a “no [wo]man’s” land.761 In 
some regards,762 this remains the position today.  Transsexuals, therefore, continue as a 
category of individuals for whom the law is both underdeveloped and emerging. While 
the notion of the transsexual as a being “in legal exile”763 is perhaps overstated in 
contemporary law, the transsexual remains, in some regards, a legal refugee. This is 
because, even in a human rights’ orientated culture: 
 
“Every society exerts close controls over the transfers of persons from one 
status to another”764 
 
And, for such individuals, questions surrounding legal rights, status and capacity assume 
great importance. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 Publication 7, at p 186.  
762 See longer discussion in Chapter 3.4; 3.5. 
763 S S M Edwards, (1996/ 2001), Sex and Gender in the Legal Process, Blackstone Press, p 8. 
764 Ibid. 
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◦ Underdeveloped and Emerging Area of Law: Transsexuals – Publication 7 
 
Publication 7 is concerned with what was termed the “relatively recent emergence of 
transsexuality into the public forum”.765 The Publication represents my contribution, from 
a Scottish doctrinal legal research perspective, to a phenomenon that has generated a 
diverse legal response worldwide.  The development of rights and recognition for the 
transsexual in law is observed to be heavily influenced by social perceptions of the 
transsexual, which are, in turn, connected to the dominant medical theories concerning 
transsexuality. Difficulties surrounding legal recognition by the transsexual of his or her 
new status in an acquired gender are discussed and the transsexual’s capacity to enter 
into legally recognised adult relationships is explored. Here it must be acknowledged that 
this remains an underdeveloped area of law: there has been little case law and new 
statutory provision for same-sex marriage will lead to amendments in the law concerning 
transsexuals.766 
 
Although Publication 7 provides a comparative legal analysis, the publication is also 
intended to form a contribution that is accessible to the interdisciplinary community. 
Specifically, where rights, status and capacity are concerned, the publication: (i) critically 
evaluates the impact of medical terminology, diagnoses and research upon evolving law 
governing recognition of transsexuality; (ii) discusses the impact of social factors upon 
the law and engages in comparative judicial analysis; (iii) provides a critique of the (then) 
recently in force Gender Recognition Act 2004, both in England and Scotland with 
reference to case law in the UK and elsewhere; (iv) analyses human rights issues 
affecting transsexuals and predicts future issues relating to rights within the realm of 
treatment and self-determination; (v) provides a considered analysis of those excluded 
from the terms of the 2004 Act and posits whether such individuals may acquire the 
status they desire through other means. Accordingly, as a contribution to the literature 
Publication 7 seeks to comprehensively address a range of questions about rights, status 
and capacity concerning the transsexual. 
 
In this Section, my publications have been brought together and their contribution to the 
thesis overarching conceptual themes of individual rights, status and capacity critically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 Publication 7, at p 162. 
766 The current Marriage and Civil Partnership bill, recently passed, Stage 3 debate: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/64983.aspx. 
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5.3. The Overall Contribution of my Published Work  
 
In Part 1 of this thesis, my published work has been critically appraised and set within its 
wider and thematic legal framework.  In other words, I have provided a reflective 
commentary in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of my publication premises and aims, and research 
outcomes.   
 
Insofar as the overall contribution is concerned, my publications have targeted particular 
questions of significance and complexity.  Affording individuals parity of rights, status 
and capacity is a predominant feature of any just and compassionate society.  The recent, 
and wide-ranging, Equality Act 2010 demonstrates that the process of ensuring adequate 
measures are in place to protect against unfair treatment at home, at work and in wider 
society is far from complete. 
 
Accordingly, taken together as a whole, my publications form a distinctive contribution 
in respect of important, and pressing, issues arising in contemporary life.  A more specific 
commentary about the contributions made by my published work is provided below: 
 
Publications 1, 2 and 3: Overall Contribution  
 
Publications 1, 2 and 3 (‘A child is, after all, a child’, ‘Moral actors in their own right’ 
and ‘Re A-H (Children)’) were all written in 2008/9 with the aim of promoting 
knowledge exchange that would generate “identifiable benefits”767 to family lawyers, 
academics and, I hope, wider society.  Each of these publications was concerned with an 
underdeveloped, or emerging, area of Scots, and wider-UK, law that had not yet been the 
subject of comprehensive analysis.768    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767 Edinburgh Napier University, “Research, Knowledge Transfer and Commercialisation Strategy 2009-15”, 
available at: http://www.napier.ac.uk/randkt/documents/rktc_strategy.pdf.  
768 Some practitioner publications had already addressed unyielding contact disputes and parental alienation, in 
England, around the time of Publications 1,2  and 3 but, as explained in Chapter 1, none had done so in depth.. 
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Since 2008/9, the broad areas that were the focus of Publications 1, 2 and 3 have been 
canvased, almost exclusively, in shorter publications written by the practitioner 
community in the UK.769 In terms of diagnosing, classifying and contextualising wide-
ranging legal difficulties affecting the young in family proceedings, I believe my 
publications were (and remain) significant and original contributions.770   
 
Insofar as impact is concerned, in 2009, my publications were used by the Faculty of 
Advocates (the Scottish Bar) in a lecture given to the Attorneys and Judges of the Bronx 
Family Court in New York City.771  Publications 1 and 2 have been cited as authorities by 
prominent academics, a recent citation being in March 2012.772  These publications also 
feature on the reading lists of Scottish Universities teaching undergraduate and 
postgraduate legal studies.773  My published work concerning the rights, status and 
capacity of the young in their home environs has been, and is being, critiqued and used 
by others in both the academic and the wider professional community.   
 
Publications 4, 5 and 6: Overall Contribution 
 
Publications 4, 5 and 6 (‘The Child’s Right to Education, ‘Contributory Negligence and 
the Child’ and ‘Trips, Slips and Bangs: the Teacher’s Duty of Care’) are concerned with 
the rights, status and capacity of the young in education and the wider community.  
 
Insofar as impact is concerned, the text of which my chapter (’The Child’s Right to 
Education’)  belongs, Children’s Rights in Scotland, is cited as a leading authority on its 
subject-matter: successive editions have, for example, been routinely referred to by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 Interestingly, much more has been written about children and their general participation in family 
proceedings concerning them in other jurisdictions. See, e.g, Ryrstedt E, (2012), ‘Mediation Regarding 
Children: Is the Result Always in the Best Interests of the Child? A View from Sweden’, Int J Law Policy 
Family 26 (2): 220; Morag T, (2012), ‘Child Participation in the Family Courts, Lessons from the Israeli Pilot 
Project’, Int J Law Policy Family 26 (1): 1; Birnbaum R, (2011), “Children's Experiences with Family Justice 
Professionals in Ontario and Ohio”, Int J Law Policy Family 25 (3): 398; D Smith, (2011), ‘Fought all the 
way’, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (‘JLSS’), 56(2), 44; Morris G,(2009), ‘Family: Children’s 
Voices’, 159 NLJ 1721; Shaw M and Bazley J, (2011), ‘Effective strategies in high conflict contact disputes’, 
Fam. Law, 41(10), 1129-1137. 
770 Articles 1 and 2, which were submitted to the REF ‘dry run’ and assessed by leading Scottish academic 
Kenneth McK Norrie were assessed by him (jointly) as a 3 star contributions, being “an important point of 
reference in [their] field.” 
771 Faculty of Advocates, information available on request. 
772 Freeman M (ed.), (2012), Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues, Vol 14, 978-0-19-965250-1, 
published 8 March 2012, Oxford University Press, reference in discussions about the contemporary position in 
Scots law at p 160. 
773 See, e.g, Edinburgh University reading list for Family Law (handouts), available at: 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/courses/viewcourse.aspx?ref=82.  
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Scottish Government and other policy-making bodies in their studies concerning children 
across a wide range of legal issues.774 
 
In reviewing the book for the Journal of the Law Society, Rachael Kelsey, solicitor and 
Fellow of the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, commented that 
‘Education Law’ had been “handled in typically lucid style by… Lesley-Anne Barnes”.775  
In her review for the Edinburgh Law Review, Dr Jane Mair of the University of Glasgow 
wrote: “Lesley-Anne Barnes' discussion of a child's right to education, show[s] a very 
complex and fragmented framework of regulation. One of the strengths of the book is that 
the contributors succeed in illuminating these areas even where, as in education, there is 
“a general dearth of case law”.776  Also, following the publication of my chapter on 
Education Law (and connected publications), I began research towards the W Green 
textbook, ‘Children and Delict’ (anticipated publication date: 2017/8).777  It is hoped that 
‘Children and Delict’ will be an authority on its subject in Scotland and that it will be the 
first comprehensive text in this field for UK academics and professionals. 
 
Publications 5 and 6 have been, and are being, reviewed, assessed and used by others.  
Following their publication in the Juridical Review in 2009 and 2010, I have been asked 
more frequently by academics and practitioners worldwide to comment on issues 
concerning the personal liability and self-determination of the young.  In 2010, I 
produced the materials for a Certificated Course in Education Law for teachers and other 
education professionals for the commercial training organisation, Central Law 
Training.778  In late 2011, I contributed a commentary, on request, on the landmark 
decision of the South African Constitutional Court, Le Roux v Dey779 (discussed in 
Chapter 2) for a colloquium held at Stellenbosch University.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 A Google search will bring up international and domestic citations. For citation by the Scottish Government 
in particular, see: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/07142042/8 and 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/09/14905/6742.  See also, e.g., ‘Critical Perspectives on 
Safeguarding Children’, Broadhurst K et al, (2009), J Wiley & Sons; ‘Supporting Children’s Rights and 
Entitlements in Higher Education’, Scottish Further Education Unit, 2005, Policy Report. 
775 J.L.S.S. 2010, 55(5), 53. 
776 Edin.L.R. 2011, 15(1), 153-154.   
777 A Google search will bring up international and domestic citations. For citation by the Scottish Government 
in particular, see: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/07142042/8 and 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/09/14905/6742  
777 Link to forthcoming book: http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Children-Delictual-Liability-Lesley-Anne-
Barnes-Macfarlane/9780414018990.      
778 Materials ‘Education law in Scotland’, available on request. 
779  ([2011] ZACC 4).  
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Publication 7: Overall Contribution 
 
Publication 7 (‘Gender Identity and the Law’) was concerned with the gamut of evolving 
transsexual rights and capacity and it was a matter upon which few legal commentators 
had written comprehensively within the UK or elsewhere – and this remains the case 
today.  To date, academic and practitioner legal publications in the UK can be divided 
into two, broad, categories.   
 
The first category comprises publications that have focused on transsexuality only insofar 
as gender reassignment impacts upon a particular field of (or issue in) law.  These 
publications have addressed, for example, issues affecting the transsexual arising within 
the realms of employment, pensions, conveyancing, sport, and domestic abuse.780  Insofar 
as the UK is concerned, almost all of these publications are in a short case or legislation 
comment format. 781   One substantial, peer-reviewed English publication recently 
addressed the issue of disclosure by transsexuals of their “gender history” before entering 
into a marriage.  That article considered in some depth whether such a requirement is 
discriminatory: the publication was, however, solely concerned with that topic.782 
 
The second category of academic and practitioner legal publications in the UK that 
address transsexuality is concerned with publications that, often tangentially, touch upon 
the transsexual within a general consideration of a range of wider issues discussed.  So, 
for example, these publications might discuss a diverse range of LGBT issues783 or even 
have as their focus topics as diverse as writing wills or football hooliganism.784 Latterly, 
publications concerning same-sex marriage have considered, as an aside, issues that 
might also affect transsexuals.  An example of this is Annex D in the documentation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780 See: “Employment and discrimination: denial of state pension payments to male to female transsexual at 
60”, editorial case comment, EHRLR, 2005, 5, 545-547; Cousins M, JSSL, (2006),  “Timbrell v SOS for Work 
and Pensions: retirement pension – discrimination”, 13(4), D112-113; Kenny P, Conv, (2005), “Conveyancer’s 
Handbook”, Jan/Feb, 1-6 (transsexuality not principal focus of publication); Charlish P, ISLR, (2005), “Gender 
Recognition Act 2004: transsexuals in sport – a level playing field?”, 2 (May), 38 -42; Dempsey B, (2010), 
“Trans-people’s experience of domestic abuse”, SCOLAG (Oct) 208-212. 
781 The contributions listed at note 780 above are between 2 and 4 pages in length. 
782 Transgender marriage and the legal obligation to disclose gender history, Sharpe A, M.L.R. 2012, 75(1), 33-
53. 
783 See, e.g., K McK Norrie, (2012), “Religion and same-sex unions: the Scottish Government's consultation on 
registration of civil partnerships and same-sex marriage”, Edin. L.R, 16(1), 95; Dwyer, A,  (2011), "It's not like 
we're going to jump them": how transgressing heteronormativity shapes police interactions with LGBT young 
people”, Youth Justice, 11(3), 203-220; Ashcroft, R.E, (2010),“Could human rights supersede bioethics?”, 
HRL Rev, 10(4), 639-660. 
784 See: Atkinson H, (2010), “Will drafting pitfalls”, PCB, 1, 59-67 (transsexuality not principal focus of 
publication); Christie S, (2011),“The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Bill - strong on rhetoric but weak on substance? Legislative comment”, SLT, 25, 185-189.   
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supporting the recently passed Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) bill which 
addresses the existing requirement that married transsexuals must divorce before they can 
be issued with a full Gender Recognition Certificate.785 
 
On an international level, more has been written about the transsexual’s emerging and 
comprehensive range of evolving rights in recent years, although many of these 
publications also address a broad range of LGBT issues.786  However, I believe that 
Publication 7 remains a publication forming a contribution to legal literature on its 
subject-matter in the UK. 
 
Publication 7 has also had cross-jurisdictional impact, and this can be seen through its 
citation across other legal systems.787  Publication 7 has also been cited as an authority by 
various national and international organisations across a wide range of disciplines, 
including SCOLAG, Deepdyve, Bioscience Encyclopaedia, Linsert.Org, American 
research bodies and Universities worldwide.788  (Insofar as indications of broader social 
impact are concerned, ‘Gender Identity and the Law’ is also now – somewhat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 The Bill itself is published on the Scottish Government website at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/12/9433/downloads.  Supporting documentation (including 
consultation questions on the Bill) can be found here: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00410328.pdf. In its present form, the Bill does not include 
provisions about transsexuals’ existing marriages.  Annex D to the 2012 Bill, at page 53, the Scottish 
Government proposes that the “requirement [that transsexuals] divorce before obtaining a full ‘GRC’ even 
where the married couple wish to stay together will be removed”.  The Scottish Government has undertaken to 
consider these proposals with the UK Government because the 2004 Act extends to the whole of the UK. 
786 See, e.g., Rosenfeld M, (2012),“Introduction: gender, sexual orientation, and equal citizenship”, I.J.C.L, 
10(2), 340-354; Cornides J, (2012), “Three case studies on anti-discrimination”, EJIL, 23(2), 517.  Issues 
concerning the transsexual continue to be addressed on the international forum in conjunction with other LGBT 
groups, see, e.g.: Gupta K, (2012), “The global decriminalization of homosexuality” (focus of article Jamaica), 
CL & J 2012, 176(43), 614; Barker N, (2011), “Ambiguous symbolisms: recognising customary marriage and 
same-sex marriage in South Africa”, Int. J.L.C. 7(4), 447. See also: Fishbayn, L, (2006), “Not Quite One 
Gender or the Other: Marriage Law and the Containment of Gender Trouble in the United Kingdom”; 
Fishbayn, L, 15 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 413, published around the time of Publication 7 by an 
American researcher at the Hadassah-Brandeis Institute, a Jewish sponsored University in Massachusetts, also 
having as its principal focus women’s studies rather than law.  
787 See: Knott G, (2009), “Transsexual Law Unconstitutional: German Federal Constitutional Court Demands 
Reformation of Law Because of Fundamental Rights Conflict”, University of Connecticut Foundation, Saint 
Louis University Law Journal. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433019, discussing from the 
perspective of an American Research foundation the decision of “Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court” in 
holding “the country's Transsexual Law unconstitutional.” 
788 For organisations see, e.g: SCOLAG: www.scolag.org/system/files/2010_SCOLAG_208-212.pdf; 
Deepdyve (resource); http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/edinburgh-university-press/gender-identity-and-scottish-
law-the-legal-response-to-transsexuality-la7iJEJLYG;  Biosceince Encyclopaedia: 
http://www.bioscience.ws/encyclopedia/index.php?title=Sir_Ewan_Forbes,_11th_Baronet; Linsert.Org: 
http://www.linsert.org/Resources/Bibliographies/non-fiction.htm; Saint Louis University School of Law: 
slu.edu/Documents/law/Law%20Journal/Archives/Knott_Article.pdf. 
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surprisingly – cited as an authority on the life of the colourful Scottish peer and ‘trans-
personality’, Ewan Forbes-Sempill by Wikipedia !789)    
 
Following the publication of ‘Gender Identity and the Law’, I have been contacted by 
various campaign groups and other organisations to contribute to seminars and 
conferences on multi-disciplinary legal issues concerning transsexuality. 790  This has 
been encouraging from a knowledge exchange perspective.   
 
Publication 8: Overall Contribution 
 
In assessing overall impact, and lasting contribution, the strengths and weakness of 
‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ are considered.   
 
I think that the greatest weakness of Publication 8 is that it presents, as a static research 
outcome, conclusions that are representative of a step in an ongoing research process of 
absorbing the legalities surrounding transsexuality.  However, the publication content 
was topical and it clearly outlined key areas of the law and provided some detailed 
analysis for Scottish practitioners.  Further, some of the issues raised, and observations 
made, in the publication about statute and case law had not been addressed before (or 
since) in a Scottish legal journal and so have some enduring use.   
 
Perhaps the greatest strength of ‘Transsexuality and “kidulthood”’ is that it helps to 
illustrate the beginnings of story of my research journey and the inception of my 
overarching research theme.  The law concerning young transsexuals is certainly 
something that I would like to revisit, in a more substantial publication, at some point in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Ewan_Forbes,_11th_Baronet (English pages) and 
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ewan_Forbes (German pages).  The reference is also used on the Swiss pages: 
http://www.swisscorner.com/wiki.php?title=Ewan_Forbes,_11th_Baronet, and on Spoken Web: 
http://www.spoken-web.com/read_article_wiki.cgi?bbeyal=bbeyal&key=Sir_Ewan_Forbes,_11th_Baronet.  
790 Email communications etc can be produced to verify this: for example, on 16 May 2012, the Scottish 
Transgender Alliance invited me to speak at an event.  
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5.4. Concluding comments: Limitations of my Published Work and Future Research 
 
My research and research outcomes are supported by the review and analysis of primary 
and secondary sources of law, legal policy documents and other materials arising from 
the practice of law.  This is the conventional legal research methods approach.  As with 
all research, however, certain limitations can be observed in my published work.   Some 
of these have been discussed in my thesis Introduction under the heading “(III) My 
Research Method: traditional legal research (benefits and disadvantages)”. 
  
Further, reflections have already been made in this thesis about research limitations in 
respect of individual publications.  For example, it was observed in Chapters 1 and 2 that 
outstanding questions remain in respect of various aspects of Child Law, Education Law 
and Delict concerning the young: this is because there is insufficient material available in 
contemporary law and practice to enable these questions to be fully addressed.  In 
Chapter 3, the difficulties involved in considering, in depth, broad research questions, 
wide-ranging materials and complex terminology spanning a range of disciplines was 
acknowledged.  In Chapter 4, in my Lessons Learned section, I observed weaknesses in 
my own general research approach, as a young academic, to the field(s) of law researched 
and indicated how greater research experience would have produced different research 
outcomes.  Notwithstanding these limitations, I believe my published work as a whole 
forms a valid contribution to legal scholarship and the practice of law. 
 
In respect of future research, I intend to revisit each area of law addressed by the 
publications considered in due course.   
 
Insofar as contemporary issues concerning the rights of the young are concerned, I will 
consider in more depth the research outcomes of Publication 5 (‘Trips, Slips and Bangs: 
the Teacher’s Duty of Care’) with the intention of considering the educator standard(s) of 
care believed applicable in contemporary law to further and higher education, as well as 
to school education.  I also intend to develop my research into the rights (and voice) of 
disabled children, young people and adults both in private life and as they progress from a 
school education to higher or further education and, thereafter, into the workplace.   
 
Gender and sexuality are ongoing themes of research interest.  In writing this reflective 
commentary, I identified a number of areas (including, e.g., treatment and self-
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determination) in which my critique of Scots, and wider UK, law remains the only 
comprehensive legal commentary available. I also discovered some recent developments 
that merit further consideration (for example, the rights of the child transsexual and 
transsexuality and gendered issues arising in the workplace).  I had planned to revisit this 
broad field in a few years’ time to provide a comprehensive update, but 2014 may be an 
ideal time to begin work on a new, reflective publication targeting topical issues.  In 
terms of personal impact, this critical reflection of my published work has therefore been 
a particularly beneficial exercise.   
 
  










TRANSSEXUALITY TIMELINE: Developments in Medicine, 
Society and Law 
 
 
(Strand 2 Disempowered Adults: Contextualising Publications 7 & 8) 
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TRANSSEXUALITY TIMELINE:  
Developments in Medicine, Society and Law 
 
 
1909: Magnus Hirschfeld, the German sexologist, researches and publishes 
on the transsexual condition 
 
1913: Horton v Mead (UK): 
Man convicted of “solicitation” in public lavatory, court refers to 
“this class of men” in finding guilt  
 
1945:  Re Leber (Swiss decision): 
  Newly acquired “gender” of transsexual recognised 
 
1949: Mainstream medical community in Europe/America begin to adopt 
transsexuality as a “syndrome” deserving research, compassion and 
“cure” 
  
1957: X, Petitioner (UK, Scotland): 
Transsexual fails to prove that she should have her birth certificate 
altered to reflect her acquired sex/gender (medical sex determination) 
 
1967: Forbes-Sempill case (Court of Session) 
Scottish court “corrects” birth certificate of likely transsexual, finding 
that he is, instead, a “hermaphrodite” (medical sex determination) 
 
1971:   Corbett v Corbett (UK): 
Emergence of the public transsexual in UK civil law: medical 
determination of “true sex” means no legal recognition of status 
since the transsexual is only a “pastiche” of femininity 
 
1976:  MT v JT (New Jersey): 
Recognition of transsexual’s status “in no way disserving any social 
interest, principle of public order or precept of morality” 
 
1991:  Cossey v UK (ECHR): 
Transsexual unsuccessful in attempt to find the UK in breach of her 
human rights but ECHR refers to “ever-growing awareness of the 
essential importance of everyone's identity” 
 
1990s: Medical researchers publish increasingly about a possible “sex 
difference” in the transsexual human brain… 
 
1995: Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court (New Zealand): 
 “Relief and recognition” provided by court to transsexuals who wish 
to marry 
 
1999: R v North West Lancashire HA Ex parte A, D and G (UK): 
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2002:  Goodwin v UK (ECHR):   
UK failure to recognise “acquired status” of transsexual is, in found 
contemporary law and society, to breach of Article 8 and 12  
 
2002/3: Bellinger v Bellinger (UK): 
UK failure to recognise transsexual’s “right to marry” incompatible 
with Convention Rights 
   
2004:  Re Alex (Family Court, Australia): 
Authority granted for 13 year old transsexual to begin gender 
assignment hormone treatment 
 
2004:  Gender Recognition Act 2004 passed (in force 2005): 
Gender Recognition Certificate = recognition in acquired status for 
“all purposes” 
 
2006/7: Publications 7 and 8 produced 
 
 
2008:  Re Brodie (Family Court, Austria): 
Hormonal treatment to suppress puberty authorised for 12 year old 
transsexual 
 
2009:   Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 passed (key sections in force): 
  “surgically constructed” penis / vagina constitute genitalia in law  
 
2010:  Equality Act 2010 passed and (mostly) comes into force: 
  Gender reassignment is a “protected characteristic” 
 
2010:  18 entries on the Gender Recognition Register in Scotland 
 
2011:   Re: Jamie (Family Court, Australia): 
10 year, 10 months old transsexual too young to make significant 
decisions about puberty and beyond 
 
2011:  R (AC) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust (UK): 
Gender reassignment treatments can be categorized as “low priority” 
as long as individual cases considered  
 
2011: UK Government launches “first ever transgender action plan to 
advance gender equality” 
 
2011: “Transsexual differences caught on brain scan” by medical 
researchers 
 
2011: 24 entries in the Gender Recognition Register in Scotland 
 
2012: Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill (December) 
published (bill passed on 4 Feb 2014) 
 
2012:  Scottish Government evaluating data relating to aggravated crimes 
committed against transsexuals: it is hoped policy steps will follow  
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